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Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is currently employed for a variety of appli-
cations such as RFID-based wireless payment, healthcare, homeland security, asset management,
etc. Due to newer privacy requirements and increasingly secure applications, typical RFID tags
are required to expand security features such as data encryption and safe transactions. However,
RFID tags have extremely strict low-power consumption requirements. Thus, reduced power con-
sumption and secure data transactions are two main problems for the next generation RFID tags.
This dissertation presents an architectural approach to address these two main problems.
This dissertation provides a multi-domain solution to improve the power consumption and
security, while also reducing design time and verification time of the system. In particular, I
describe (1) a smart buffering technique to allow a tag to remain in a standby mode until addressed,
(2) a multi-layer, low-power technique that transcends the passive-transaction, physical, and data
layers to provide secure transactions, (3) an FPGA-based traffic profiler system to generate traces
of RFID communications for both tag verification and power analysis without the need of actual
hardware, and (4) a design automation technique to create physical layer encoding and decoding
blocks in hardware suitable for RFID tags.
This dissertation presents four contributions: (1) as a result, based on a Markov Process en-
ergy model, the smart buffering technique is shown to reduce power consumption by 85% over a
traditional active tag; (2) the multi-layer, low-power security technique provides protection against
malicious reader attacks to disable the tag, to steal the information stored in or communicated to the
device. The power consumption overhead for implementing these layers of security is increased
iii
approximately 13% over the basic tag controller; (3) in addition, the FPGA-based traffic profiler
system has been able to generate traces for ISO 18000 part 6C (EPC Gen2) protocol; and (4) the
designs of encoding/decoding blocks are generated automatically by the Physical Layer Synthesis
tool for five protocols used in or related to RFID. Consequently, any power consumption of five
designs is less than 5 µW. Furthermore, compared with five designs implemented by hand, the
difference of the power consumption between two of them is less than 7% at most.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology is an automatic identification technology that
uses radio waves carrying energy or data between interrogators or unidentified tags/objects. An
RFID system contains two main components: interrogators and RFID tags. Active and passive
are two dominant types of RFID tags shown in Figure 1. A passive RFID tag is also known as
a passive transponder including a transponder antenna, RF interface, logic circuitry and memory
shown in Figure 1(a) [1, 2]. It does not have an internal power supply for the logic circuitry and
memory. The energy powering the entire passive tag is provided by an interrogator. Therefore,
the restriction of the power supply limits the transmission range of a passive RFID tag and the
complexity of the tag operation.
Unlike a passive RFID tag, an active RFID tag has an internal power supply, usually a battery.
In general, a traditional active RFID tag is composed of an RF transceiver, a processor-based
controller, and an on-board battery as shown in Figure 1(b). Since an active RFID tag is powered
by an internal power supply, it supports more complex tag operations and transmit responded
signals with a long distance (around 300 feet). However, the tag’s life relies on the battery life.
Therefore, the low power consumption is a main issue for the user to design and develop active
RFID systems.
Active RFID technology confronts several problems in energy dissipation, security, system ver-
ification, and design cost. Section 1.1 addresses the motivation of four problems. First of all, the
waste of power dissipation is discovered in a traditional active RFID tag. If the power dissipation
can be reduced, a battery life can be extended or an active tag can perform advanced operations,
such as advanced security operations, without diminishing the battery life. More detailed power
dissipation is described in Section 1.1.1.
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(a) Passive RFID tag. (b) Active RFID tag.
Figure 1: An architectural overview of RFID tags.
The second problem is the need of low-power security features. Traditional RFID tags provide
security features by activating their processor-based controller with increasing power consumption.
Thus, this is a fundamental trade-off situation: the need for stronger security features is increas-
ing complexity and energy consumption of RFID tags. However, RFID systems require security
features to be implemented using techniques that provide a high degree of protection while not
significantly increasing the complexity of the system as complexity can increase power consump-
tion and implementation cost. Thus, it is important to develop new security techniques that take
advantage of the fundamental properties of RFID communication such as physical layer proto-
cols, low-power communication extensions, sleep modes, physical implementation variations, etc.
More detailed information is described in Section 1.1.2.
Thirdly, RFID technology requires a verification scheme for the network traffic of RFID sys-
tems. A computer network debugging tool, tcpdump as an example, allows the user to intercept
TCP/IP packets and display them. Upon the collected packet information, the user is able to verify
and analyze the network properties, monitoring the traffic, and even providing a protection to the
network. However, there is no tool like tcpdump in RFID systems, which provides detailed net-
work traffic of RFID communications from the system level perspective. This concept is described
in Section 1.1.3.
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The fourth problem of RFID technology is the increasing design cost for designing and imple-
menting a variety of RFID systems. In order to meet the requirements for different RFID speci-
fications and support extensive RFID applications, multiple standards exist. In most application,
RFID tag and reader hardware software must be specifically designed for each applications. This
keeps overall design time long and the system costs high. Section 1.1.4 presents the impacts of the
design automation technology on RFID systems.
This dissertation provides a multi-domain solution to improve the power consumption and
security, while also reducing design time and verification time of RFID systems. In particular, this
dissertation describes:
1. Smart buffering technique to allow a tag to remain in a standby mode until addressed. This is
the solution for reducing power consumption of active RFID tags.
2. A multi-layer, low-power technique that transcends the passive-transaction, physical, and data
layers to provide secure transactions. This technique provides high degree protection for active
RFID tags with minimum power consumption.
3. An FPGA-based traffic profiler system to generate traces of RFID communications for both
tag verification and power analysis without the need for actual hardware. This technique is a
system-level verification platform for RFID systems.
4. A design automation technique to create physical layer encoding and decoding blocks in hard-
ware suitable for RFID tags. This technique is a solution for reducing design cost and time.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents the motivation of
each contribution including problem statement in more detail. Section 1.2 presents the disserta-
tion statement including a concise statement of the contributions of this work. The impact of the
contributions is described in Section 1.3. The outline of the dissertation is listed in Section 1.4.
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1.1 MOTIVATION
1.1.1 The Energy Dissipation of Active RFID Systems
A transceiver and a processor-based controller are two dominating components of a traditional ac-
tive RFID tag shown in Figure 1(b). Two significant sources of power dissipation can be observed
during the operation of active RFID tags, in terms of the power consumption of the transceiver and
of the processor-based controller. One of the significant sources of power consumption is the need
to energize the transceiver all the time in order to receive any incoming signal. Since the RFID in-
terrogator dominates the communication, every communication will be initiated by the reader. The
energy consumed by a receiver (Er) is proportional to the time (Tr)when the receiver is energized,
if the power consumption of the receiver (Pr) is constant, shown in Eq. (1.1). The key to reducing
the energy consumed in the receiver (Er) is to compress Tr.
Er = E
s
r + E
a
r (1.1)
= P sr · T sr + P ar · T ar
K = T sr + T
a
r
Ec = E
s
c + E
a
c (1.2)
= P sc · T sc + P ac · T ac
= P sc · T sc + P ac · (Tsc ·Nc)
K = T sc + T
a
c
The other significant portion of power dissipation derives from the processor-based microcon-
troller. A microcontroller needs 2.2 to 8 mA to stay in the active mode and ONLY needs 1 to
15 µA to stay in the sleep mode. However, in RFID systems, the microcontroller of an active tag
is awakened by those incoming commands which are intended for other tags.
Broadcasting is the only communication method between RFID readers and tags. However,
RFID technology uses not only one-to-all RFID commands but also point-to-point commands
4
specified in ISO 18000 Part 7 [3] and ANSI 256 [4] active RFID standards. Collection or
Collection with Data in ISO 18000 Part 7 are two common one-to-all commands. An
RFID reader broadcasts this type of commands to all RFID tags and they wake up and respond
associated information back to the reader.
For point-to-point commands such as Sleep or User ID from ISO 18000-7, the RFID
reader broadcasts a point-to-point command to all RFID tags even though it attempts to access
only one tag. All tags wake up and process the incoming command. However, only one of tags
needs to respond with the associated information while the rest of the tags ignore the incoming
command. For those tags ignoring the incoming command, on-tag controllers dissipate energy for
receiving and dropping commands which could be avoided.
Eq. (1.2) shows the energy consumed by a processor-based controller for an active RFID tag.
The total energy dissipated is the summation of Esc and E
a
c . E
s
c presents the energy consumed dur-
ing the controller in the sleep/standby mode, which can achieved by the power consumption (P sc )
times the duration (T sC). And E
a
c = P
a
c × T ac presents the energy consumed by a controller when
it is activated, where P ac illustrates the power consumption when a controller is in the activation
mode and T ac indicates the duration when a controller processing commands. The time variable,
T ac , is determined by the number of processed commands (Nc) and the time of processing a single
command (Tsc).
The total energy consumed by a processor-based controller (Ec) is proportional to the number
of commands (Nc) processed in it shown in Eq. (1.2). Based on the point-to-point communication
model, Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the reduction of the processed commands (Nc) on the
energy consumed by a microcontroller in an active RFID tag. The solid line shows the energy con-
sumed for one active tag when the number of total tags in valid communication range is increased
to 20 tags.
The dashed line and the dotted line in Figure 2 represent the idea that assumes the number of
commands (Nc) processed in a tag is reduced by 50% and 75% perspectively. The dashed line
predicts the result of energy dissipation when the number of processed commands is reduced by
50%. Furthermore, the dotted line indicates the energy saving result when Nc is reduced by 75%.
Based on general assumption, these preliminary results provide a research tendency and focus;
however, they are not accurate for predicting how much power can be conserved. We need a
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Figure 2: The preliminary results illustrating the tendency of energy dissipation for a microcon-
troller.
solution that minimizes the time when the controller is active to save power.
1.1.2 Security and Energy Trade-off
Traditional RFID tags provide security features by activating their processor-based controller with
increasing power consumption. This situation creates a security strength versus energy trade-off.
However, RFID systems require security features to be implemented using techniques that provide
a high degree of protection while not significantly increasing the complexity of the system. Com-
plexity can increase power consumption and implementation cost. Thus, it is important to develop
new security techniques that take advantage of the fundamental properties of RFID communica-
tion such as physical layer protocols, low-power communication extensions, sleep modes, physical
implementation variations, etc.
6
Application
Standard 
Used
ISO 14443
ISO 15693
ISO/IEC 
18000-7
ISO 11784
Application
Requirements
Operation
Range
Stored 
Information
Security 
level
Animal 
Tagging
X
Medium
ID No.
Low
Inventory
Management
Short to long
Product 
Code
Low to High
X
Door 
Access
X
Short to 
Medium
ID No.
Low to 
High
XX
Transit 
Payment
X
Short
Fare 
value
Medium to 
High
Credit 
Card 
Payment
X
Short
Account 
Info.
High
Secure 
Employee 
ID
X
Short
Employee 
ID No.
High
ePassport
X
Short
Personal 
Info.
High
Figure 3: The security requirements and standards for RFID applications.
Applications for RFID continue to expand into domains such as electronic passports, electronic
payment systems, and electronic container seals. These applications have a risk of unauthorized
access to sensitive biometric or financial information through the RFID tag or tag communication.
Figure 3 illustrates a variety of RFID applications with associated applied standards and security
requirements [5].
The inventory management application requests security requirements from low-level to high-
level. For example, if the RFID technology is applied to an asset or stock management, it may
request a low-level sensitivity of security requirement. However, when containers containing con-
fidential material or goods, the security level needs to be roused to high sensitivity. For instance,
the Department of Defense (DoD) sees combining RFID technology with satellite communication
as a new approach to improve the performance and security of the military’s supply operations [6].
The ePassport is one of the RFID applications requiring high-level security protection. For
instance, the Department of Homeland Security sees RFID technology as a means to improve
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Table 1: Power requirements of microcontrollers.
Model PIC18F6720 MSP430F16x ATmega128L
Frequency (MHz) 20 8 8
Word size (bit) 8 16 8
Power (awake; mA) 2.2 2 8
Power (Sleep; µA) 1 1.1 15
the ability to match entries without significantly increasing processing time or invading visitors’
privacy [7].
However, as RFID devices are intended to be small and relatively simple devices, security
protocols and techniques can significantly lag behind the other details such as correctness, read
rate, power consumption, etc. As such, the state of security in RFID systems is generally weak
compared to other mature computational technologies such as Internet servers, shared computing
workstations, and even smartcards. RFID systems in general and RFID tags in particular have the
requirement of a power versus area tradeoff. The power consumed by the tags impacts the range of
the device (passive) or lifetime of the tag (active), where the area dictates the cost of the device. In
general, the industry has focused more on the area constraint than the power constraint for passive
tags. The 5 cent RFID tag is a famous example of an area optimized device for reduction in cost.
For instance, the 5 cent tag, one example of passive RFID tags, is composed of less than 10,000
gates [8].
Table 1 lists microcontrollers used for prototyping active RFID tags or commercial products in
wireless sensor networks [9, 10, 11]. An active tag needs to provide adequate power, from 2mA to
8mA, to provide a microcontroller enough energy to perform security features.
An Application-Specified Integrated Circuit (ASIC) technology has been proved that it con-
sumes a small amount of energy to perform advanced security operations. For example, the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES), a strong encryption algorithm, is designed and implemented
by using 0.18µ technology. This design consumes 8.15 µA with adequate 992 clock cycles and
307 µA with adequate 10 clock cycles [12].
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Security features have often been a secondary concern for vendors who provide passive RFID
tags primarily because strong authentication and encryption algorithms are complex and would
significantly increase the cost and power budget of the tag. Sarma et al. discusses the security risks
and challenges of low cost RFID tags [8]. For example, in the 5 cent tag, less than 1,000 gates
are dedicated to security. In contrast, commercial implementations of the Advanced Encryption
Standard require approximately 4,000 - 173,000 gates [12].
Unlike passive tags, expanding security features in active RFID tags may be affordable, but
still impacts the lifetime of the tags. The lifetime of active RFID tags is related to fixed power
sources (eg. on-board battery). As providing more security features, active RFID tags increase not
only the complexity of tags, but also the power consumption. For example, an active tag performs
a software-based data encryption algorithm. The processor-based controller needs to stay in active
mode for a longer time to perform the data encryption. This tag consumes more energy than
that does not provide the same security feature. Therefore, the active RFID systems needs a new
technique that can provide not only high degree of protection, but also requiring a minimum power
dissipation (eg. within the range of µW) to support these security features.
1.1.3 System-level Verification Platform for RFID Systems
Verification of RFID technology, especially the network traffic of RFID systems, is currently ad
hoc requiring expensive equipment. In computer network debugging tools like tcpdump as an
example allows the user to intercept TCP/IP packets and analyze them. Upon collecting the packet
information, the user is able to verify and analyze the network, monitor the traffic, and even provide
protection to the network. However, there is no tool like tcpdump in RFID systems, which provides
detailed network traffic of RFID communications from the system level perspective.
Some theoretical traffic models, such as ALOHA traffic models [13, 14, 15],were developed to
describe RFID communication patterns. However, those traffic models are not capable of providing
precise views of RFID-command exchanges among interrogators and tags. To test new RFID
systems or protocols, it is valuable to have real workloads from RFID deployments. In order
to provide a precise real workloads or network traffic profile of RFID communication for power
consumption analysis, a new verification platform is required to capture the RFID command traffic,
9
Figure 4: Case studies of RFID technology in 2008.
analyze RFID commands, and output the traffic profile to a readable text file.
1.1.4 The High Design Cost and Long Design Time for New RFID Applications
The main problem in developing new RFID systems or applications is the increasing design cost
for designing and implementing these systems in a case by case basis. In order to meet the re-
quirements for different RFID circumstances and support extensive RFID applications, multiple
standards exist. In most applications, RFID tag and reader hardware software must be specifically
designed for each applications. This keeps overall design time long and the system costs high.
For example, RFID systems are expanding rapidly with their applications in a wide range of areas.
These systems are used for a wide range of applications that track, monitor, report, and manage
items as they move between different physical locations. A survey of RFID applications [16] de-
picts the summation of extensive new research including 3096 RFID projects in late 2007 shown
in Figure 4. Based on this report, item-level management, contactless card, vehicle applications
(e.g. E-Z Pass), and pallet flow control, are primary applications dominating the fields of academic
research and RFID marketing.
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A wide range of extensions such as memory, sensors, encryption, and access control can be
added to the tag. The interrogators query the tags for information stored on them, which can
include items like identification numbers, user written data, or sensory data shown in Figure 3.
Tags contain a unique tag identification number and potentially additional information of interest
to manufacturers, healthcare organizations, military organizations, logistics providers and retailers,
or others that need to track the physical location of goods or equipment.
In order to meet the requirements for different RFID circumstances and support extensive RFID
applications, multiple, often competing, standards exist (ISO=IEC JTC1, ANSI, EPC, etc.) for
RFID hardware, software, and data management. Thus, most of the RFID systems are deployed
for closed loop applications using either proprietary protocols or nonintersecting standards with
nonreusable tags and readers.
As a result, in most applications, RFID tag and reader hardware and software must be specifi-
cally designed for each particular application, and must be physically modified or redesigned every
time the specification for the current application is adjusted, as new applications are introduced,
as the standards are modified or as new standards are developed. This situation keeps the overall
design time long and the system costs high. It is important to develop a new design automation
technique for RFID systems to reduce the design cost and design time.
1.2 DISSERTATION STATEMENT
This dissertation provides a multi-domain solution to improve the power consumption and security,
while also reducing design time and verification time of RFID systems. This research is placed
in the context of an innovative architecture for active RFID tags called Passive Active RFID Tag
(PART), which integrates the benefits of passive and active RFID tags. PART is designed for a
low-power, long-range and high-secure RFID solution described in Section 2.2.
In particular, I describe (1) a smart buffering technique to allow a tag to remain in a standby
mode until addressed, (2) a multi-layer, low-power technique that transcends the passive-
transaction, physical, and data layers to provide secure transactions for active RFID tags, (3) an
FPGA-based traffic profiler system to generate traces of RFID communications for both tag ver-
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ification and power analysis without the need for expensive verification tools, and (4) a design
automation technique to create physical layer encoding and decoding blocks in hardware suitable
for RFID tags.
This dissertation presents four contributions: (1) As a result, based on aMarkov Process energy
model, the smart buffering technique is shown to reduce power consumption by 85% over a tra-
ditional active tag; (2) The multi-layer, low-power security technique provides protection against
malicious reader attacks to disable the tag, to steal the information stored in or communicated
to the device. The power consumption overhead for implementing these layers of security is in-
creased approximately 13% over the basic tag controller; (3) In addition, the FPGA-based traffic
profiler system has been able to generate traces for ISO 18000 part 6C (EPC Gen2) protocol; and
(4) The designs of encoding/decoding blocks are generated automatically by the Physical Layer
Synthesis tool for five protocols used in or related to RFID. Consequently, any power consumption
of five designs is less than 5 µW. Furthermore, compared with five designs implemented by hand,
the difference of the power consumption between two of them is less than 7% at most.
1.3 IMPACT OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation presents a multi-domain solution to improve the power consumption and security,
while also reducing design time and verification time of RFID systems.
After analyzing the operation of active RFID tags, we found that two significant sources of
power dissipation can be saved while a processor-based controller remains in a sleep/standby mode.
Based on the PART architecture, the Smart Buffer technique behaves like a guard, blocking any
incoming commands carrying incorrect information. Therefore, the processor-based tag controller
remains in a sleep/standby mode until a legitimate command arrived. The Smart Buffer technique is
implemented by a dedicated hardware circuit which dissipates a small amount of energy compared
with the processor-based controller. Based on our experimental result, it shows that using the
Smart Buffer technique helps an active RFID tag to reduce the power consumption by 85%.
From security perspective, low-power security features are applied to different levels in the
RFID tag communication structures from the physical layer through encryption of the data trans-
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mission. Multi-layer security proposed in this dissertation provides protection against malicious
reader attacks used to disable the tag, in order to steal the information stored in or communicated
to the device. As a result, the power overhead for implementing these layers of security is approx-
imately 13% over the basic tag controller logic.
Some theoretical traffic models, such as ALOHA traffic models [13, 14, 15],were developed to
describe RFID communication patterns. However, those traffic models are not capable of providing
precise views of RFID-command exchanges among interrogators and tags. In order to provide a
precise power profile of RFID communication for power consumption analysis, a Traffic-profiler
Platform has been studied in this dissertation. It is capable of capturing the RFID command traffic,
analyzing RFID commands, and generating the traffic profile to a readable text file.
Due to the expanding usage of RFID technology, many RFID standards have been developed
in different countries for different needs. In order to either reduce the design cost (time-to-market)
for a variety of RFID applications or meet the low-power requirement, this dissertation introduces
a Physical Layer Design Automation tool which generates encoding/decoding blocks in hardware.
Based on different waveform descriptions of a variety of RFID standards, it is capable of generating
corresponding hardware encoding/decoding blocks. The experimental results demonstrate that the
power consumption of five encoding/decoding benchmarks are less than 5 µW. In addition, the
difference of the power consumption between the encoding/decoding blocks generated by the tool
and those generated by hand is within a range of 0.6 µW at most.
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
• Chapter 2 introduces reviews the prior research, Passive Active RFID Tags (PARTs), including
its architecture, and a power reduction component, the burst switch. The concept of discrete-
time Markov process models used for modeling the RFID systems and energy analysis is de-
scribed in this chapter.
• Chapter 3 describes the first contribution, the Smart Buffer technique, and its architecture. The
Smart Buffer allows a tag to remain in a sleep/standby mode until addressed. This chapter also
illustrates a RFID testing circumstance in a testing scenario and an associated Markov Process
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model to analyze the efficiency of power saving. Detailed energy analysis for active RFID tags
with or without using Smart Buffer is presented and the comparison of power consumption is
provided in this chapter.
• Chapter 4 shows the second contribution, multi-layer low-power security architecture, provid-
ing data protection transcending the passive-transaction, physical, and data layers to provide
secure transactions. The experimental results demonstrate the implementation of our encryp-
tion algorithm has resistance to the side-channel attacks.
• Chapter 5 describes the third contribution, an FPGA-based traffic profiler system to generate
traces of RFID communications for both tag verification and power analysis without the need
of actual hardware. It demonstrates how to use the generated traffic trace file to profile the
power consumption of the communication.
• Chapter 6 depicts the fourth contribution, a design automation technique, for generating en-
coding and decoding hardware blocks of the physical layer design in RFID systems. The main
benefit of creating this tool is to shorten the design time for a variety of RFID standards and
applications.
• This research is concluded in Chapter 7. Future research directions are proposed.
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND PRIORWORK
This chapter presents a general background relevant to this dissertation research and reviews prior
work developed by the RFID research group of the RFID Center of Excellence in University of
Pittsburgh. The related background to each contribution is presented in the beginning of each con-
tribution chapter. Section 2.2 presents the prior research on the Passive Active RFID Tag (PART)
architecture. This section gives background on the main components of the PART architecture,
including a description of the burst switch in Section 2.2.1. Section 2.3 describes the background
of a discrete-time Markov process, which is utilized to analyze the power consumption trends of
the SmartBuffer technique.
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO RFID SYSTEMS
The Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology is an automatic identification technology
that uses radio waves carrying energy or data between interrogators or unidentified tags/objects.
During World War II, the radar technology was invented to discover air crafts. In the early 1940s,
the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, the first RFID-based application, was used to identify
allied planes by sending out radio waves and detecting the echoes [17, 18]. Since the first RFID-
based access control system invented by Charles Walton in 1973 [17], the RFID technology has
been studied in its applications. Due to its particular identification method, the application of RFID
technology is expanding in many area. For example, tracking products, supply chain, asset man-
agement, and animal tracing [17, 1, 19, 6] are low-security level applications and access control,
wireless payment,confidential cargo shipment and homeland security [20, 21] are high-security
level applications.
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An RFID system contains two main components: interrogators and RFID tags. Active and
passive are two dominant types of RFID tags shown in Figure 5. A passive RFID tag is also
known as a passive transponder. In general, a traditional passive RFID tag usually consists of
a transponder antenna, RF interface, logic circuitry and memory shown in Figure 5(a) [1, 2]. It
does not have an internal power supply for the logic circuitry and memory. In other words, the
passive transponder can operate only when the supplied energy is transferred from an interrogator
via an alternating magnetic field. Thus, the antenna and the RF interface absorb the energy and
then generate an induced voltage to perform memory access. After accessing the memory, the
passive tag backscatters the energy back to the interrogator and modulates the energy signal with
Amplitude-Shift Key (ASK) or On-Off Key (OOK) modulation.
Many standards of passive RFID tags are developed for a variety of applications. For example,
the ISO 18000-6C standard [22], issued by International Standard Organization (ISO), and the
EPC Gen2 Standard [23] were developed for item management to replace the bar code. Not only
can the passive tag be used for identifying or tracing ground items, but they also can be applied
to aircraft components, such as Aerospace Standard AS5678, a standard passed by Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) for air craft. Furthermore, the passive tags have also been employed
to applications that require high personal privacy, such as wireless payment [24] or biometric
passport [21].
Unlike a passive RFID tag, an active RFID tag has an internal power supply, usually a battery.
In general, a traditional active RFID tag is composed of an RF transceiver, a processor-based con-
troller, and an on-board battery as shown in Figure 5(b). The transceiver includes a transmitter and
a receiver. The transmitter is powered to transmit responded signals back to an interrogator with a
long distance (around 300 feet) and the receiver is powered on all the time to receive incoming sig-
nals from an interrogator. The processor-based controller is responsible for processing incoming
RFID commands and data and generating the associated responses. The on-board battery powers
the RF transceiver and the controller.
In 2004, the ISO ratified the ISO 18000 part 7 standard as an active RFID standard. It defines
the physical layer protocol, data coding mechanism and RF communication at 433 MHz. Due to an
active RFID tag is energized by an internal power source, it could perform complex computation,
such as cryptographic computation, and long distance transmission. For example, in 2006, the
16
R
F 
In
te
rfa
ce
Lo
gi
c
M
em
or
y
Passive TagInterrogator
R
F Interface
M
icro-Processor
Energy
Data
(a) Passive RFID tag. (b) Active RFID tag.
Figure 5: An architectural overview of RFID tags.
U.S. Department of Defense was pushing to use active RFID technology to track military goods
and cargo containers in worldwide [25].
Although passive RFID tags are energized by an interrogator, the shortage of induced power
limits the complexity of logic computation. On the other hand, an active RFID tag has an internal
power source to support strong logic computation. However, powering an active transceiver all the
time and energizing complex computation limit the usage life of active RFID tags.
Energy saving and strong security features are two main study topics for the next generation
of RFID technology. Due to increasing privacy requirements and secure applications, such as
access control, wireless payment, and homeland security [20, 6, 21, 24], current RFID tags are
not sufficient to meet these requirements. Consequently, additional security features such as data
encryption and safe transactions are required. However, RFID tags have extremely strict low-
power consumption requirements. Additionally, even for some particular applications requiring
the capability of an active RFID tag, it is difficult to perform the battery replacement. For example,
the oversea shipment is a low-cost, large-scale application requiring active tags for tracing cargos,
it is not feasible to replace the battery of an active tag while the container is in the middle of
nowhere. Thus, to hurdle the power limitation and improve secure features are two main problems
for the next generation RFID tags.
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2.1.1 Current Research Survey on Hurdling Power Limitation
Current research in the active RFID area focuses on protocol, technology, and network architecture
approaches to hurdle the power limitations. From the protocol perspective, Nilsson et al. [26, 27]
describe how to design a protocol for an active RFID system to obtain the better energy efficiency.
Bhanage and Zhang proposed a tag reading protocol, Relay-MAC, to achieve reliable and energy-
efficient tag reads [28]. Based on their research, power conservation can be achieved by reducing
the amount of information sent over the network and providing collision detection by modifying
protocols. It is possible to conserve energy for active RFID tags if a protocol provides collision-
free communication or collision protection mechanisms. Authors evaluate the energy savings from
reducing the number of retransmissions, however, the receivers of the active RFID tags are powered
on and consume energy all the time.
Kaya and Koser study a power conservation solution for RFID systems from the technology
perspective. They proposed a novel technology for RFID system, called a batteryless solution
which is based on a MEMS (Micro-Electro Mechanical Systems) energy scavenger [29]. The
embedded MEMS accelerometer is capable of generating voltage while a sudden or continuous
acceleration happens. This technology is used in a passive RFID transponder. It can generate
power for a passive RFID tag for writing the memory bits without harvesting energy from the RF
signal. Therefore, it behaves like a batteryless active RFID transponder. Although it is called a
batteryless active RFID transponder, the technology is constructed on a passive RFID architecture.
[30] shows the benefits of energy efficiency by using the sensor-enhanced approach for active
RFID systems. With embedded range-sensor, active RFID tags control the frequency of range
information exchanging among tags. While short distance between two tags, the information ex-
change rate will be dropped in order to conserve energy. The experimental results show that the
energy consumption is reduced by 56%.
Bhanage et al. [13] show an approach to reduce power consumption from the network archi-
tecture perspective. They proposed an asymmetric RFID system. The power conservation can be
obtained by eliminating the receiver and utilizing a simple MAC-layer protocol. The active RFID
tag only transmits a tag’s information, such as tag ID, but is not allowed to receive any information.
They sacrifice the functionality of active RFID tags to achieve power conservation.
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2.2 PASSIVE ACTIVE RFID TAGS (PART)
The RFID system contains two main components: RFID readers and RFID tags. RFID tags gen-
erally come in two types, passive and active. Passive tags do not contain an internal power source.
As a result, these tags not only receive information from a query, they also receive energy. This en-
ergy is used to power the tag in order to determine if the tag should send a response to the query or
not. While passive tags are generally cheaper than active tags, they have two major disadvantages:
(1) the range of passive tags is significantly lower than that of active tags and (2) the complexity
of response is significantly reduced compared to active tags due to the limited energy budget.
Unlike passive tags, active tags require an internal power source (usually a battery) to power
the transceiver for receiving queries and transmitting responses. The power supply also powers the
tag’s controller, which may be an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or an embedded
microprocessor. Since active tags contain an internal power source, they are capable of providing
complex responses and transferring data within a long distance. However, their main disadvantage
is the limitation of the lifetime of the internal power source. Even for some particular applications
requiring the capabilities of an active RFID tag, it is difficult to perform the battery replacement.
For example, oversea shipment is a low-cost, large-scale application requiring active tags for trac-
ing cargos. It is not feasible to replace the battery of an active tag while the container is in the
middle of nowhere.
To solve this problem, a novel active tag architecture was built in [31] combining passive and
active tag technologies to reduce the power consumption. The goal is to build a tag system with
an essentially infinite battery shelf life and an active battery life essentially equal to that of the tag.
The overall architecture for such a tag is given is Figure 6. This architecture is referred to as a
“Passive Active Radio Frequency Identification Tag (PART).”
Recall the architecture of a passive tag and an active tag as shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1(a),
a passive tag consists of a transponder antenna (passive energy receiver) and a logic controller. In
Figure 1(b), an active tag is composed of an active transceiver and a complex logic controller. The
passive active RFID tag system integrates a passive energy receiver, an active transceiver, and a
logic controller with two power reduction mechanisms into a novel architecture in Figure 6. Two
power reduction components are a passive transceiver switch and a Smart Buffer circuit.
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Figure 6: Overview of the ultra low-power active RFID tag.
The system contains five major components: a passive energy receiver, a passive transceiver
switch, an active transceiver, a Smart Buffer, and a logic controller. When RF energy is received on
the passive energy receiver, the passive energy receiver and the passive transceiver switch absorb
RF energy to activate the active transceiver. Once the active transceiver is activated, the Smart
Buffer begins receiving queries from an interrogator, buffering the entire incoming queries, and
processing incoming commands. In the mean time, the logic controller remains in sleep mode
until the Smart Buffer wakes it up to process a relevant RFID command. The controller may be a
processor-based system or an ASIC depending on the particular application.
The operation of this architecture is as follows. When a tag is not being interrogated the
battery power to the transceiver and Smart Buffer will be disconnected and the controller will be
in the sleep mode if they are processor- or FPGA- based. On the other hand, if the smart Buffer or
controller are ASIC or Flash FPGA- based, they will be disconnected from power. When a group
of tags are to be interrogated the passive transceiver burst switch supplies power to the transceiver
and Smart Buffer. If a particular tag is being interrogated, the Smart Buffer awakens and supplies
power to the controller. The controller interprets the interrogation and issues the appropriate reply.
The controller then returns to sleep or off mode and power is disconnected from the Smart Buffer
and transceiver.
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2.2.1 Passive Transceiver Switch
The passive transceiver switch is also called a burst switch. Figure 7 shows a generic circuit of a
passive transceiver switch [31]. It absorbs RF energy and converts the energy into a direct current
(DC). The DC behaves as a power source for waking up the rest of the tag. In the case of the PART,
a battery is used to power the device, while the burst switch is used to power the battery controller.
Most of the time, if there is no communication between interrogators and tags, the battery remains
OFF or provides a tiny current for powering the logic controller in sleep mode. Thus, the battery
life must be extended to a maximum; likely the life of the asset being tagged.
  
Figure 7: A simple generic burst switch.
One of the difficulties with the simple RF wake-up circuit illustrated in Figure 7 is that spurious
RF energy (noise) could potentially awaken the sleeping device. Thus, it may be necessary to
interface a low power or passive circuit (essentially a filter) between the RF switch and the higher
power consuming receiver shown in Figure 8.
 
Burst 
Switch 
Low-Power 
Circuit 
(Filter) 
Higher 
Power 
Circuit 
Figure 8: A low power filter to avoid false wake-up from RF noise.
The Low-Power Circuit (Filter) of Figure 8 could be any low power device that can be turned
on for a short period of time, increment a counter(s) and go back to sleep. Essentially, this device
acts like a receiver. A watch dog timer may be used to reset the device after extended noisy periods
or after long intervals of inactivity. As an example of the operation of this low power type of
device, consider the powering profile of Figure 9.
21
5 2 4 6
Figure 9: Powering sequence coded for security.
The code is made up of four bursts of 5, 2, 4 and 6 units of time. The device counts (possibly
on a dedicated counter) the number of separate bursts; 1, 2, 3, 4; and the length of each burst; 5,
2, 4 and 6; is stored in say a register (or any suitable) memory. When the count reaches four, the
registers are checked for the proper code, e.g., 5, 2, 4, 6. If the code is correct, the Higher Power
Circuit is awaken. Otherwise, all of the registers are reset. This same scheme can be used for
any N bursts and any length ON periods as well as any frequency or combination of frequencies
or sequences. More details on the burst switch encoding are described in Section 4.3.1, Passive
Activation Layer Security.
2.3 DISCRETE TIME MARKOV PROCESS MODEL
A discrete-time Markov process (DTMP) is a stochastic process studying how the consequence of
the current status is influenced by the previous status [32]. A discrete-time Markov process is used
to model the behavior of a system. In this dissertation, a discrete-time Markov process is utilized to
analyze the power consumption of RFID systems. Two power consumption models are developed
in Chapter 3. The first model describes the power consumption of a traditional RFID tag. The
second model describes the power consumption of an RFID tag with a Smart Buffer .
Definition 1: A discrete-time Markov process is a stochastic process {X0, X1, X2, .., Xn, ...}
in discrete time {n = 0, 1, 2, ...}, where sn denotes the state at discrete time n and a set of states,
defined as S = {s0, s1, ..., sn, sn+1}, which is formed as [33]:
Pr(Xn+1 = sn+1|Xn = sn, Xn−1 = sn−1, ..., X0 = s0) = Pr(Xn+1 = sn+1|Xn = sn),
∀n ≥ 0,∀sn+1, ..., s0
(2.1)
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Eq. (2.1) represents that moving to the next state, Xn+1 = sn+1, only depends on the current
state, Xn = sn, and is independent of any past state, Xn−1 = sn−1, ..., X0 = s0. This property is
called the Markov property or Memoryless property.
Definition 2: A transition probability is the probability of moving from state si to state sj at the
discrete time n, which is denoted by pij(n) [33]. Therefore, pij(n) = Pr(Xn+1 = sn+1|Xn = sn).
If a transition probability is independent of discrete time, a discrete-time Markov process is a
homogeneous discrete-time Markov process [33]. Therefore, the transition probability of moving
from state si to state sj can be denoted by pij and written as:
pij = Pr(Xn+1 = sj|Xn = si) (2.2)
Definition 3: A transition probability matrix P is defined as a matrix containing all pij [34].
So that:
P =

p11 p12 ...
p21 p22 ...
: : pij
: :

, and
∑
j
pij = 1,∀i = 0, 1, 2, ... (2.3)
A discrete time Markov process can be represented by using a state diagram composed of
a set of states and a set of transitions. Figure 10 illustrates a two-state discrete-time Markov
process including two states, {s0, s1}, and four transitions, {p00, p01, p10, p11}. For example, the
probability of moving from state s0 to state s1 is p01, and its value is α. The probability of staying
within state s0 is p00. Based on Eq. (2.3), the summation of all outgoing probabilities from state s0
is 1. Thus, p00 = (1− α).
The transition probability matrix Ptwo−state can be shown as a 2x2 array in Eq. (2.4). An
“answering the phone” event is used as an example to demonstrate a discrete-time Markov process
model. Bob has a mobile phone. If a phone call comes in, he will answer the phone with 90%
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Figure 10: The state diagram of Two-state discrete-time Markov process.
probability. For all of the phone calls he answered, 20% of incoming calls are wrong-number calls.
Therefore, this two-state matrix can be rewrote as Ptwo−state =
 0.1 0.9
0.2 0.8
.
Ptwo−state =
 p00 p01
p10 p11
 =
 (1− α) α
β (1− β)
 (2.4)
2.3.1 Aperiodic and Irreducible Discrete Time Markov Process
Definition 4: A discrete-time Markov process is irreducible if all of its states communicate with
any other state [34].
Figure 11 illustrates two examples of a non-irreducible and an irreducible discrete-timeMarkov
process. The example in Figure 11(a) shows a discrete-time Markov process containing five states,
{s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}. Subset A in the graph is composed of {s0, s1, s2}, where all of the states
are capable of communicating with each other. Similar to Subset B in Figure 11(a), it containing
{s3,s4} is an irreducible set of states. However, the discrete-time Markov process containing five
states in Figure 11(a) is not irreducible. State s0 is able to reach states s3 and s4, but state s0 is not
accessible from states s3 and s4.
On the contrary, the discrete-time Markov process in Figure 11(b) is irreducible. Figure 11(b)
presents a similar state diagram with additional transitions from state s3 to state s1. This transition
makes state s0 accessible for from states s3 and s4. Consequently, the entire state diagram becomes
irreducible states.
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(a) Subset A and B are irreducible. (b) An irreducible discrete-time Markov pro-
cess.
Figure 11: Non-irreducible and Irreducible DTMP.
Definition 5: The distance of state j is the number of transitions of a loop outgoing from state
j and looping back to itself.
Definition 6: The period of state j is the greatest common divisor (GCD) of the set of distances
of state j [34].
Definition 7: A discrete-time Markov process is aperiodic if it has period of one [34].
Figure 12 illustrates two examples of a periodic and an aperiodic discrete-timeMarkov process.
The example in Figure 12(a) shows two DTMP state diagrams, four-state and five-state DTMP. For
the four-state DTMP, two loops pass though state s0. The first loop is constructed of {s0, s1, s2}
and the second path consists of {s0, s1, s3}. Thus, state s0 has two distances (3, 3). In addition,
the period of states s0 is three. State s1 is similar to state s0. The two distances of state s1 are
(3, 3). The period of state s1 is three. Therefore, the four-state DTMP is periodic.
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Another example in Figure 12(a) is the five-state DTMP. The first loop of state s0 is {s0, s1},
and the second loop is {s0, s2, s3, s4}. Thus, the distances of state s0 are (2, 4). The period of the
five-state DTMP is two. It is a periodic DTMP.
In Figure 12(b), the four-state and five-state DTMPs are modified by adding one more tran-
sition. The four-state DTMP has an additional transition from state s3 to state s2. The five-state
DTMP has an additional loop on state s0. For the four-state DTMP, this modification causes the
distances of state s0 to become (3,3,4). Therefore, the period of the four-state DTMP is one. It
becomes an aperiodic discrete-time Markov process. For the five-state DTMP, the distances of the
state s0 become (1,2,4). Thus, the period of the five-state DTMP is one. It becomes an aperiodic
discrete-time Markov process.
(a) Periodic four-state and five-state DTMP.
(b) Aperiodic four-state and five-state DTMP.
Figure 12: Periodic and Aperiodic DTMP.
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2.3.2 Stationary Distribution
Definition 8: A stationary distribution Π = Π · P can be calculated by the equation shown in
Eq. (2.5), if the discrete-time Markov process is an irreducible and aperiodic DTMP [33].
Π = Π · P =
[
pi0 pi1 pi2 pi3
]
·

p00 p01 p02 p03
p10 p11 p12 p13
p20 p21 p22 p23
p30 p31 p32 p33
 , and
∑
allj
pij = 1 (2.5)
A state probability represents the probability of staying in a particular state when the system
is in a “long-run” time. pi0 represents a state probability of state s0. When a discrete-time Markov
process is aperiodic and irreducible, the limit of the state probability exists in a “long-run” time.
A vector of state probabilities can be determined by using Eq. (2.5). It is also called a stationary
distribution, Π.
2.3.3 Reward Matrix
A reward matrix is a matrix containing reward values for each transition in the state diagram of
a discrete-time Markov process. This matrix assists a discrete-time Markov process in modeling
a system with experimental data. This work has been demonstrated by Hawrylak in his disserta-
tion [35]. A reward matrix represents an energy consumption matrix used in benefit analysis of
using SmartBuffer technique in Section 3.4.
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3.0 SMART BUFFERING TECHNIQUE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Power consumption affects both passive and active devices. For an active device, the amount of
power/energy required by the tag dictates the lifetime that the tag may operate. Passive devices’
ranges and complexity of computation for features such as added security or access to sensors are
directly impacted by power consumption. This chapter presents techniques and architectures that
are applicable to active tags. These techniques are designed to address the concerns of reducing
power in RFID systems without compromising their capability or to extend their capability in a
power efficient manner.
To reduce the power consumption of the tag microcontroller, it is necessary to decrease the
time that the controller is active. Therefore, an RF transceiver coprocessor was created to manage
the buffering of messages to and from the transceiver, and the activation of the controller in order to
respond to RFID primitives when necessary. This is an information filter used for power reduction.
Thus the RF transceiver coprocessor, or Smart Buffer, assists the embedded controller to sleep or
stay in a low-power idle mode while any non-relevant packets arriving at the RFID tag are ignored
and valid packets wake up the processor to respond appropriately [36, 37].
The Smart Buffer technique allows the embedded microcontroller to sleep or stay in a low-
power idle mode while any irrelevant packets arriving at the RFID tag are ignored. Meanwhile,
valid packets wake up the processor to respond appropriately. Effectively, it acts as a packet filter.
Before waking up the microcontroller, it analyzes every incoming command and decides whether
or not to wake up the microcontroller to process the command.
A description of the Smart Buffer technique for a Passive Active Radio frequency Tag (PART)
is given in this chapter. The smart buffering technique allows a tag to remain in a standby (sleep)
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mode until addressed. For a traditional active tag, the battery life is significantly impacted by
the frequency of tag awakening and the period of data processing. Thus, this smart buffering
technique reduces the wake-up frequency and usage period of an active tag. The remainder of
this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes how RFID communication impacts on
the power consumption of an RFID system. Section 3.3 describes the architecture of the smart
buffering technique including the algorithm of smart buffering technique and main components.
In Section 3.4, the Markov process model characterizes a power consumption model of Smart
Buffer circuitry by exploiting a general scenario. In addition, it is exploited to explain how the
smart buffering technique can reduce the power consumption of a PART tag. Section 3.5 reports
the experimental results of power reduction.
3.2 THE IMPACT OF RFID SYSTEM COMMUNICATION
Broadcasting is the only communication method between RFID readers and tags. However, RFID
technology uses not only one-to-all RFID commands but also point-to-point commands specified
in ISO 18000 Part 7 and ANSI 256 active RFID standards. The ISO 18000 Part 7 standard defines
14 active RFID commands: Table 2 lists three on-to-all commands and Table 3 lists eleven point-
to-point commands . The first column indicates the command code for each command, where the
letters R andW represents Read andWrite.
Table 2: One-to-All commands defined in ISO 18000 part 7.
Cmd Code Cmd Name Cmd Type Cmd Description
(R/W)
10 / NA Collection Broadcast (one-to-all) Collect all Tag IDs
11 / NA Collection with Data Broadcast (one-to-all) Collect all Tag IDs with Data
14 / NA Collection with User ID Broadcast (one-to-all) Collect all Tag IDs with UIDs
Three one-to-all commands, also known as Broadcast commands, can be found in Table 2:
Collection, Collection with Data, and Collection with UserID. The
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Collection command allows an interrogator to collect all Tag IDs within the interrogator RF
communication range. The Collection with Data and Collection with UserID
allow an interrogator to collection not only Tag IDs, but also specified data and user IDs.
Figure 13 illustrates the impacts of one-to-all communication on the power consumption for
one active RFID tag. Assume that there are 10 active tags within the interrogator RF communica-
tion range. The cube represents an interrogator and circles represent tags. Initially, the microcon-
troller of each tag is in the Sleep, shown in blue in Figure 13(a).
When an interrogator broadcasts an one-to-all command, such as Collection, to a group of
tags, all microcontrollers are aroused and go into the Active mode, shown in red. At this moment,
the microcontroller of each tag is utilizing the peak energy to process the incoming one-to-all
command and the transceiver is on for transmitting the response back to the reader as illustrated in
Figure 13(b). Consequently, all tags must wake up to process the one-to-all command and respond
to the reader.
(a) Before receiving a one-to-all
command.
(b) After receiving a one-to-all com-
mand.
Figure 13: One-To-All communication impacts on the power consumption.
In addition to the one-to-all commands, eleven point-to-point commands are defined in the
standard and listed in Table 3. They are Sleep, Status, User ID Length, User ID,
Owner ID, Firmware Revision, Model Number, Read/Write Memory,
Set Password, Set Password Protect, and Unlock. For example, if an interrogator
wants to set the User ID for a particular tag, it must broadcast a User ID command to all tags
with containing the destination tag ID. After receiving the command, the tag with the matching
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destination tag ID responds to the reader and sets its User ID. But the other tags ignore the User
ID command. Figure 14 illustrates the impact of the point-to-point communication on the power
consumption. In Figure 14(a), the cube represents the interrogator and circles represents active
tags. Initially, they are all in the Sleep, shown in blue.
Table 3: Point-to-Point commands defined in ISO 18000 part 7.
Cmd Code Cmd Name Cmd Type Cmd Description
(R/W)
NA / 15 Sleep Point-to-point Put a Tag to sleep
01 / NA Status Point-to-point Retrieve Tag Status
07 / 87 User ID Length Point-to-point Set length of UID
13 / 93 User ID Point-to-point Set User ID
09 / 89 Owner ID Point-to-point Set Owner ID
0C / NA Firmware Revision Point-to-point Set by manufacturer
0E / NA Model Number Point-to-point Set by manufacturer
60 / E0 Read/Write Memory Point-to-point Memory data
NA / 95 Set Password Point-to-point Set Tag Password
17 / 97 Set Password Protect Point-to-point Set/Clear Tag secure bit
NA / 96 Unlock Point-to-point Unlock password protection
When the interrogator broadcasts a point-to-point command, such as User ID, to all tags,
all of the microcontrollers are aroused and go into Active mode, shown in red. At this moment,
the microcontroller is utilizing the peak energy to process the incoming point-to-point command as
described in Figure 14(b). Tag A, marked with the star in Figure 14(b), is the only tag must respond
the corresponding data back to the reader The rest of the tags ignore the User ID command and
remain in Active mode.
The ideal communication pattern for minimal power consumption in active RFID systems
requires the following behavior:
• One-to-all commands need all tags to wake up and respond.
• Point-to-point commands need only one tag to wake up and respond.
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For point-to-point communication, the current tag architecture is designed contrarily. When a
group of tags receive a point-to-point command, all of the tags wake up. However, only one tag,
Tag A, responds. The rest of the tags wasted energy to wake up and ignore the incoming command.
Therefore, the Smart Buffer technique, an energy saving approach, for active RFID tag is proposed
to solve this problem.
Tag "A"
(a) Before receiving a point-to-point
command.
Tag "A"
(b) After receiving a point-to-point
command.
Figure 14: Point-to-point communication impacts on the power consumption.
3.3 SMART BUFFER ARCHITECTURE
The Smart Buffer technique is designed to achieve the ideal communication pattern for minimum
power consumption in active RFID systems, particularly for the point-to-point communication.
The Smart Buffer is a dedicated hardware which behaves like a pre-processing circuitry. In order
to save power, a Smart Buffer is developed to sit between the transceiver and the tag microcontroller
as shown in Figure 15, the overall architecture diagram of the ultra low-power active RFID tag. It
allows the embedded microcontroller to remain asleep while an incoming packet is buffered.
The burst switch, described in Section 2.2.1, is a passive receiver that is powered by RF energy
from the air, which allows the active receiver to be turned completely off. Thus, the shelf life of
the battery is determined primarily by the controller’s sleeping power consumption. The active
receiver and Smart Buffer are turned on only when the burst switch is activated by the wake-up
signal(s) from the interrogator. The embedded microcontroller is managed by the Smart Buffer.
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Figure 15: Overview of the ultra low-power active RFID tag.
The result is an active tag with minimal power consumption that can operate on a single battery for
its lifetime.
The smart buffer technique allows the embedded microcontroller to sleep or stay in a low-
power idle mode while any non-relevant packets arriving at the RFID tag are ignored. Meanwhile,
valid packets wake up the processor to respond appropriately. Effectively, it acts as a packet filter.
Before waking up the microcontroller, it analyzes every incoming command and decides whether
or not to wake up the microcontroller to process the command.
Tag "A"
Figure 16: The impact of the Smart Buffer technique on the power consumption of point-to-point
communication.
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Figure 16 illustrates the impact of the Smart Buffer technique on the power consumption of
point-to-point communication. The diagram shows that only one tag wakes up and dissipates the
peak power for a microcontroller in Active mode. The rest of the tags remain in Sleep mode.
The Smart Buffer technique is capable of saving power by reducing the frequency of waking up
a microcontroller. However, the drawback of using this technique is the need for an extra circuitry
and power to support it. This chapter discusses the tradeoff and the efficiency of power saving of
utilizing the Smart Buffer technique.
The top-level diagram of the Smart Buffer is depicted in Figure 17. The Smart Buffer has four
I/O pins to the RF front end circuit.
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Figure 17: The top-level block diagram for the Smart Buffer architecture.
The blocks described in Figure 17 are enumerated as follows:
Preamble Removal Unit: Detects the incoming preamble signal and differentiates between sig-
nals intended for tags and readers.
Manchester Decoder: Converts Manchester code into binary values.
Preamble Generator: Generates the Manchester code for the tag response.
Packet Analysis Unit: Detects ID flags to determine whether to wake up the processor.
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Interrupt Process Unit: Generates an interrupt to the processor.
Processor Control Command Unit: Communicates data to and from the processor.
Air Interface Unit: Communicates data to and from the air interface.
When an incoming command arrives at the RF front end circuitry, the preamble removal unit
detects a valid incoming preamble signal. After the whole command is buffered/stored in the
Smart Buffer, the Manchester decoder translates the Manchester encoded data immediately fol-
lowing a valid preamble. Based on the header information in the RFID packet, the packet analysis
unit determines specific characteristics of the packet needed to decide whether to wake up the con-
troller for response generation. This is the key procedure. If the header of the packet carrying
wrong information, such as non-relevant Tag ID or User ID, the Smart Buffer will drop the packet.
The interrupt process unit wakes up the controller only when a complete RFID packet is stored
into the output FIFO and the analysis result forwarded by the packet analysis unit is positive. The
command control unit fetches control commands from the controller, such as read and write data
to FIFO, update Tag ID or Group/Owner ID, and so forth. The preamble generator generates a
preamble signal followed by the final sync pulse. When the final sync pulse is transmitted, the
preamble generator informs the Manchester encoder to begin to output its serial encoded data. The
air interface unit has output control signals which are enabled when the Smart Buffer needs to
listen for incoming signals from the air, or when it is ready to transmit a response to readers [37].
3.3.1 Algorithm for Smart Buffer Technique
The conceptual flow in Figure 18 shows the mechanism for the RF transceiver co-processor, i.e.,
the smart buffer. In the first four states highlighted as green, the Smart Buffer verifies the message
preamble and buffers the incoming packet. The smart buffer then checks to see if the packet was
intended for this particular tag. The processor is not used to make the check, it is done in hardware
while the processor remains idle or asleep. As a result, only the Smart Buffer consumes power. If
the incoming packet is invalid, the Smart Buffer will ignore it and go back to the sleep state.
If the incoming packet is identified as an intended packet for the Tag, by matching the tag ID
or group ID from the packet, the smart buffer will wake up the processor to process the packet.
The processor reads data from the Smart Buffer and responds correspondingly.
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After the processor writes response data back to the Smart Buffer, the Smart Buffer generates
a bit stream of data consisting of a preamble signal and the response data with Manchester coding.
It is at this point that the processor returns to the low-power mode. Upon completion of sending
the packet response, the Smart Buffer returns to listening for the next preamble.
Listen
Check
Receive 
preamble
Noise/ 
Not Valid
Preamble
Check
Valid 
Preamble
Receive 
Manchester 
code
Error – not 
match timing 
contraint
Check
Analyze 
Packet 
Check Tag ID
Check Group ID
Not intended 
for me
Proc 
read
Wakeup 
processor
Send Interrupt
Proc 
write
Transfer Data 
to processor
Generate 
Preamble
preamble
Generate 
Manchester 
Code
Manchester
Done
Smart Buffer 
back to Listen
Figure 18: The conceptual flow of the Smart Buffer.
3.3.2 Preamble Removal Unit
The preamble removal unit detects a valid incoming preamble signal. It receives bit stream data
from the RF front end circuit. This digital bit stream data is converted from an analog signal the
RF circuitry receives from the antenna. However, because the input signal is analog, a signal may
be due to noise rather than a preamble. Therefore, the Smart Buffer has the ability to tolerate noise
and only recognize the valid preamble signal. The specification of the preamble signal is defined
in the ANSI and ISO standards [4, 3].
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The preamble signal begins with a series of pulses with 30 µs high followed by 30 µs low.
Every preamble signal, regardless of whether it has originated from a tag or a reader has 20 of
these regular pulses. These 20 regular pulses are followed by the final sync pulse, which determines
whether a tag or reader originated the preamble. If an RFID packet comes from a tag, the final sync
pulse is 42 µs high and 54 µs low. If an RFID packet comes from a reader, the final sync pulse is 54
µs high and 54 µs low. The Smart Buffer can ignore RFID packets which come from other tags by
checking the length of the final sync pulse. It will only focus on RFID packets from interrogators
as long as the sync pulse is 54/54 pattern. Other packets are not buffered.
The implementation of the preamble removal unit uses four times oversampling within each 30
µs period for each pulse. The design utilizes counters to count the sampling period. The difference
in the sync pulse can be detected by counting for how many samples the final signal is high, 5 for
tags and 7 for readers.
3.3.3 Manchester Decoder
The Manchester decoder translates the Manchester encoded data immediately following a valid
preamble. It is the block for filtering and buffering incoming RFID packets. The decoder extracts
a bit stream of Non-Return to Zero (NRZ) data from the encoded data.
The Manchester code combines the concept of clock with synchronous data into a single serial
data stream as shown Figure 19. In order to enforce synchronization, Manchester code contains a
transition in the middle of each Manchester bit. The Manchester bit represents zero (0) NRZ data
if this transition is from high to low. Similarly, the Manchester bit represents one (1) NRZ data
if the transition is from low to high. By representing data with a guaranteed transition for each
bit, slight discrepancies of timing can be tolerated without disrupting the communicated data. The
timing specification of the Manchester code is defined in the ISO and ANSI standards.
The Manchester decoder block converts eight serial decoded data bits into a parallel 8-bit
datum (e.g. byte). In addition, the Manchester code contains a ninth bit for synchronization which
is always ‘0’. This is called a stop-bit, and is removed during decoding. Each byte is stored in an
output FIFO shown in Figure 17. When the decoder detects the final bit of an RFID packet, it stops
storing data into the FIFO and asserts the end of packet (EOP) signal to the interrupt process unit.
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Figure 19: Example of Manchester encoding.
Based on the analysis result, the interrupt process unit determines if it is necessary to wake up the
processor.
3.3.4 Packet Analysis Unit
Based on the header information obtained from the RFID packet, the packet analysis unit attempts
to determine the specific characteristics of this particular packet needed to decide whether to wake
up the processor for response generation. These elements include (1) the primitive operation code
(or opcode), (2) the tag id for which the packet is intended, and/or (3) some other distinguishing
information or id from the packet.
Both the ISO and ANSI standards have their own algorithms for tags to identify RFID packets.
Therefore, the packet analysis unit has the ability to switch between these two algorithms seam-
lessly. For example, if the tag travels to Europe or Asia where the RFID system follows the ISO
standard, the Smart Buffer can perceive that it being accessed by ISO primitives. However, if the
tag returns to the United States, it would switch over to recognizing ANSI commands.
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For broadcast commands, both standards allow partitioning of the tags into different binswith a
unique identifier where a logical bin can contain an unlimited number of tags. This is accomplished
by assigning that unique id to each tag contained within the bin. In ISO this is called the Owner
ID and for ANSI the Group ID. For point to point commands, a Tag ID is used distinguish the
destination tag.
The packet analysis algorithms are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. In both standards, com-
mands are segregated into broadcast commands (B) and point to point (P2P) commands. If the
tag receives an ISO broadcast command, it always responds if no Owner ID is set within the tag.
If an Owner ID is set, the tag only responds if an Owner ID is included in the command and it
matches the stored Owner ID. For ANSI, broadcast commands are subdivided between 3 opcodes,
30, 16, and 35. If the opcode is either 16 or 35, the tag always responds. If the opcode is 30, the
tag only responds if the internal Group ID matches the primitive Group ID. ANSI specifies that a
stored Group ID of zero (0) always results in a match. For point to point commands, both standards
require a Tag ID match. However, ISO requires that the Owner ID must match as well as the Tag
ID for point to point commands with an Owner ID present in both the tag and command.
Once the packet analysis unit verifies that the packet requires a response, it sends a signal to
the interrupt process unit to process the packet stored in the FIFO. Because the packet analysis
occurs in parallel with the packet buffering, a signal can be sent to the interrupt unit prior to the
entire packet being buffered. If the packet does not require processing it is dropped from the FIFO.
This prevents the processor from being powered up unless it is needed to process the packet.
3.3.5 Interrupt Process Unit
The interrupt process unit will wake up the processor only when a whole RFID packet has been
stored into the Output FIFO and the analysis result forwarded by the packet analysis unit is positive.
Figure 20 shows the state diagram for the interrupt procedure. The interrupt process unit will go
back to the idle state after sending an interrupt signal to the processor.
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Table 4: Packet analysis algorithm for the ISO standard.
Input Output
B/P2P Owner ID field Owner ID in tag Process command
B No No Yes
B No Yes No
B Yes No Yes
B Yes Yes If Owner ID match
P2P No No If Tag ID match
P2P No Yes If Tag ID match
P2P Yes No If Tag ID match
P2P Yes Yes If Tag ID and Owner ID match
3.3.6 Command Control Unit
The command control unit fetches control commands from the processor, such as read and write
data to FIFO, update Tag ID or Group/Owner ID, starts the transmission procedure, and so forth.
For processor compatibility, it was desirable to minimize the number of lines between the processor
and the Smart Buffer. Thus, four (4) parallel lines are utilized to communicate the processor to
buffer command control.
The processor to Smart Buffer commands are illustrated in Figure 21. After waking up the
processor, the smart buffer listens for the processor to initiate commands for data communication.
As shown in Figure 21, the control unit decodes 4-bit processor commands into 5 basic opera-
tions: transmit, update, push, pull, and null. The double circle represents a potentially multi-cycle
operation.
Based on different control commands, the unit will determine the direction of the bi-directional
Smart Buffer, processor interface. In Figure 21, dir = 0 represents that the direction of I/O
is from processor to Smart Buffer and dir = 1 is the reverse. Because the Smart Buffer and
processor are operated in two different clock domains, a hand-shaking communication approach is
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Table 5: Packet analysis algorithm for the ANSI standard.
Input Output
Opcode Process command
30 If Group ID match1
16 Yes
35 Yes
P2P If Tag ID match
required to push/pull data to/from the FIFOs. Therefore, it is necessary to dedicate more than one
cycle to transmit a single byte of data between the processor and FIFO.
Once the processor has generated a response and completed pushing the response data into the
FIFO, it sends the transmit command. This signals the Smart Buffer to generate the preamble
signal, convert data in the FIFO to a serial data stream and encode the bit stream data in Manchester
coding.
3.3.7 Preamble Generator
According to the ISO and ANSI standards, the preamble generator generates a preamble signal
with 20 pulses of 60 µs, 30 µs high and 30 µs low, followed by the final sync pulse. Because
of this RFID packet generated from a tag, the final sync pulse is 42 µs high and 54 µs low. The
preamble generator utilizes several counters to trace the period time for each pulse. These counters
are running with the Smart Buffer system clock at 33MHz. Therefore, the preamble signal will be
skewed less than 1 µs requiring the reader to tolerate an error of +/- 3.3%.
In order to help the receiver filter out an ambient noise in the air, a mark state, or a stable
logic low signal for 120 µs is generated and transmitted just prior to the preamble signal. While
the preamble generator creates the mark state and preamble signal, the air interface unit forces the
rx enable signal low and raises the tx enable signal.
1A group ID match always occurs if the currently stored group ID within the tag is zero (0).
41
Idle
Interrupt
Back
Not finished storing RFID packet or 
negative packet-analysis result
Finished storing RFID packet and 
positive packet-analysis result
Send an interrupt to the 
embedded µprocessor
Set interrupt low
Figure 20: The interrupt finite state machine.
When the final sync pulse is transmitted, the preamble generator informs the Manchester en-
coder to begin to output its serial encoded data immediately. Any significant gap between data and
the preamble signal may cause an error, which may not be tolerated in the system.
3.3.8 Manchester Encoder
The Manchester encoder starts encoding the data in the input FIFO after it is notified by the pream-
ble generator. This notification occurs during the transmission of the final sync pulse to give the
encoder enough time to have the first byte of data ready. First, the Manchester encoder converts the
next available byte in the FIFO to eight (8) single serial bits. Those eight (8) bits are individually
stored in single-bit shift registers. In addition, a stop bit needs to be appended for each byte of data
in the shift registers.
The Manchester encoded data is the output of a NRZ data XOR coding clock, shown in Fig-
ure 19. The NRZ data is synchronized with the coding clock. According to the specification of
ISO and ANSI standard, the period of coding clock is 36 µs; 18 µs high and 18 µs low. This
clock signal is generated in the Manchester encoder block. The Manchester encoder combines the
coding clock and serial data as shown in Figure 22.
42
Sleep
Mode
Halt
Read an RFID 
packet from the 
output FIFO
Be interrupted 
Interrupt 
procedure call
Execute
Execute an 
RFID command
Response
Respond to an 
RFID command
Go back to 
sleep mode
.
Embedded  µProcessor
Fetch
Null Transmit Update Push Pull
µProcessor to 
Smart Buffer 
commands
dir = 0
dir = 0 dir = 0 dir = 0 dir = 0 dir = 1
Figure 21: Fetch and operation diagram for the command control unit.
3.3.9 Air Interface Unit
The air interface unit has two output control signals, tx enable and rx enable. Since the
Smart Buffer defaults to listening for incoming signals from the air, the rx enable signal is
set high and tx enable signal is set low at all times except when the Smart Buffer is ready to
transmit an RFID response packet back to readers.
3.3.10 Experimental Results
The Smart Buffer was prototyped on the Spartan 3 FPGA as well as studied for ASIC implemen-
tation using 0.16 µm OKI standard cells. While it was possible to implement FIFO blocks on the
Spartan 3 FPGAs using Xilinx IP blocks, ASIC versions of these FIFOs were not available. In
order to study the impact of having the Smart Buffer in an ASIC versus the Spartan 3 FPGA, three
components were separated from the larger design and synthesized and power profiled indepen-
dently. These blocks include the preamble detection, a 30 kHz wake-up signal detection, and the
Manchester decoder.
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Figure 22: Top-level diagram for the Manchester encoder.
The results for power estimation of the ASIC and Spartan 3 based smart buffer components
are displayed in Table 6. Both power analysis are based on post synthesis simulation with the
exact same stimuli. The FPGA power results were computed using Xilinx Xpower and the ASIC
power results were calculated using Synopsys PrimePower. Based on the results from Table 6 the
ASIC version of the implementation uses orders of magnitude less dynamic power for all three
components. Interestingly, the quiescent power alone is nearly three orders magnitude greater than
the dynamic power of the ASIC.
Table 6: ASIC versus FPGA power consumption for portions of the Smart Buffer.
Component Spartan 3 0.16 µm ASIC
Wake-up Signal 0.01 mW 0.001 mW
Preamble Detection 0.87 mW 0.005 mW
Manchester Decoder 0.95 mW 0.002 mW
Quiescent Power 92 mW 0 mW
Total 93.83 mW 0.008 mW
In order to operate the Smart Buffer, an ultra low-power active RFID tag needs to consume
extra power by 8µW, which is close to the power consumption of a microcontroller remaining
in the Sleep mode (1 to 15 µ A) as shown in Table 7. Table 7 lists the power consumption for
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microcontrollers and the Smart Buffer. An active tag consumes the extra power (i.e. 0.008 mW)to
avoid waking up the microcontroller frequently. According to Table 7, every time to wake up the
microcontroller consumes 2 to 8 mA.
Table 7: The comparison of the power consumption among microcontrollers and the Smart Buffer.
Model PIC18F6720 MSP430F16x ATmega128L Smart Buffer
Frequency (MHz) 20 8 8 10
Word size (bit) 8 16 8 8
Power (awake; mA) 2.2mA 2mA 8mA 0.008mW
Power (Sleep; µA) 1µA 1.1µA 15µA 8µW
The experimental results of the Smart Buffer circuitry is power consumption parameters used
for the power analysis in the next section.
3.4 MARKOV PROCESS ENERGYMODEL
In order to analyze the power dissipation of each tag in detail, two different Markov-process models
of a RFID transaction were built. The first model, shown in Figure 23, is for a tag with µprocessor
only, which is abbreviated as the MP-µP model. The second model, shown in Figure 24, is for
a tag with a µprocessor and a smart buffer, which is abbreviated as the MP-µP-SB model. Five
states are used in both Markov process models: S1, sleep; S2, listen for preamble; S3, receive
command; S4, process command; and S5, transmit response. By traversing those five states, both
models represent the control flow of an RFID tag for a communication transaction.
During a scenario when a tag is not participating in a transaction, the tag remains in the sleep
state, S1. After receiving a wake-up tone, it proceeds to state S2 and listens for the preamble signal.
The transition from S2 to S3 occurs when a tag receives a valid preamble and is ready to receive an
incoming command. After receiving a command, the tag decides whether to continue processing
the command (e.g. move to state S4) or return to the “listen for the preamble state” (e.g. move to
state S2). If the incoming command is intended for the tag, it will process the command in state
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Figure 23: Markov-process model for a RFID tag with an on-tag µprocessor (MP-µP model).
S4 and transmit the associated information back to the reader in state S5. Otherwise, the tag will
drop the command and transition from S3 to S2. If the following command received puts the tag
to sleep, it transitions to the sleep state, S1. The only difference between the transitions of the two
scenarios is that in the MP-µP scenario the transition to S1 occurs in S3 and for MP-µP-SB this
transition occurs in S4. This is because the Smart Buffer does not currently recognize the sleep
command.
The labels µP(A) and µP(S) are used to represent the µprocessor being in either the Active
or Standby mode, respectively. Similarly the labels, SB(A) and SB(S), in the MP-µP-SB model
represent that the Smart Buffer is in either the Active or Standby mode, respectively.
In the MP-µP model, the µprocessor is in standby in the sleep state, and active in all other
states. For many scenarios the on-tag µprocessor will dissipate energy when receiving incoming
commands that are not intended for the tag and are eventually dropped. For example, a RFID reader
sends N point-to-point commands equally distributed to N RFID tags in a reachable area. For each
tag, the MP-µP model in Figure 23 indicates that a µprocessor will stay in a loop between states S3
and S2 for N-1 communications. Consequently, the µprocessor dissipates energy processing N-1
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Figure 24: Markov-process model for a RFID tag with an µprocessor and a Smart Buffer (MP-µP-
SB model).
extraneous communications.
In contrast, in the MP-µP-SB model the Smart Buffer alone becomes Active (SB(A)) while
listening for a preamble signal and receiving a command (states S2 and S3), while the µprocessor
still remains in Standby mode (µP(S)). Thus, if the incoming command is not destined for this tag,
the µprocessor will never become active. This can result in a power reduction of several orders of
magnitude, see Section 3.3.10.
3.4.1 Discrete Time Markov Energy Model for MP-µP Model
Figure 23 illustrates the state diagram of the discrete time Markov process µP model. The tran-
sistion matrix of the MP-µP model can be obtained in a square array as Pµp in Eq. (3.1). In the
transition matrix, the probabilities pij represents transition probabilities between State i and State
j. If pij = 0, it means there is no probability of a transition between State i and State j.
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Pµp =

p11 p12 0 0 0
0 0 p23 0 0
0 p32 p33 p34 0
p41 0 0 p44 p45
0 P52 0 0 p55

(3.1)
All of the transition probabilities are determined by the following environmental parameters:
the number of tags (Ntag)within a reachable area, the number of repeat runs (Nr), the number of
one-to-all (broadcast) commands (NB), the number of point-to-point commands (Np2p), and the
command time (Tc). All probabilities in the matrix Pµp are enumerated as follows:
• p11 represents the probability that the tag remains in the sleep state. It can be obtained by
1− p12.
• p12 represents the probability that the tag receives an incoming preamble. The probability, p12,
can be obtained as p12 = (Tc · Nr)/Ttotal, where Tc is composed of the preamble time, the
point-to-point command time, and the one-to-all command time . The command time can be
obtained by
Tc = Tpreamble +NB · τB +Np2p · τp2p
• p23 represents the probability that the tag receives an incoming command, which always equals
to one.
• p32 represents the probability that the incoming command is a not relevant. The tag drops the
command. The probability can be obtained as 1− (p33 + p34)
• p33 represents the probability that the tag is receiving the incoming command, which can be
calculated by:
p33 =
∑
ΛallincomingCMDs − 1∑
ΛallincomingCMDs
The ΛallincomingCMDs variable corresponds to the length of all commands or the processing
time of all commands.
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• p34 represents the probability that the incoming command is a relevant command. The tag
attempt to process the command and generate feedback data. The probability can be calculated
by p34 = (1 − p33) · (pB + pp2p · prelevant), where pB indicates the probability of processing
one-to-all commands , pp2p represents the probability of processing point-to-point commands,
and prelevant represents the probability of processing relevant commands.
• p41 represents the probability that the incoming command is a sleep command. Thus the tag
goes into the sleep mode. The probability can be calculated by p41 = (1−p44)·(psleep·prelevant),
where psleep represents the probability of processing sleep commands, and prelevant indicates
the probability of processing relevant commands.
• p44 represents the probability that a command is still in process. The tag is processing the
command and generating feedback data. The probability can be calculated by:
p44 =
∑
ΛresponseCMDs − 1∑
ΛresponseCMDs
The ΛresponseCMDs variable corresponds to the length of response commands or the processing
time of feedback data.
• p45 represents the probability that the tag finished processing the command and attempts to
transmit the feedback data, which can be obtained as 1− (p44 + p41)
• p52 represents the probability that the tag finished transmission and listens for the next preamble
signal, which can be obtained as 1− p55.
• p55 represents the probability that the tag is still transmitting data. This probability is equal to
the probability, p44.
For instance, the simulation scenario of this Markov power model assumes that one RFID
interrogator exists and there are 20 tags within a reachable area (Nt = 20). As an example,
the number of tags may represent the number of point-to-point commands is 20 (Np2p = 20) if
the reader equally distributes the point-to-point commands. The reader is assumed (1) to send
a one-to-all command for collecting all tag IDs (NB = 1), (2) to set the User ID for each tag
(Np2p = 20), and (3) to put each tag back to sleep (Np2p + 20). The number of tags’ response
equals to Nresp = Np2p = 20. Therefore, the total number of commands sent by the reader is
NB + Np2p + Nsleep = 1 + 20 + 20 and the total commands responded from tags is Nsleep = 20.
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The whole communication pattern repeats 20 times within one hour and the distribution of all
commands for tags is an even distribution. After applying these environmental parameters, the
transition matrix can be calculated as
Pµp =

0.774011 0.225989 0 0 0
0 0 1.000000 0 0
0 0.007858 0.992102 0.000039 0
0.000039 0 0 0.992024 0.007937
0 0.007937 0 0 0.992063

(3.2)
Because this matrix is an aperiodic and irreducible transition matrix. These two properties can
be found in Section 2.3.1. The stationary distribution, Πµp =
[
pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5
]
, can be calculated
as:
Πµp = Πµp · Pµp (3.3)
=
[
pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5
]

p11 p12 0 0 0
0 0 p23 0 0
0 p32 p33 p34 0
p41 0 0 p44 p45
0 P52 0 0 p55

Therefore, the elements of Πµp can be calculated as:
pi1 = p11pi1 + p41pi4
pi2 = p12pi1 + p32pi3 + p52pi5
pi3 = pi2 + p33pi3
pi4 = p34pi3 + p44pi4
pi5 = p45pi4 + p55pi5
1 = pi1 + pi2 + pi3 + pi4 + pi5
(3.4)
An energy matrix is a reward matrix introduced in Section 2.3. It is used to describe the energy
characteristics of each transition for the MP-µP model in Figure 23. The energy matrix represented
byEµp is given in Eq. (3.5). Each element in the matrix represents the energy consumption for each
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corresponding transition. For example, the energy consumed while supporting a tag remaining in
sleep mode is stored in the element 11. Thus, it can be obtained by (PWµp(s) + PWRF−sleep) ·
(Thour−Tt ·Nr), where PWµp(s) indicates the power consumption of a microprocessor remaining in
sleep mode, and PWRF−sleep represents the energy consumed when a RF front-end circuit remains
in sleep mode.
Eµp =

11 12 0 0 0
0 0 23 0 0
0 32 33 34 0
41 0 0 44 45
0 52 0 0 55

(3.5)
All of the energy elements in the matrix Eµp are enumerated as follows:
• 11 represents the energy consumed by a tag remaining in the sleep state. It can be obtained by
(PWµp(s)+PWRF−sleep) · (Thour−Tt ·Nr), where PWµp(s) represents the power consumption
of a microprocessor remaining in sleep mode, and PWRF−sleep indicates the energy consumed
when a RF front-end circuit remains in sleep mode.
• 12 represents the energy consumed by a tag receiving a wake-up signal. It can be calculated
by (PWµp(s)+PWRF−active) ·Twakeup ·Nr, where PWRF−active indicates the power dissipated
when a RF front-end circuit remains in active mode.
• 23 represents the energy consumed by a tag receiving a preamble signal. It can be calculated
by (PWµp(a) + PWRF−active) · Tpreamble ·Nr
• 32 represents the the energy consumption for a tag to realize the incoming command is non-
relevant, which can be attained by (PWµp(a) + PWRF−active) · 36µs ·Nr.
• 33 represents the energy consumed by a tag receiving an incoming command, which can be
obtained by (PWµp(a) + PWRF−active) · [(NB · (LB − 1) + Np2p · (Lp2p − 1)) · 36µs] · Nr,
where LB and Lp2p are the length of a one-to-all command and the length of a point-to-point
command respectively.
• 34 represents the energy consumed by a tag entering the processing-command state, which is
equal to 32.
• 41 represents the energy consumed by a tag to find out that the incoming command is a sleep
command and put the microcontroller into sleep mode, which is equal to 32.
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• 44 represents the energy consumed by a tag generating feedback data. It can be calculated by
(PWµp(a)+PWRF−active) · [(NB−resp · (LB−resp−1)+Np2p−resp · (Lp2p−resp−1)) ·36µs] ·Nr,
where LB−resp and Lp2p−resp are the lengths of the response data for a one-to-all command and
a point-to-point command respectively.
• 45 represents the energy consumed by a tag entering the transmission state, which is equal to
(PWµp(a) +PWRF−active+PWtx−active) · 36µs ·Nr, where PWtx−active represents the energy
consumption of energizing the transmitter.
• 52 represents the energy consumed by a tag listening for any incoming wake-up signals, which
is equal to 45.
• 55 represents the energy consumed for a tag to transmit feedback data. It can be calculated by
(PWµp(a)+PWRF−active+PWtx−active) · [(NB−resp · (LB−resp− 1)+Np2p−resp · (Lp2p−resp−
1)) · 36µs] ·Nr
After applied the energy parameters, such as the power consumption of microprocessor, the
energy matrix is given as:
Eµp =

206.250000 0.598950 0 0 0
0 0 23.740200 0 0
0 0.653400 16498.350000 0.653400 0
0.653400 0 0 8249.175000 5.405400
0 5.405400 0 0 59994.000000

(3.6)
Therefore, the energy probability matrix EPµp can be obtained by:
EPµp = Pµp × Eµp
and the State Energy Matrix, SEMµp, can be obtained in Eq. (3.7).
SEMµp =
[
5∑
i=1
EP1i
5∑
i=1
EP2i
5∑
i=1
EP3i
5∑
i=1
EP4i
5∑
i=1
EP5i
]−1
(3.7)
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The total energy consumption, Etotal−µp, for one active tag can be calculated by Eq. (3.8). This
calculation of the energy consumption is based on one circumstance, such as an environment with
20 tags, 20 point-to-point commands, etc. More detailed results can be found in Section 3.4.3.
Etotal−µp = Πµp · SEMµp (3.8)
3.4.2 Discrete Time Markov Energy Model for MP-µP-SB Model
Figure 24 illustrates the state diagram of the discrete time Markov process µP-SB model, which
is the discrete time Markov process model used for modeling the energy consumption of a micro-
controller and a Smart Buffer within one active RFID tag. The transistion matrix of the MP-µP-SB
model can be obtained in a square array as Pµp+SB in Eq. (3.9). This transition matrix is identical
to the Pµp of the discrete time Markov µP-SB model. The details of each transition probability can
be found in Eq. (3.1) in Section 3.4.1.
Pµp+SB =

p11 p12 0 0 0
0 0 p23 0 0
0 p32 p33 p34 0
p41 0 0 p44 p45
0 P52 0 0 p55

(3.9)
After applying the same environmental parameters, the transition matrix Pµp+SB can be at-
tained by Eq. (3.10). Thus, the stationary distribution can be achieved by Πµp+SB = Πµp+SB ·
Pµp+SB.
Pµp+SB =

0.774011 0.225989 0 0 0
0 0 1.000000 0 0
0 0.007858 0.992102 0.000039 0
0.000039 0 0 0.992024 0.007937
0 0.007937 0 0 0.992063

(3.10)
The key difference between these two models, µP Model and µP+SB Model, is the energy
matrix, Eµp+SB, which can be found in Eq. (3.11). With the assistance of the Smart Buffer, the
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microprocessor remains in sleep mode and the Smart Buffer enters the active mode in State 2 and
State 3 in Figure 24. The other difference is that the Smart Buffer, as well as the microprocessor,
need to be concerned with in the energy calculation of each transition. Therefore, the energy
elements in the energy matrix are redefined as following:
Eµp+SB =

11 12 0 0 0
0 0 23 0 0
0 32 33 34 0
41 0 0 44 45
0 52 0 0 55

(3.11)
• 11 represents the energy consumed by a tag remaining in the sleep state. It can be obtained by
(PWµp(s) + PWSB(s) + PWRF−sleep) · (Thour − Tt ·Nr), where PWµp(s) represents the power
consumption of a microprocessor remaining in sleep mode, PWSB(s) indicates the power con-
sumption of a Smart Buffer remaining in sleep mode, and PWRF−sleep represents the energy
consumed when a RF front-end circuit remains in sleep mode.
• 12 represents the energy consumed by a tag receiving a wake-up signal. It can be calculated
by (PWµp(s) + PWSB(a) + PWRF−sleep) · Twakeup · Nr, where PWSB(a) indicates the power
dissipated when a Smart Buffer circuit remains in active mode.
• 23 represents the energy consumed by a tag receiving a preamble signal. It can be calculated
by (PWµp(s) + PWSB(a) + PWRF−active) · Tpreamble ·Nr
• 32 represents the the energy consumption for a tag to realize the incoming command is non-
relevant, which can be attained by (PWµp(s) + PWSB(a) + PWRF−active) · 36µs ·Nr.
• 33 represents the energy consumed by a tag receiving an incoming command, which can be
obtained by (PWµp(s)+PWSB(a)+PWRF−active)·[(NB ·(LB−1)+Np2p·(Lp2p−1))·36µs]·Nr,
where LB and Lp2p are the length of a one-to-all command and the length of a point-to-point
command respectively.
• 34 represents the energy consumed by a tag entering the processing-command state, which is
equal to 32.
• 41 represents the energy consumed by a tag to find out that the incoming command is a sleep
command and put the microcontroller into sleep mode, which is equal to 32.
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• 44 represents the energy consumed by a tag generating feedback data. It can be calculated by
(PWµp(a)+PWSB(a)+PWRF−active) · [(NB−resp · (LB−resp−1)+Np2p−resp · (Lp2p−resp−1)) ·
36µs] · Nr, where LB−resp and Lp2p−resp are the lengths of the response data for a one-to-all
command and a point-to-point command respectively.
• 45 represents the energy consumed by a tag entering the transmission state, which is equal to
(PWµp(a) +PWSB(a) +PWRF−active +PWtx−active) · 36µs ·Nr, where PWtx−active indicates
the energy consumption of energizing the transmitter.
• 52 represents the energy consumed by a tag to listen for any incoming wake-up signals, which
is equal to epsilon45.
• 55 represents the energy consumed by a tag to transmit feedback data. It can be calculated by
(PWµp(a) +PWSB(a) +PWRF−active +PWtx−active) · [(NB−resp · (LB−resp− 1) +Np2p−resp ·
(Lp2p−resp − 1)) · 36µs] ·Nr
After applying the energy parameters, such as the power consumption of microprocessor, the
energy matrix is given as:
Eµp+SB =

206.250000 0.002756 0 0 0
0 0 0.114450 0 0
0 0.013194 333.148500 0.013194 0
0.013194 0 0 8249.652400 5.841900
0 5.841900 0 0 59994.605000

(3.12)
Therefore, the energy probability matrix EPµp+SB can be obtained by:
EPµp+SB = Pµp+SB × Eµp+SB
and the State Energy Matrix, SEMµp+SB, can be obtained in Eq. (3.13).
SEMµp+SB =
[
5∑
i=1
EP1i
5∑
i=1
EP2i
5∑
i=1
EP3i
5∑
i=1
EP4i
5∑
i=1
EP5i
]−1
(3.13)
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The total energy consumption, Etotal−µp+SB, for one active tag can be calculated by Eq. (3.14).
This calculation of the energy consumption is based on one circumstance, such as an environment
with 20 tags, 20 point-to-point commands, etc. More detailed results can be found in Section 3.4.3.
Etotal−µp+SB = Πµp+SB · SEMµp+SB (3.14)
3.4.3 Results
Based on these two models, an analysis of power dissipation is able to depict the impact of a Smart
Buffer on an RFID tag based on different communication patterns such as broadcast and point-
to-point communication. In three experimental scenarios, a general assumption is that only one
RFID reader (R0) starts the communication with a field of RFID tags (T ), containing N tags, with
a wake-up signal followed by a collection broadcast command. The reader then submits a
series of k point-to-point commands. Finally, the reader puts all the tags to sleep using a point-to-
point sleep command. The duration of each experimental scenario is one hour and each experiment
is repeated 20 times with the average of all trials taken.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
The number of tags (x10)
T
he
 e
ne
rg
y 
di
ss
ip
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 ta
g 
in
 o
ne
 h
ou
r 
(µ
J)
The energy dissipation comparation on a tag with and without Smart Buffer
 
 
µProcessor−based tag + 1 p2p CMD
µProcessor−based tag + 50 p2p CMD
µProcessor−based tag + 100 p2p CMD
SB−based with uP tag + 1 p2p CMD
SB−based with uP tag + 50 p2p CMD
SB−based with uP tag + 100 p2p CMD
Figure 25: The energy impacts on a tag for point-to-point communication patterns
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The results of three different scenarios are shown in Figure 25. Scenario one (solid line)
sets k = 1. Scenario two (dashed line) sets k = 50. Scenario three (dotted line) sets k =
100. Data points with “+”s represents the µprocessor only tag, while data points with “o”s have
a Smart Buffer. In this scenario the point-to-point command selected is the set owner id
command. The average energy saved by adding the Smart Buffer is 82%, 88%, and 90% per tag
where N = 100 for scenarios one, two, and three, respectively. As expected, as k increases, the
energy consumed by the µprocessor-based tags increases because the µprocessor is processing
every packet. In contrast, the smart buffer tags consume approximately the same energy regardless
of the number of messages because the µprocessor is rarely activated. The increase in energy
consumed by the µprocessor tags as N increases is due to the point-to-point sleep commands
which scales with N . The Smart Buffer based tags avoid this increase.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter discussed energy reduction issues. Two observations are made that energy is wasted
mainly when (1) irrelevant point-to-point commands are sent to a group of tags, and when (2)
the receiver of each tag always listens to the incoming signals. Based on these observations, the
Smart Buffer technique is proposed to assist power saving for a passive active RFID tags (PARTs).
The Smart Buffer is capable of filtering irrelevant commands and remaining the microcontroller in
sleep mode until it is addressed. Our experiments show that the average energy saved by adding
the Smart Buffer is 82%, 88%, and 90% per tag where N = 100 for scenarios one, two, and three,
respectively Section 3.4.3.
The amount of power saved by using the Smart Buffer is highly dependent on the scenario,
especially for a point-to-point scenario. First, the Smart Buffer must consume less power than
the active tag controller. This is supported by the data shown in Section 3.3.10. Secondly, the
amount of power saved depends on how many successful accesses the tag receives on average,
how long the processor is active, etc. We examine several scenarios and the Smart Buffer impact in
Section 3.4.3. As seen in Section 3.3.10 the power savings seen from using the Smart Buffer can
be several orders of magnitude for the microprocessor based tag.
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4.0 MULTI-LAYER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Applications for RFID continue to expand into domains such as electronic passports, electronic
payment systems, and electronic container seals. These applications have a risk of unauthorized
access to sensitive biometric or financial information through the RFID tag or tag communication.
However, as RFID devices are intended to be small and relatively simple devices, security
protocols and techniques can significantly lag behind the other details such as correctness, read
rate, power consumption, etc. As such, the state of security in RFID systems is generally weak
compared to other mature computational technologies such as Internet servers, shared computing
workstations, and even smart cards.
RFID systems require security features to be implemented using techniques that provide a high
strength of protection while not significantly increasing the complexity of the system as complexity
can increase power consumption and implementation cost. Thus, it is important to develop new
security techniques that take advantage of the fundamental properties of RFID communication
such as physical layer protocols, low-power communication extensions, sleep modes, physical
implementation variations, etc.
This chapter provides a survey of existing security techniques employed in RFID systems in-
cluding authentication and encryption as well as commonly employed types of attacks, and security
features of existing RFID standards. This discussion is contained in Section 4.2. Subsequently, a
security scheme, as also called layers of security, for an RFID tag that combines features from
passive and active tags is described in Section 4.3. Our security system takes advantage of the
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fundamental properties of the tag to create multiple levels of low-complexity security features,
that when combined provide a strong protection. Some concluding remarks are presented in Sec-
tion 4.4.
4.2 SECURITY IN RFID SYSTEMS
RFID systems in general and RFID tags in particular have the requirement of a power versus area
tradeoff. The power consumed by the tags impacts the range of the device (passive) or lifetime of
the tag (active) where the area dictates the cost of the device. In general, the industry has focused
more on the area constraint than the power constraint. The area optimized device for reduction in
cost. The composed of less than 10,000 gates.
Security concerns have often been a secondary concern for vendors primarily because strong
authentication and encryption algorithms are complex and would significantly increase the cost
and power budget of the tag. Sarma et al. discusses the security risks and challenges of low cost
RFID tags [38]. For example, in the security. In contrast, commercial implementations of the
advanced encryption standard require approximately 20,000 - 30,000 gates.
As a result, security techniques for RFID tags must leverage specific details of RFID commu-
nication to create low-overhead secure transmissions. It is important to ensure that neither the tag
and reader are malicious with the intent to access restricted data or destroy data. To prevent this,
authentication techniques for RFID are described in Section 4.2.2. Additionally, once a reader and
tag have entered into a trusted communication, it is important to prevent a malicious device from
overhearing the communication and stealing data. To prevent this, encryption techniques for RFID
are described in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Types of Attacks for RFID Systems
An intrusion or an attack to a computer on a traditional network has a physical limitation due to
physical network links. An intruder attempting to perform an attack requires either some physical
connection to the network through tapping a network cable or access to some terminal on the
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victim’s network. Those attacks may be traceable by detecting traffic over particular network links
or tracing with IP addresses, etc. However, a malicious access to computing nodes in an open RF
environment, such as RFID network, wireless sensor network, or other wireless or RF network
is not easy to be detected and much more difficult to track. For example, data travels over the
air which is easily detectable by many non-trusted devices. As a result, there is a high demand
to increase the security and privacy for RFID networks. To understand potential attacks to RFID
networks we have summarized several common attacks in the following subsections.
4.2.1.1 Eavesdropping An unauthorized observer attempts to capture the exchanged informa-
tion between the reader and tags without permission. This is a passive style attack. RFID commu-
nication occurs over the air and is thus an easy target for an eavesdropper to monitor data trans-
mitted without being detected. As a result, sensitive corporate or personal information may be
captured, recorded and analyzed by a malicious attacker. Complex data encryption and decryption
algorithms would be suggested as good approaches to prevent this type of attack. Unfortunately,
complex data encryption such as AES encryption is often too expensive for low cost and/or passive
RFID tags.
4.2.1.2 Spoofing In the spoofing attack, a malicious device forges an existing tag with a cloned
tag that can interact in a trusted manner by a reader. For example, after employing the eavesdrop-
ping attack, an unauthorized third party may be able to analyze and reverse engineer the captured
encrypted information. Often, this information is easy to crack as the encryption is typically simple
due to the limited design complexity of these tags. After the attacker breaks the architecture or the
secret key of the encryption algorithm, they are capable of cloning the tag to deceive a legitimate
reader.
This type of attack is able to defeat access control [39], allow unauthorized access to personal
property and systems such as e-payment [40]. Mutual authentication and complex data encryption
are suggested for preventing this type of attack. As before complex data encryption is often too
expensive for many RFID systems. When adding mutual authentication as a requirement, the cost
is increasingly prohibitive.
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4.2.1.3 Denial of service In computer networks, a denial-of-service (DoS) attack attempts to
paralyze computers so that they are not available for a legitimate access. One DoS attack is to
flood a network in order to disrupt services to legitimate users or occupy the most of the network
bandwidth. SYN flood and PING flood are two well known DoS attacks in computer networks.
From the RFID system perspective, a denial-of-service attack may cause either RFID readers
or RFID tags to malfunction [41]. In consequence, it will cause a tag temporary or permanent
paralysis where the tag becomes unreadable or untraceable. This type of attack may cause prob-
lems to applications such as automated inventory processing (e.g. shopping) or tracking military
shipments.
The denial-of-service attack can be easily performed on active RFID tags where tags utilize
batteries. The energy of battery will be exhausted at a drastic rate when an attacker surreptitiously
transmit a large number of RFID commands.
4.2.1.4 Brute force A brute force attack is an approach to guess a secret key of an encryption
algorithm or to gain an access of a computer resource by exhaustively trying all possible keys. For
example, in order to search the 56-bit secret key of a DES encryption system, a hacker needs to try
256 possible keys, meaning 255 trials (36x1015 trials), to find the match. To exhaustively compute
this is easily accomplished within approximately seven days as illustrated by the study of Kumar
et al. [42].
Researchers at the Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute and RSA Labora-
tories (JHU-RSA) successfully demonstrated the vulnerability of a 40-bit RFID-enabled crypto-
graphic tag [40]. The Digital Signature Transponder (DST) by Texas Instruments, utilizes a 20-
round unbalanced Feistel cipher encryption algorithm with 40-bit secret key [40]. This is the RFID
technology behind ExxonMobil speedpass, a wireless payment system tied into a credit card. The
research group at JHU-RSA built a parallel Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) platform to
perform a brute force attack to crack the 40-bit secret key. By utilizing parallel computation of 16
FPGA devices, the 40-bit secret key can be recovered on average in less than one hour. This group
suggests that a 40-bit cipher key is vulnerable for brute-force attack and a 128-bit cryptographic
algorithm is recommended for commercial and homeland security applications.
61
4.2.1.5 Relay The relay attack, also called the “man in the middle” attack, is an example of
a spoofing attack where a third party deceives the first legitimate party thinking he is the second
legitimate party and deceives the second party into thinking he is the first party. In effect the third
party relays the message from one party to the second and vice versa. Thus, the two authorized
parties intending to communicate with each other are tricked into a three party conversation without
being aware of the third party. Two relay-attack examples are shown in [43, 44].
The longest distance to make this type of attack is approximately 50 m [44]. However, the
relay attack is limited by the distance between the reader and the tag. For example, as the distance
between the tag and reader increases, the time of relaying signals by the third party between the
reader and the tag increases as well. According to the ISO 18000 part 6C standard, the reader waits
for the tag response within 77 µs after transmitting a Query to the tag. Otherwise, the reader will
terminate this communication attempt. Therefore, a possible prevention for this type of attack is to
set a more strict time requirement to prevent this attack even at reasonably close distances.
4.2.1.6 Side channel Unlike previous attack types, in a side channel attack a cryptanalyst ex-
ploits some information measured externally from the device [45], such as timing [46], power [47],
or electromagnetic [48, 49] details. Side channel attacks based on power analysis have seen par-
ticular interest for RFID and similar systems.
Power analysis techniques measure or monitor power consumption of a cryptosystem by phys-
ically probing a ground pin [47]. These analysis techniques have been classified into two sets:
simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) [47]. The accuracy of per-
forming SPA can be easily affected by the signal-noise-ratio (SNR) on the probed pin. However,
the DPA technique not only measures power consumption of a cryptosystem, but also requires a
statistical analysis based the collected power consumption information. Thus, it can minimize the
effect of SNR because it differentiates output power traces.
The statistical technique of DPA works using a correlation function that indicates the corre-
lation between using a guessed key and the unknown secret key of the cryptosystem. The key is
subdivided into sub keys and each permutation of the sub key is tested while the remainder of the
key is held constant. If the correct guessed sub key is used, the correlation function will indicate
high correlation (e.g. spikes of differential power traces) between the correct guessed sub key and
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the actual secret sub key. At the end the entire correct key is composed of the high correlation sub
keys. By using this technique the number of keys to try is reduced by orders of magnitude over a
brute force attack.
In 1999, Kocher et al. announced a DPA attack against a Data Encryption Standard (DES)
co-processor [47]. This work describes DPA traces with correct and incorrect guessed sub keys
against a secret key of the DES co-processor and shows the actual power spikes when the cor-
rect sub key is guessed. DPA attacks have been proven effective on various cryptosystems such
as an AES ASIC co-processor [50], AES hardware-based implementations [51, 52], and a DES
FPGA implementation [53]. To increase resistances of DPA, many protection countermeasures are
proposed [54, 51, 55].
For RFID systems, Rakers et al. describes a DPA attack on a ISO 14443 RFID enabled “con-
tactless” smartcard [56]. In 2002, Messerges et al. [57] illustrate an implementation of a similar
DPA attack on smartcards. Rakers also describes an approach to protect the contactless smart
card from DPA attacks by exploiting an isolation circuit. An isolation circuit is primarily used on
an ASIC to prevent bit error rate (BER) degradations due to digital interference. It behaves like
a current source which is independent of power consumption of the digital circuitry. Thus, the
power signature of the digital circuitry is reduced by a factor of 2000 or 66dB, which significantly
increases the difficulty to perform DPA.
4.2.2 Authentication Techniques in RFID Systems
Authentication is a mechanism or process to either verify the identification of a party with which
communication occurs or to verify the integrity of received messages without their having been
modified. For example, symmetric encryption mechanism provides a form of authentication among
those who share the same secret key. In addition, asymmetric encryption provide authentication
and confidentiality among those who share public keys.
An alternative approach to authenticate a message is the use of a hash function. The hash
function maps a variable-length message into a fixed-length hash value. It is easy to convert a
63
message into a hash value, but it is difficult to recover the message from a hash value without
appropriate information. An advanced hash function, such as Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA),
combines hash function with secret keys.
4.2.2.1 Lightweight Authentication Protocols Vajda and Buttyan [58] describe several
lightweight authentication protocols for RFID tags including encrypting a challenge message using
XOR, subset, square, RSA, and KNAPSACK. For example, in the XOR authentication protocol,
a reader and a tag initially share two different, independent random keys, k0R and k
0
T respectively.
The RFID reader initiates the authentication protocol, shown in Eq. (4.1), by transmitting a initial
challenge message of x0 XOR k0R to the tag. The tag retrieves the challenge message by computing
XORwith k0R and responds with another challenge message computed by XORwith k
0
T to the reader.
The reader extracts x0 and compares with the one it transmitted to the tag.
R→ T : x0 ⊕ k0R (4.1)
T → R : x0 ⊕ k0T
For subsequent runs of the protocol, xi and kiR are random numbers generated by the reader.
The reader transmits not only the encrypted challenge message but also the kiR XOR k
i−1
R . Eq. (4.2)
details the protocol for XOR. The other four authentication protocols utilize a similar flow but apply
additionally complex encryption methodologies to encrypt challenge messages.
R→ T : xi ⊕ kiR||kiR ⊕ ki−1R (4.2)
T → R : xi ⊕ k0T
Peris-Lopez et al. propose a new lightweight mutual authentication protocol (LMAP) tech-
nique targeting area optimized implementation for low cost devices such as RFID tags [59]. The
LMAP protocols is decomposed into four steps: tag identification, mutual authentication, index
updating, and key updating. The implementation of their proposed protocol needs 86, 173, 346,
691, and 1037 gates for 8-, 16-, 32-, 64-, and 96-bit authentication messages, respectively.
Bernardi et al. propose a new architecture of a UHF RFID transponder compatible with the
ISO 18000 part 6C standard and extending the system with secure authentications. Additionally,
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they proposed a multi-layer network protocol for ISO 18000 part 6C. The architecture includes a
microprocessor, output control unit, memory blocks, I/O encoder and decoder, and an encryption
module. A simplified asymmetric RSA encryption algorithm is implemented in the encryption
module, which encrypts 16-bit input plain-text with a 1024-bit fixed secret key and provides 1024-
bits of encrypted data. For a 90-nm HMOS process, a design running at 1.9 MHz required 1.4
mm2 of area and consumed approximately 1.5 mW of power.
Bolotnyy and Robin proposed a hardware-based authentication approach based on physically
unclonable functions (PUFs) [60]. PUFs take advantages of variations in silicon processes and
operating conditions to increase authentication strength. The PUF is based on a silicon random
number generator [61, 62, 63]. The value generated from the silicon random number generator
depends highly on the wire delay, temperature, thermal gradients, etc of the physical device. The
proposed RFID architecture combines the PUF with a universal hash function [64]. The proposed
64 PUF hash function circuit is composed of 64 single bit units and one oscillating counter circuit.
Each single bit unit requires an estimated 8 gates and the oscillating counter circuit are estimated
at 33 gates, which when extrapolated to a 64-bit PUF hash function requires 545 gates.
Leung et al. proposed the use of a cryptographic nonce as the tag identifier designed to avoid
the tracing and cloning style attacks [65]. A cryptographic nonce is a one time use number. Be-
cause the identifiers are used only once, it is not possible to trace the tag with its identifier unless
the sequence of identifiers is known to the attacker. Similarly, it is not possible to clone the de-
vice. However, it is relatively easy for the tag and reader to be unsynchronized through a denial of
service attack.
4.2.2.2 Symmetric authentication protocols A symmetric authentication protocol is an au-
thentication mechanism for those who share the same secret key to verify authenticated messages.
In describing the tradeoffs of security versus cost of RFID tags, Weis et al. proposed hash-lock
and randomized hash-lock authentication protocols [66, 67]. As hash-lock authentication uses
hash-based access control using one-way hash functions. By comparing an internal “metaID” with
the value of a hash function of a received key from the reader, the tag unlocks itself to the reader
upon a match.
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The randomized hash-lock authentication protocol [66, 67] extends the hash-lock technique to
include randomly generated numbers as identifiers in the exchange. For example, a tag is equipped
with a random number generator. When the tag is queried it responds with a pair (r, h(IDk||r))
where r is a random number, h is a hash function, and IDk||r is the kth ID concatenated with the
random number. The reader performs a hash function of all ID in the database concatenated with
r until it finds a match. To unlock the tag, the reader transfers IDk back to the tag.
4.2.2.3 Asymmetric authentication protocols An asymmetric authentication protocol utilizes
a public and private key to perform the authentication process. For example, the reader transmits
an authentication message to the tag encrypted by the tag’s public key. The tag decrypts the mes-
sage with its private key. The tag responds with the same authentication message back to the
reader encrypted by the reader’s public key. The reader then decrypts it with its private key and
checks it against the message it initially sent. General asymmetric encryption implementations
such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are exponential computations inefficient for pervasive
computing environments [68].
Niederreiter asymmetric encryption is an existing asymmetric encryption algorithm that does
not require exponential complexity but requires matrix operations [69]. Cui et al. introduced a
lightweight asymmetric authentication protocol designed for RFID devices [68]. This technique
employs the Niederreiter asymmetric encryption technique to perform a challenge response au-
thentication protocol by using public and private keys. The public and private keys are built in
Niederreiter encryption algorithm by generating several matrices and an (n,k)-linear code.
4.2.2.4 Strong authentication protocols Feldhofer proposed a strong authentication technique
for RFID based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [12]. First the reader generates a ran-
dom number Nreader and sends it to the tag. The tag returns a random number Ntag and both the
Ntag andNreader encrypted with the AES secret key. The reader decrypts and verifies the encrypted
Nreader is the same as originally sent. It then reverses the order of Nreader and Ntag and returns
this, encrypted, back to the tag. If the reader decrypts the correct Ntag, then the reader and tag
continue with their transaction.
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For this implementation the system for AES encryption is an 8-bit co-processor for and thus re-
quires only 3,600 gates. However, it requires approximately 1000 clock cycles to accomplish each
encryption operation thus requiring approximately 10 ms to computation time. From a power con-
sumption perspective, this implementation of the design utilizes 0.35 µm technology and requires
8.15 µA at 100 kHz.
4.2.3 Encryption Techniques in RFID Systems
Authentication provides a procedure to verify the identity of the parties to communication. In the
case of RFID, this includes tags and readers. However, after the authentication has been completed,
the readers and tags transmit insecure information. As the communication is wireless, it is very
easy for a snooping device to pick up and steal this information. In many cases this information
may be of a sensitive nature, such as biometric data, identification numbers such as credit card or
social security numbers, corporate infrastructure details, etc.
In order to secure the information exchanged between readers and tags, data encryption is
needed to protect these systems. However, current commercial data encryption modules may be
too expensive in terms of area (cost) and power (range/lifetime) to be feasible for an RFID system.
Therefore, several efforts have studied how to find “low-cost” encryption techniques suitable for
RFID systems.
4.2.3.1 Symmetric key encryption A symmetric key encryption mechanism utilizes a single
private key shared amongst readers and tags to encrypt or decrypt a message or data. The length
of the key controls the level of security for this encryption quantified by the time taken to break
the encryption with a brute-force attack. The length of key also correlates with the implementation
complexity of the security technique. For example, a modern 128-bit symmetric-key encryption
core costs more than 100,000 gates in area [70] while performing high throughput of encrypted
data with the strength of 2128 possible key values. However, for low-cost RFID systems, an RFID
tag has much stricter area constraint making this algorithm infeasible. Thus, implementations for
RFID systems must trade off encryption strength against implementation complexity.
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The Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) [71] has been proposed for low-cost RFID data encryp-
tion [72]. A 32-bit TEA algorithm has been implemented and synthesized for a 0.35 µm CMOS
technology. The implementation required 0.21 mm2 of area and could achieve a maximum clock
frequency of 50 MHz. The dynamic power dissipation is estimated at 7.37 µW with a 25.6 kHz
clock.
The TinyAES architecture is based on AES-128 for RFID systems [12]. The data path of
the hardware-based architecture is 8-bits wide. The silicon implementation result shows that the
TinyAES module draws a current of 3.0 µA and consumed the power of 4.5 µWwhen operated at
100 kHz and 1.5V. The core needs an area of 0.25 mm2 on a 0.35 µm CMOS technology, which
compares roughly to 4400 gates.
Another approach describes a tradeoff between area and timing of an AES encryption im-
plementation [73]. This implementation was introduced to reduce timing requirement of AES
encryption by optimizing the the data processing of the algorithm. The 8-bit hardware-based ar-
chitecture implemented in 0.25µm CMOS technology has a gate count of 3,868 gates and requires
870 clock cycles at 10MHz. However, the power dissipation information for this implementation
is not provided.
4.2.3.2 Asymmetric key encryption An asymmetric encryption algorithm relies on one key,
called a public key, for encryption and a different, but related key, called a private key for decryp-
tion [74]. Thus, to send an encrypted message, first the receiver provides the sender with its public
key. The sender encrypts the message with the public key and the receiver decrypts the message
with its private key. It is important not to be able to determine the private key from the public key.
To increase security by adding an authentication component, to verify that the message came from
a trusted sender it would be required to decrypt the message with the receiver’s private key and
sender’s public key.
Asymmetric key encryption requires more complex algorithms compared to symmetric key
encryption for comparable encryption strengths, but also provides many advantages such as not
having to divulge and share a secret key and the capability to manage the system for individual
devices and groups of devices. For RFID systems, implementing an asymmetric encryption scheme
is a significant challenge.
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a type of public-key cryptography proposed for low cost
RFID systems [75] and in particular for ISO 18000 Part 6C [76]. The ECC processor is composed
of a control unit, arithmetic unit (ALU), and memory (RAM and ROM). The ECC synthesized in
0.25 µm CMOS technology shows that the ALU requires 6300 - 7800 gates depending on the size
of the Galois Field adder GF(2m) where m is the length of the key. It can also be much larger
depending on the size of the memory block.
The study of Leung et al. [65] describes an implementation of a 173-bit ECC crypto-processor
based on an Optimal Normal Basis (ONB) methodology. This implementation is designed for
a low-power inductive RFID application such as the ISO 14443 contactless smartcard standard,
which operates at 13.56MHz. The 173-bit ECC crypto-processor is capable of operating at 18MHz
and executing an ECC encryption process within 7.56 ms and requires 95mW with a 3.3V power
supply.
4.2.4 Current Security in RFID Standards
4.2.4.1 ISO 18000 Part 7 The ISO 18000 Part 7 standard [3] is the most popular protocol
for active ultra high frequency (UHF) systems. To prevent malicious access to the tags, a pass-
word style authentication mechanism is provided in the standard by the set password, set
password protect, and unlock commands. The set password command sets an in-
ternal password required for further tag accesses. The set password protect command
enables or disables password authentication. The unlock command allows unprotected access to
the tag. Unfortunately, password protection is not a strong authentication technique, and passwords
can easily be stolen and spoofed.
4.2.4.2 ISO 18000 Part 6C The ISO 18000 Part 6C standard [22] is a recent adoption by ISO
of the Class 1 Generation 2 “Gen 2” RFID specification [23] for passive UHF tags from electronic
product code (EPC) global, Inc. Even prior to its standardization by ISO, Gen 2 tags have become
very popular and widely used for applications requiring passive RFID.
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Neither the ISO standard or the Gen 2 specification contain any particular requirements for
security in compliant tag or reader implementations and typical implementations employ minimal
security features.
The interrogator or reader can lock or unlock each individual area of memory. This includes
access to the access or kill passwords, the electronic product code (EPC) memory bank, or tag
identification (TID) memory bank. When the tag is locked, the passwords cannot be read or mod-
ified and all other memory banks are write protected. Additionally, the reader can permalock the
lock status for a password or memory bank so that it is not changeable. As the name implies,
one permalock is asserted to a particular memory block, it cannot be changed. Finally, the tag
can be permanently deactivated if the tag receives the kill command with the correct password.
After the tag is killed it no longer responds to interrogator commands. Interestingly, killed tags are
actually alive and can still receive passive power and actually buffer incoming packets, but never
respond.
Jeuls proposes an authentication protocol to combat tag cloning even in environments with
untrusted readers [77]. This protocol assumes an authenticated tag that contains its own unique
EPC identifier and its own 32-bit secret key. The readers authenticated to communicate with the
tag contain a database of secret keys associated with the authenticated tags. During a transaction, a
tag identifies itself and the reader verifies the identifier with its database. The reader responds with
the appropriate secret key. Finally, the tag verifies the secret key from the authenticated reader.
Unfortunately, if any adversary eavesdrops during this authentication process the tag identifier and
secret key can be captured. Data encryption is required to protect this technique for this information
leakage.
4.2.4.3 ISO 14443 The ISO 14443 standard [78] is the most popular standard for high fre-
quency proximity cards or what are also called contactless RFID cards or contactless smartcards
shaped at the size of a credit card. ISO 14443 compliant devices typically have a range of ap-
proximately 3 inches and cost less than $5. The devices are passively powered. The ISO 14443
standard does not specify any specific cryptographic algorithm or authentication protocol. How-
ever, security features, such as authentication and encryption, available in the smart card standard
ISO 7816 [79] are also compatible for ISO 14443 devices [80]. The ISO 7816 smartcards, which
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are in contact with the readers when they are accessed, can be directly powered. Thus, the pas-
sively powered ISO 14443 devices have a significantly lower power budget, making many of these
cryptographic algorithms difficult to implement.
Mandel et al. describe how to use a $30 device to perform a relay attack on proximity cards that
adhere to the ISO 14443 standard [39]. The technique takes advantage of the passive authentication
feature employed by these devices rather than more secure alternatives such as active authentication
and a challenge-response protocol. The broadcast signal from the proximity card is captured and
then relayed using a $30 AM transmitter to a gate that subsequently opens. In addition to being
able to recreate the signal, after snooping several proximity ID and broadcast signals, the passive
authentication structure in the card was easily reverse engineered.
Kfir and Wool analyzed the man-in-the-middle attack approach to perform relay attacking on
the RFID-enabled contactless smartcard [43]. In their approach they use a theoretical model to
describe the behavior of the device and show that it is possible to perform relay attacks when the
authorized tag and reader are in relatively close proximity to each other.
Hancke implemented prototypes called a “Mole” and “Proxy” system to perform a practical re-
lay attack against an ISO 14443 type-A contactless smartcard [44]. In this experiment, the distance
of the relay attack is shown to be as far as 50 m.
The MiFare microprocessor [81] from Philips, a leading manufacturer of ISO 14443 chips,
contains a crypto-co-processor capable of processing 3DES algorithms in hardware. 3DES is a
variant of the data encryption standard encryption algorithm (DES) originally proposed by
IBM [82] that avoids brute force attack vulnerabilities of DES and meet-in-the-middle vulnerabil-
ities of double DES.
4.2.4.4 ICAO extension to ISO 14443 Personal information contained within a travel docu-
ment, credit card, driver’s license, or other identification is often extremely sensitive and results
in concerns about information privacy. One of the applications that employs the ISO 14443 stan-
dard is electronic passports (E-passports). As this application raises a significant privacy concern,
efforts have been made to add additional security to ISO 14443 specifically for this application.
Juels et al. employ basic access control to prevent the RFID chip from being accessed by an
unfamiliar reader unless the reader can prove it is authorized [83]. To accomplish this, they employ
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a digital signature cryptographic technique based on public key cryptographic algorithms [74].
However, as these devices are passively powered, the power budget for operating the tag is limited,
which also limits the strength of authentication that can be employed. In this implementation the
key length is very small making it relatively easy to defeat. Additionally, the key is hard wired into
the device making it quickly obsolete.
E-passport cryptography is further addressed in the Machine Readable Travel Documents
(MRTD) specification published by the International Civil Aviation Organization [84]. The ICAO
requires a baseline security technique of passive authentication based on RSA, DSA, or a similar
variant. It also goes further to describe techniques for active authentication, basic access control,
extended access control, and data encryption.
The passive and active authentication measures ensure that the content of the RFID chip in the
E-passport has not been modified or that the RFID tag has been improperly replaced or forged.
Extended access control is a protection protocol to prevent unauthorized access to biometric in-
formation. Data encryption prevents against a third party listening to the transmitted biometric
information.
4.2.4.5 ISO 18185 [85] The ISO 18185 standard [85] describes RFID tags that can be used for
electronic container seals. Electronic container seals allow the tracking of a container all the way
through a supply chain to verify that the items have not been opened, or tampered with. When the
container is initially filled with cargo and sealed the ISO 18185 compliant tag controls a locking
bolt which is put in place. After the container has been sealed it may not be resealed. Once the
container reaches its destination it is opened by breaking the bolt and the RFID tag moves to the
“opened” state, where it remains and cannot be changed. After use the tag is disposed of.
The container seal tags contain no significant security features, data, such as cargo contents,
are transmitted in clear text. The only form of authentication is use of a unique tag identifier to
avoid replication. The 18185 tag is susceptible to a snooping and spoofing attack. For example, an
attacker can listen to a tag access to get the unique information. Then they can break the seal, and
replace it with a spoofed tag that uses the same unique id as the tag placed prior to tampering.
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4.2.4.6 ANSI NCITS 256 The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) published a stan-
dard for active RFID systems (ANSI NCITS 256) [4]. It defines an equivalent air interface char-
acteristics and specifications to the ISO 18000 part 7 standard including the same preamble signal
and data format. The differences from ISO 18000 part 7 deal with the types of RFID commands.
Except the collection command, there are 13 data commands in ANSI 256 standard. However,
none of them is used for access control, authentication or data protection. ANSI NCITS 256 is
vulnerable to eavesdropping, tag cloning, data disclosure, and other standard attacks.
4.3 LAYERS OF SECURITY
The approach for securing RFID transactions is to employ security at multiple levels during the
RFID transaction. These levels are applied to different layers in the communication scheme similar
to the layers in the Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model. As such, the system assumes as
the baseline architecture the passive active RFID tag (PART) [31] described in Section 2.2 and
the use of a design automation technique to program the architecture [37, 36, 86] described in
Section 4.3.3. Thus, the approach provides layers of security in the final RFID system including:
(1) the passive activation layer (burst switch), (2) the active communication encoding (physical
layer) (3) the use of encrypted data transmission (specified with the RFID design automation) and
(4) physical security protection.
The passive activation layer is encoded to prevent a malicious reader from continuously acti-
vating the tag to drain its battery or to attempt to issue malicious commands. This layer secures
and protects the security of the “Passive Transceiver Switch” in Figure 26. The physical layer
is encrypted using a mixture of Manchester and Differential Manchester encoding. This layer of
protection is developed at the level of the “Smart Buffer” in Figure 26. Finally, the encrypted
data transmission and physical security protection are developed for the layer of “Controller” in
Figure 26.
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Figure 26: Overview of the ultra low-power active RFID tag.
4.3.1 Passive Activation Layer Security
The burst switch alone is not sufficient to replace the active receiver for RFID tags. The simple
presence of RF energy such as noise or a communication with other wireless systems or even a
malicious reader can cause the tag to wake up the active transceiver. To solve this problem, we
have developed a signal encoding methodology using both hardware and software prototypes. The
RFID reader generates bursts of energy of different durations like those shown in Figure 27. In the
example from Figure 27, the reader generates four pulses with lengths of 2, 12, 3, and 9 time units.
The tag must detect a unique code from these bursts in order to activate the remainder of the tag.
The software based system is implemented with a PIC microprocessor [87]. The hardware based
system is designed for implementation in an ASIC or SoC. The strength of the encoding is related
to two components: the number of bursts in the sequence n and the unique number of different
burst lengths detectable by the receiver b. Thus, the resulting number of unique codes is nb˙. The
main components of the detection circuit, shown in Figure 28 are two counters and a comparator.
The first counter detects the value of the burst determined by the burst length requiring dlg be bits
and the second to tracks which burst is being checked in the sequence requiring dlg ne bits.
The clock speed of the circuit depends on the detection precision of the burst switch. For
example, if we consider the detection of a 6 µs burst with a granularity of 1 µs we clock our circuit
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Burst -Detecting 
C ircuit If  match
6_s , 12_ s, 3_ s, 9_s
2_s 3_ s12_s 9_s
Figure 27: Example encoding for the burst switch. The wake-up signal contains four bursts of 2,
12, 3, and 9 time units, respectively.
at 10 MHz. However, as shown in Figure 29 with the solid line, a 6 µs burst was detected with
non-zero probability for bursts ranging from 5.1 - 6.9 µs. This can be corrected by oversampling of
10X (e.g. clocking at 100 MHz instead of 10). Unfortunately, increasing the clock speed by 10X
also increases the power consumed dramatically. However, only at 6.0 µs does detection occur
with 100% probability.
Thus, rather than oversample, we consider the impact of increasing the number of pulses in the
sequence. The heavy dashed line from Figure 29 shows the impact of placing four bursts together
with the same deviations. Interestingly, the false positives drop off much more quickly than pre-
dicted (dotted line), which still predicts as high as 40% false positives after the actual number of
false positives have already dropped to zero. By including a small amount of oversampling (2-3X)
and breaking the burst detection into multiple bursts, it is possible to see negligible false positives
and keep our power budget at a minimum.
Once the proper burst switch encoding has been received, the active transceiver is wakened to
begin the active stage of communication. The encoded burst switch prevents a malicious reader
from executing a denial of service attack on the passive-active tag to dramatically drain the battery.
4.3.1.1 Results To determine the minimum time increment for differentiating a different length
pulse, we prototyped the digital portion of the hardware with Spartan 3 FPGAs and connected the
generator and detector with a wire. Figure 29 shows the percent of reads that were detected as
6 µs for values ranging from 5 - 7 µs. In this experiment the deviation was approximately 1 µs.
By considering four pulses, this deviation drops to 0% for 0.3 µs. When testing with the Lynx
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Figure 28: Architecture of the burst sequence detection circuit.
transmitter and receiver we found that the clock speed should be reduced significantly below 1
MHz as the resolution of the transceiver is at least an order of magnitude (100 kHz) slower [88].
The burst switch detector was implemented in ASIC hardware using Synopsys Design Com-
piler targeting 0.16 µm Oki cells and examined for power consumption using Synopsys Prime-
Power at 10 MHz, 1 MHz, and 100 kHz system clock rates. The number of unique representations
for each burst was represented using 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32-bits and for each experiment the number of
bursts was held constant at four. The area and power results are shown in Table 8. For comparison,
the same functionality was implemented in a Microchip PIC12F635 8-bit ultra low power micro-
processor requiring 200 µW of power [87]. Even operating at the highest clock speed 10 MHz, the
power consumption for the largest design is less than 30% of the PIC. However, a 100 kHz clock
speed design, closer to matching the capability of the transceiver, requires 300X less power than
the PIC when processing. Interestingly, at such low clock speeds, the clock gated circuit provides
little power advantage.
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Figure 29: Percentage of false positives for one burst and four bursts detection between +/- 1 µs
and granularity of 0.1 µs.
4.3.2 Physical Layer Security
Active RFID tags generally communicate using some form of Manchester encoding. Manchester
encoding combines data communication with a synchronization clock. Each bit is contained within
a window in the signal that contains a transition in the middle. If the transition goes from high to
low (falling edge), the bit is a ‘0’. Similarly, if the transition goes from low to high (rising edge),
the bit is a ‘1’. Differential Manchester encoding considers the same window, while again, there
is always a transition in the middle. However, the bit value is determined if there is a transition
between the end of one window and the beginning of the next. If there is a transition, the bit is a
’0’, and if there is no transition the bit is a ’1’.
Figure 30 provides an example of Manchester and Differential Manchester encoding of the
bit vector “011001.” The interesting thing about these two different encodings is that they appear
superficially the same, however, unless you know which code is being used, it is impossible to de-
termine the encoding just by examining the data itself. For example, in Figure 30, if a Differential
77
Table 8: Hardware burst switch detection circuit implemented in 0.16 µm technology at 1.8V.
2-bit 4-bit 8-bit 16-bit 32-bit
Area(#cells) 42 52 78 120 205
Area(µm2) 124 149 235 327 566
10 MHz Clock
Power(µW) 14.95 17.82 24.33 33.96 53.45
1 MHz Clock
Power(µW) 1.78 2.21 2.85 3.84 5.86
100 kHz Clock
Power(µW) 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.58
Gated Clock
Power(µW) 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.55
Manchester encoding of “011001” is read as Manchester code, it appears to be “101110,” which is
entirely unrelated to the original value.
To further protect data in our system, we mix the use of Manchester and Differential Manch-
ester encoding in the same data sequence. A key will be used to specify the encoding employed, for
example, a ’0’ would imply Manchester encoding while a ’1’ would suggest Differential Manch-
ester encoding.
To convert Manchester or Differential Manchester code into bit-vectors, the signal is sampled
so as to detect the transition in the middle or beginning of the window, respectively. To extract
the values from a signal that combines Manchester and Differential Manchester code in the same
signal it is necessary to sample for transitions at both the beginning of the window and the middle of
the window, simultaneously. This requires doubling the sampling rate over either encoding alone.
Additionally, it will be necessary to create logic to detect the existence or absence of a transition
at the beginning of the window and the direction of the transition in the middle of window to
determine the value. However, the key can be used as an enable signal to these blocks, so the
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Figure 30: Example of the bit-vector “011001” encoded as Manchester encoding, Differential
Manchester encoding, and Differential Manchester encoding read as Manchester encoding.
inactive block does not consume power.
The architecture of the decoder is described in Figure 31. The input signal is sampled to detect
the Manchester value and Differential Manchester value for the same window. The Manchester
circuit keeps the decoder in synchronization as it detects the transition that occurs in the middle
of the window with the direction of this transition dictating the “Manchester” value. It also sends
a synchronization signal to the Differential Manchester decoder to tell it when to sample for the
beginning of the next window. This is necessary as there is not guaranteed to be a transition
between the windows. The existence or lack of a transition dictates the “Differential Manchester”
value. The transition detection is completed by some variation of the edge detection circuit. This
circuit compares the current and previously sampled value and generates a ’1’ if there is an edge
or a ’0’ if there is not an edge. The direction of the edge can be detected by checking the current
or previously sampled value.
The final decoded value is selected by the key, where a ’0’ means select the “Manchester”
value and a ’1’ means select the “Differential Manchester” value, indicated with the multiplexer in
the figure. The bits arrive serially and are grouped into bytes for processing in the tag controller.
Keys may be updated by adding new primitives into the RFID system.
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Figure 31: Encoder and decoder block for combining Manchester and Differential Manchester
encodings using a key.
4.3.2.1 Results We built a Manchester decoder in 0.16 µm Oki cell-based ASIC hardware syn-
thesized with Synopsys Design Compiler and profiled for power with Synopsys PrimePower. The
design was analyzed by simulating the design at 500 kHz. 500 kHz was selected as the appropriate
sampling rate for a 27.7 kHz signal, which is the standard data rate for ISO 18000 Part 7 [3]. This
design is based on the Manchester decoder developed for a power saving smart buffer for active
tags described in [37]. The design was extended as shown in Figure 31 to include concurrent Dif-
ferential Manchester decoding and selection based on a key. The results of these two designs are
summarized in Table 9. The overhead of adding Differential Manchester decoding increases the
design area by approximately 42% and the power consumed by 38%.
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Table 9: Overhead for adding Differential Manchester decoding using a key to a Manchester de-
coder.
Area (#cells) Area (µm2) Power (µW)
Manchester Decoder alone 466 3780 2.886
with Differential Manchester 664 5386 3.996
4.3.3 Encrypted Data Transmission with AES
Once the correct encoding has been received by the burst switch and the physical layer has been
successfully decoded creating a packet comprised of several bytes of data, the data must be de-
crypted. The advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm from the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) was selected for our third layer of security. Our implementation
goal for AES was to create an implementation that was low-energy to allow the longest battery
life possible for the tag. As a result, we employed the SuperCISC compiler [89] to assist with the
hardware generation for the encryption and decryption completed in the tag.
The SuperCISC compiler generates extremely energy efficient hardware descriptions from C
applications. The primary concern for active tags is battery life. It is often inconvenient or impos-
sible to change a battery. Additionally, active tags are typically much more expensive than passive
tags, costing on the order of $100, compared to several cents for passive tags. Silicon area in the
tag controller design impacts the per part cost of the chip that goes into the tag. The SuperCISC
approach often trades area increases for energy savings. However, with the cost of active tags being
so high, a slight increase in tag cost versus a longer battery life is easily acceptable.
An overview of the AES implementation approach is shown in Figure 32. A total of five
blocks for the C implementation of AES were synthesized using SuperCISC. For encryption, AES
requires 12 rounds of computation with four functions occurring back to back: SubByte(),
ShiftRows(), MixColumns(), and AddRoundKey() with AddRoundKey() being exe-
cuting prior to these rounds and all functions with the exception of MixColumns() being exe-
cuted once after the rounds. Thus for encryption, three blocks were synthesized:
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Figure 32: AES architectural overview.
AddRoundKey(), which is primarily a Galois Field Adder, the combination of SubByte()
and ShiftRows(), which simplify to table lookups and routing, and MixColumns(). Using
a simple finite state machine (FSM), the resulting encryption block is shown in Figure 32(a). De-
cryption requires complementary functions InvMixColumns() and the combination of
InvSubByte() and InvShiftRows() in addition to the AddRoundKeys() block from en-
cryption. Decryption is implemented in a similar manner to encryption, as shown in Figure 32(b).
Figure 33 shows core synthesized hardware for the MixColumns() block. For ease of vi-
sualization, only a single iteration is shown here. MixColumns and its decryption complement
InvMixColumns() are the most complex blocks in the AES algorithm. Even this function is
built from relatively simple computations, constant modulus, constant increment, compare against
zero and select, table lookups, and exclusive OR. The SuperCISC compiler provides a low la-
tency combinational implementation of all these blocks to avoid the power overheads of a highly
pipelined implementation with a possible increase in area. However, the performance of these
blocks far exceeds the relatively slow communication speeds of approximately 30 kHz employed
by active tags.
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Figure 33: One loop iteration of the MixColumns() function from AES encrypt.
4.3.4 Physical Security
RFID tags are often deployed in environments that do not provide physical security for the device.
This opens the RFID tag to a class of attacks that involve analysis of the tag power consumption
to determine the secret key stored in the device. These types of power attacks have been effective
for breaking the encryption of smart cards [57]. The first class of attack is simple power analysis
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(SPA), which involves correlating the power consumption of the device to the input provided [46].
The second class of attack is differential power analysis (DPA), which uses statistical analysis to
help discover the secret key [47]. While both SPA and DPA require knowledge of the encryption
algorithm’s behavior, SPA is only effective when the algorithm has a control flow that depends
on the secret key, where DPA is effective independent of whether the control flow depends on the
secret key [54] making it a much more powerful attack. As a result, we consider the effectiveness
of DPA attacks on the RFID tag and discuss methods to protect against these attacks.
4.3.4.1 Differential Power Analysis (DPA) DPA attacks attempt to discover the secret key by
subdividing the key into subgroups of a limited number of bits and examining power traces for
all the combinations of each of these subgroups. For example, in 128-bit AES, the 128-bit key is
subdivided into 32 groups of four bits each. During DPA, a subgroup is examined between “0000”
and “1111” with all the remaining groups set to a fixed value. The power analysis compares a
known implementation that is using the guessed key value with the system to be broken where the
internal value of the key is unknown. DPA takes the difference between these two implementations
(averaged over the course of many input text samples) for each guessed key value where on average
the power differences cancel out, however, there are spikes when key values match between the
two systems.
A more rigorous explanation is based on the descriptions in [47, 57]. The AES algorithm is
executed withN values of plain-text input for each guessed key. A discretized power output signal
Si[j], is recorded for each of the guessed keys, where i is a particular plain-text input and j is a
particular key. For AES, 0 ≤ i < N with N typically being 512 and 0 ≤ j < 32 where the upper
bound is the product of the number of discrete keys per group and the number of groups. Using
the partitioning function D(·), the power traces are subdivided into sets where the guessed key
contains a ’0’ or ’1’ as follows:
S0 = {Si[j]|D(·) = 0}
S1 = {Si[j]|D(·) = 1} (4.3)
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A0[j] =
1
|S0|
∑
Si[j]∈S0
Si[j]
A1[j] =
1
|S1|
∑
Si[j]∈S1
Si[j] (4.4)
T [j] = A0[j]− A1[j] (4.5)
The average power for each guessed ’0’ and ’1’ is computed as Ai[j] as shown in Eq. (4.4).
The DPA bias signal, T [j], is the difference of the average power as shown in Eq. (4.5). T [j] is the
value which shows spikes when the correct secret key is guessed.
Table 10: Power, energy, throughput, and area of the AES hardware block implemented in Oki
0.16 µm cell-based ASIC design.
AES Mode Clock Speed Power Energy Rate
Encryption: Area 0.46 mm2
10 MHz 4.62 mW 5.08 nJ 1 Gb/s
500 kHz 0.19 mW 4.18 nJ 5 Mb/s
100 kHz 0.047 mW 5.17 nJ 1 Mb/s
10 kHz 4.056 µW 4.46 nJ 106 Kb/s
Decryption: Area 0.72 mm2
10 MHz 7.05 mW 7.76 nJ 1 Gb/s
500 kHz 0.28 mW 6.16 nJ 5 Mb/s
100 kHz 0.069 mW 7.59 nJ 1 Mb/s
10 kHz 7.031 µW 7.73 nJ 106 Kb/s
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4.3.4.2 Results The AES encryption and decryption components were implemented in 0.16 µm
Oki cell-based hardware synthesized using Synopsys Design Compiler and simulated at different
speeds with Mentor Graphics Modelsim. The power consumption was analyzed using Synopsys
PrimePower. The results are reported in Table 10. The results show that while there is a large
variation in power consumption dependent on the speed the energy consumption for the entire
AES operation is relatively similar varying between 4.18 and 5.17 nJ for encryption and 6.16 and
7.76 nJ for decryption. If the minimal energy solution was selected, it would be the 500 kHz speed
allowing a throughput of 5 Mb/s, which matches the clock speed for the Manchester decoder.
However, for line speeds of 27.7 kHz as is defined by the ISO 18000 Part 7 standard for active
tags, the 10 kHz clock yielding a throughput of 106 Kb/s is more than sufficient.
This design may also be possible or passive tags, which operate on a very strict power budget.
Typically, passive tags consume a few µW of power. The AES design at 10 kHz is already in the
µW range, and if the speed is reduced to approximately 30 kHz, the power may be reduced by as
much as 3.5-4 times to 1-2 µW.
4.3.4.3 Resistance to the DPA attack It has been shown that the predominant power con-
suming component of the AES algorithm is the Galois Field Adder, GF(2n), which is typically
implemented as an XOR function. The GF(2n) adder is from the AddRoundKey() function, and
the SDFG for this function is shown in Figure 34 as parallel XOR gates. To ensure that our RFID
tag is not susceptible to DPA, it is necessary to mask the power signature of this component so that
it does not change in the predicted manner dependent on the key.
The standard technique to accomplish the power signature obfuscation is to calculate each bit
of the GF(2n) (XOR) calculation as if the bit is a ’0’ and a ’1’ and then use the actual key value to
select which result is actually used in the computation. While, this method obfuscates the power
consumption, it does require twice as much work increasing the area and power consumption of
the device. Our goal is to protect the implementation from DPA while minimizing the area and
power increase.
The DPA technique presented by Kocher in [46, 47] assumes that the encryption algorithm
is run on a microprocessor and that based on the output testing, the test can determine when the
application is processing the portion of the key containing the four-bit window currently being
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tested. By using the SuperCISC technique for our implementation, the entire key is operated on in
parallel making it impossible to distinguish the operations on the four-bit window from the other
124 bits of the key.
Ba
sic
 B
loc
k 0
b0
0  ^ 
 
b0
0 
1
rk0
0 2
b0
1  ^ 
 
b0
1 
1
rk0
1 2
b0
2  ^ 
 
b0
2 
1
rk0
2 2
b0
3  ^ 
 
b0
3 
1
rk0
3 
2
b1
0  ^ 
 
b1
0 
1
rk1
0 2
b1
1  ^ 
 
b1
1 
1
rk1
1 
2
b1
2  ^ 
 
b1
2 
1
rk1
2 
2
b1
3  ^ 
 
b1
3 
1
rk1
3 2
b2
0  ^ 
 
b2
0 
1
rk2
0 2
b2
1  ^ 
 
b2
1 
1
rk2
1 2
b2
2  ^ 
 
b2
2 
1
rk2
2 
2
b2
3  ^ 
 b2
3 
1
rk2
3 
2
b3
0  ^ 
 
b3
0 
1
rk3
0 
2
b3
1  ^ 
 
b3
1 
1
rk3
1 
2
b3
2  ^ 
 
b3
2 
1
rk3
2 
2
b3
3  ^ 
 
b3
3 
1
rk3
3 
2
Figure 34: AddRoundKey() SDFG, which is basically a 2n Galois Field Adder.
The DPA attack was applied to our AES design holding the secret key 0x2B7E151628AE-
D2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C. Table 11 shows the DPA analysis (power difference) between our
design and a reference design. In the table the rows represent the differences for a particular 4-bit
window of the key. The bold values represent the maximum power difference with a particular
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key and the asterisk number is the actual key. Based on the results, the predicted key would be
0x4B33D3CD2112179A628B3A11672FB053, which is different than the actual key. To prove
that there is no relationship between the actual key and the predicted key we performed a t-Test
between the maximum difference magnitude and the difference magnitude when the key matched
the secret key.
For our test, we used an alpha value of 0.05 and the resulting p-value was< 0.01, which shows
that there is sufficient resolution for the maximum difference and that the maximum difference is
unrelated to the difference from guessing the correct key. We also calculated the number of bits
that differ between the key with the maximum difference and the correct key. The average number
of bits that differ is 2.00 with a standard deviation of 0.95. The median is 2. This shows that even
considering the deviation the result is a positive number of bits typically ranging from 1 to 3 bits
that differ between the correct and maximum difference guess. This confirms that the guess from
DPA of our AES design is truly unrelated to the actual correct key.
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Table 11: Differences for each 4-bit window of the 128-bit key. Maximum difference is in bold
and correct key is denoted with a *.
Difference in µW for the guessed key
Window 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
0 -1 6 5* 1 12 5 1 6 1 0 -7 2 -1 -4 -1 -3
1 5 4 6 1 -4 0 -12 -100 3 -1 5 -108* 1 3 6 -1
2 7 8 5 -9 -2 -1 0 -4 2 3 4 0 -4 3 1* -4
3 7 8* 5 -9 -2 -1 0 -4 2 3 4 0 -4 3 1 -4
4 1 3* -1 -4 -2 -1 0 -1 -4 3 4 -6 -4 9 2 -1
5 7 8 5 -9 -2 -1* 0 -4 2 3 4 0 -4 3 1 -4
6 7 8* 6 -4 -2 -1 -1 0 2 3 4 -8 9 6 1 -4
7 -1 4 9 -5 -4 -1 2* -4 2 3 3 7 -1 -8 -7 -5
8 -1 -1 6* -3 -2 -1 5 -4 -4 -3 0 3 -4 -5 1 -4
9 7 8 5 -1 -2 -1 0 -4 2* 3 4 0 -4 3 1 -4
10 2 -9 1 0 4 7 0 3 8 -7 3* 4 -6 4 -1 -2
11 -6 -8 -9 -8 -4 -5 7 5 5 7 4 -3 -4 -9 -6* -7
12 7 8 8 -3 -2 -3 0 -4 2 3 4 0 -4 3* 1 -4
13 7 8 5* -4 -2 -1 -2 -9 -1 2 4 0 3 1 3 -4
14 -2 2 -1 -5 8 -8 -5 -2 0 -9 -5* 4 -2 2 0 -5
15 -1 -1 1 0 3 2 6* -2 0 -6 -9 6 7 5 -2 3
16 6 4 2 -1 -2 3 9 2 1 -3 -7* -7 -3 0 2 -1
17 -2 -8 10 4 -2 0 5 1 -1 -2 -1 -6* -1 7 1 -6
18 -1 -1 5 -4 -3 1 0 5 9 3 -1 1 -7 -3 -1 1*
19 -2 -4 10 -1 -5 7 2 -9* 2 4 -1 12 -4 1 -5 -7
20 -9 5* 6 11 0 -2 7 -2 -4 8 -1 5 -1 -6 3 -2
21 -2 -8 -1 -2 1 -1* -1 6 2 -5 10 6 6 1 10 1
22 3 -11 9 -4 -2 -6 4 0 2* 1 -8 0 -6 -4 -3 -3
23 3 8 -4 -5 0 -2 -1 -4 -3* 0 -3 4 1 2 1 -8
24 3* 4 -5 -6 5 3 11 3 4 -9 6 8 -8 0 -3 -1
25 -6 2 7 -5 4 -5 -1 -11 0 -5* -5 2 1 0 2 -3
26 1 0 -7 -6 4 2 4 -2 -1 1 6 -6 0* -3 -2 4
27 -1 0 -6 0 3 5 -3 7 -4 -1 3 1 -6 2 2 7*
28 2 3 -4 -2 -5* 1 -3 5 1 1 2 6 3 3 2 -2
29 9 -4 2 7 -1 0 1 0 4 -5 1 2 -1 7 3 -1*
30 5 2 2 1* -7 -8 0 -1 -2 0 8 6 3 -1 1 5
31 -2 -5 -6 9 2 -2 1 0 -7 2 -2 5 2* 1 1 4
4.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter describes an overview of the state of the art of security in RFID systems. In particular,
the classes of security applied to RFID including various classes of authentication and encryption
are outlined in Section 4.2. The types of attacks employed on RFID systems and the facilities
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and extensions for securing RFID standards are introduced. In addition, this chapter describes the
current security problem for RFID systems, the security and energy trade-off circumstance. As
active RFID tags provide More security features, more energy dissipation is consumed. The new
security technique is studied and developed as the solution for this problem by providing high
degree protection with the minimum power dissipation.
A secure transmission methodology for PART is presented where our primary concern is func-
tionality and power (battery lifetime). Our technique provides layers of security as multiple levels
of defense against attack. The passive activation layer is encoded to prevent a malicious reader
from continuously activating the tag to drain its battery or to attempt to issue malicious commands.
The physical layer is encrypted using a mixture of Manchester and Differential Manchester encod-
ing. Finally, the data itself is encrypted using the AES implemented to avoid the key from being
broken using DPA.
These security modifications are implemented with a minimal power overhead from the actual
RFID transaction power required. The burst switch detection circuit requires< 1µWwhen operat-
ing at 100 kHz even for 32-bit values (.58µW). The modified Manchester, Differential Manchester
decoder requires approximately 1µW of additional power (1.11µW). Finally, the AES operation
requires a maximum of approximately 7µW at 10 kHz (7.031µW), which is more than sufficient
for the data transmission speed. Based on the active tag primitive logic controller implemented
in the same hardware, depending on the number of primitives included (up to 40) the power con-
sumed is 63-65 µW [86]. Thus, the overhead for the security is just under 9µW (8.721 µW) which
is 13.4% increase over the active tag logic alone.
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5.0 FPGA-BASED RFID TRAFFIC PROFILER
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an RFID traffic profile system that records details on the RFID-command
information of the RFID communication for the current RFID systems. It allows the users to build
the power estimation based on the monitored RFID communication. This technique also provides
an affordable approach to profiling RFID traffic, instead of using expensive devices such as digital
oscilloscope and network/spetrum analyzer.
To test new RFID systems or implementations, it is valuable to have real workloads from RFID
deployments. In order to accomplish this, we have created a technique to generate trace files of
RFID communication transactions. These trace files can be used as input test vectors for new RFID
components built to satisfy a particular standard. Additionally, these trace files may be adapted for
testing new protocols with similar or extended functionality of previous standards.
An overview of the RFID traffic profiling system is shown in Figure 35. As previously men-
tioned, the RFID interrogator broadcasts RFID commands to the field of tags. The RF-front-end
circuit converts the RF signals into the digitized RFID packets. The RFID packets are the inputs to
the RFID traffic profile system, which is composed of an FPGA-based RFID-command detector, a
C-based command-analysis program and a traffic profiling database.
The RFID traffic profile system is implemented by using as a hardware-software co-design ap-
proach. This system consists of an FPGA-based RFID command detector, which is the hardware-
portion of the system, and a C-based command-analysis program, which is the software-portion
design. The FPGA-based RFID-command detector [90] is capable of decoding the incoming RFID
packets. The C-based command-analysis program is composed of an FPGA-related Application
Programmer’s Interface (API) [91] module and the command-analysis module which is capable
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of generating the traffic output file. The C-based software program also allows the RFID network
analyst, RFID network manager, or RFID researchers to create a textual output file to study and
analyze the RFID communication among readers and tags.
Figure 35: Overview architecture of RFID traffic profile system.
A traffic-profile file or a trace file output from the C-based command-analysis program contains
a sequence of RFID commands, also called test vectors, which is captured from real RFID trans-
actions. Therefore, this information can not only be used for network monitoring, traffic analysis,
and collision-avoid study, but also can for power estimation of a design.
Multiple RFID standards exist [4, 3, 22, 85, 92] for RFID hardware, software, and data man-
agement. Some of these includes active battery powered tags and passive RF energy harvesting
tags with frequencies ranging from 125 kHz to 2.4 Ghz. In order to make the FPGA-based RFID-
command detector more flexible, the physical layer decoder of the FPGA-based RFID-command
detector can be designed and implemented by the RFID compiler [36, 37, 88] and RFID Physi-
cal Layer Design Automation tool as described in Chapter 6. They are capable of generating the
bitstream file of the VHDL encoder/decoder. Both design automation tools are also capable of
reducing design time and cost, making this system appropriate for different RFID standards.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 contains background ma-
terial on research and related work pertaining to RFID. The conceptual architecture of the RFID
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traffic profiler is presented in Section 5.3 with the description of the hardware-portion and software-
portion of the system. The hardware design is covered in Section 5.3.1 with a description of the
FPGA-based design approach. The software design of the system is presented in Section 5.3.2
with a description of program’s algorithms. Section 5.4 presents an example of using the trace
file provided by the RFID traffic profiler to study an insight of RFID transactions. The example
describes the power estimation approach for the passive RFID communication described in Sec-
tion 5.5 including the power estimation results of the RFID communication. The conclusion is
organized in Section 5.6.
5.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
The targeted RFID system is the EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 system [23]. It is a passive RFID
system, which uses the UHF radio signal for communications at 860 MHz to 960 MHz.
5.2.1 The EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 UHF (Gen2) RFID Standard
Communication from the RFID interrogator (reader) is accomplished by transmitting the command
to the RFID tag using a standard air interface. The tag will respond by changing the current state
and/or transmitting a designated response message to the interrogator.
Figure 36 shows an example of the EPCglobal Gen 2 protocol for inventory and access of a
single RFID tag. In step 1, the interrogator (reader) issues a query. In step 2, the tag responds
with a randomly generated 16-bit number. This random number is designed to avoid contention
between multiple tags and to ensure that the reader is communicating with only a single tag. The
reader acknowledges by returning a random 16-bit number in step 3. This selects only one tag with
which to communicate. In step 4, only the tag that issued the matching random number responds
with its PC/EPC, essentially its identifier. In step 5, the reader issues a transaction request with the
same random number. The tag responds with a transaction handle in step 6. In step 7, the actual
transaction is issued with the handle as a parameter. Finally, the tag responds to the transaction in
step 8.
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Interrogator issues Req_RN
containing same RN16
INTERROGATOR TAG
Interrogator accesses Tag.
Each access command uses
handle as a parameter
Tag verifies handle. Tag ignores
command if handle does not match
5
6
7
8
Interrogator acknowledges
Tag by issuing ACK with
same RN16
3
Two possible outcomes:
1) Valid RN16: Tag responds with {PC, EPC}
2) Invalid RN16: No reply
4
Interrogator issues a Query,
QueryAdjust, or QueryRep
1
Two possible outcomes:
1) Slot = 0: Tag responds with RN16
2) Slot <> 0: No reply
2
Query/Adjust/Rep
ACK(RN16)
RN16
{PC,
EPC}
Req_RN(RN16)
hand
le
command(handle)
NOTES:
  -- CRC-16 not shown in transitions
  -- See command/reply tables for command details
Two possible outcomes:
1) Valid RN16: Tag responds with {handle}
2) Invalid RN16: No reply
Figure 36: EPCglobal Gen 2 protocol.
An example Gen 2 transaction is shown in Figure 37 [31]. The output shown in this figure is
generated by a special piece of equipment housed in the University of Pittsburgh RFID Center of
Excellence called a real-time spectrum analyzer (RTSA). The example Gen 2 uses passive RFID
technology, requiring the RF energy generated by the reader to be used to power the tag, and to be
used for a backscatter-based response. Backscattering uses the reflection of RF energy provided
by an external source (in this case the reader) to transmit information. The backscattering device
(in this case the tag) either absorbs or reflects the energy of the incoming RF to generate low and
high values in the backscattered response.
94
Query
TAG: RN16
ACK
TAG: {PC, EPC}
Figure 37: Real-time spectrum analyzer output of a Gen 2 transaction.
5.2.2 Specification of RFID Commands
In order to implement the decoder of the Gen-2 command into the RFID traffic profile system ,
the fields of the Gen-2 commands are introduced in this section. The communication transactions
between the RFID reader and the tag can be broken down into a series of RFID commands. The
format of the respective fields of each necessary Gen-2 commands and its corresponding response
are both illustrated in Figure 38.
The command code of each RFID command is a unique field or opcode that serves as the
identifier. Each RFID command also contains a subset of fields with varying lengths providing
positions for data present in a command in Figure 38. Similarly, the tag response to each RFID
command has fields of varying lengths.
95
Query Command
QCmd DR M TRext Sel Session Target Q CRC-5
4 bits 1 bit 2 bits 1 bit 2 bits 2 bits 1 bit 4 bits 5 bits
Response
RN16
16 bits
QueryRep Command
QR CMD Session
2 bits 2 bits
Response
RN
16 bits
QueryAdj Command
QRCMD Session UpDn
4 bits 2 bits 3bits
Response
RN
16 bits
Ack Command
ACmd RN
2 bits 16 bits
Response
PC EPC CRC-16
16 bits 96 bits 16 bits
Figure 38: Selected commands and response formats from EPCglobal Gen 2.
5.3 CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE OF RFID TRAFFIC PROFILER
Figure 35 shows the overview of our design flow to generate these trace files. We begin with an
commercial off the shelf (COTS) reader, in our case a SAMSys reader [93] from Sirit [94]. This
reader allows the raw packets transmitted from the reader and received via the reader from the tags
to be connected to an external device. We have connected the reader to a Spartan III FPGA [90]
using a wired connection that is detected from by UHF RF portion of the reader. After detecting
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the existence of RFID packets, our FPGA-based traffic profile system receives these raw packets
and decodes them. These decoded values are then recorded by an external computer into trace
files.
The description of the UHF RF detector circuit presented in [95] is placed between the reader
and the FPGA board. To translate the UHF signal into a digital signal acceptable for input to
the FPGA, a prototype circuit similar to the burst switch circuit described in [31] to produce a
digital signal. The circuit is based on the typical design of the demodulator block of a passive
RFID device. The detector circuit employs a conventional envelope detector design (a diode-
capacitor network) followed by a low-pass filter in order to demodulate the ASK (amplitude-shift
keying) signal generated by the reader. Figure 39, captured from the related previous work [95],
demonstrates the basic blocks of the circuit design, where the demodulator detects any changes in
the voltage amplitude of the input signal. The signal is then passed through the RC filter. For the
implementation the time constant of the load components is optimized to minimize the distortion
and ensure an accurate demodulation of the data for the selected modulation frequency of the
reader. Thus, the digitized RFID packets converted by the RF-front-end circuit (e.g. the UHF RF
detector circuit) are the inputs to the RFID traffic profile system.
RF
Signal
Envelope Detector Filter
Digital
Signal
 
Figure 39: Conversion circuit from UHF signals in the reader into digital signals.
The RFID traffic profile system in Figure 35 is composed of an FPGA-based RFID-command
detector, a C-based command-analysis program, and a traffic profile database. The FPGA-based
RFID-command detector [90], which is the hardware portion of the design, is capable of decoding
the incoming RFID packets. The C-based command-analysis program, the software-portion de-
sign, is composed of a FPGA-related Application Programmer’s Interface (API) [91] module and
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the command-analysis module which is capable of generating the traffic output file. The FPGA
device is programmed with a bitstream file which can be generated from three different sources:
the RFID compiler, the RFID physical layer design automation flow, and the manual design. The
RFID compiler can decode primitives sent from the reader over this wired connection. The RFID
physical layer design automation tool can generate the encoder/decoder hardware blocks. The
manual design provides the state machine, on-chip memory design, the packet-analysis design, the
hardware-software interface design, etc.
Through the physical wire connection and the FPGA-related API module, the C-based software
program is capable of performing the burst read of the RFID commands from the on-chip memory
bank on the FPGA board. Meanwhile, for each incoming command it also analyzes, decodes and
outputs the results into the trace file, which may include the decoded bit information, packet arrive
time, etc. The software portion of the design provides flexibility and also allows the RFID network
analyst, RFID network manager, or RFID researchers to achieve the textual output file to study and
analyze the RFID communication among readers and tags.
A segment of a trace file for testing a single Gen 2 tag with a SAMSys reader is shown in
Figure 40. It should be noted that with the circuit from Figure 39, this setup can be performed with
any RFID reader. From this trace we can see the behavior of the reader. One interesting result was
discovered; the reader actually sends two select commands in sequence, which was initially
unexpected. However, this is likely the result of the proprietary implementation of the protocol in
the SAMSys reader and how it deals with reading large fields of tags. It also demonstrates that the
workloads from actual readers can be significantly different even though they conform to the same
standard.
The trace file generation was verified using a real-time spectrum analyzer to ensure that the
commands issued and stored in the trace file were the same as those broadcast in the air. The
remainder of commands shown here follow the expected sequence of the Gen 2 protocol.
Figure 41 presents the conceptual architecture of the hardware-software co-design system. The
FPGA-based RFID-command detector is composed of the Preamble Detect Block, the Command
Decoder, theMemory BankModule, the StateMachine, and the USB InterfaceModule. The FPGA
device is connected to the personal computer through the USB connection. The C-based command-
analysis program, including the FPGA-related API module, the command analysis module, and the
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Select:1010 000 000 01 00000000 00000000 0 0101000001010001
Select:1010 000 000 01 00000000 00000000 0 0101000001010001
Query:1000 0 00 0 00 00 0 0001 11001
Ack:01 0000000001110010
NAK:11000000
QueryRep:00 00
QueryAdj:1001 00 110
Figure 40: Example trace file output from a SAMSys reader and a single tag.
trace generator module, is loaded in the personal computer.
Figure 41: Conceptual Architecture of the Hardware-Software Co-design System.
Since the data flash rate of the FPGA-related API to access the data from the FPGA device is
25ms, it should be noted that the size of the memory bank module on the FPGA chip needs to be
sufficient to store the RFID packet information for at least a 30ms period.
5.3.1 Hardware Portion Design
Each component of the hardware-portion design is enumerated as follows:
• Preamble Detection Block: detecting the incoming preamble single.
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• Command Decoder: decoding the RFID command.
• Memory Bank Module: storing a sequence of RFID commands.
• State Machine: controlling operations in each component, and read/write access to the USB
interface module and memory banks.
• USB Interface Module: communicating with the C-based command-analysis program.
5.3.1.1 Preamble Detection Block An RFID packet is composed of two segments of bit-
stream data. The first segment is a preamble signal and the second segment is an encoded RFID
command. The preamble detection block detects a valid preamble signal. It receives digital bit-
stream preamble data converted from the RF-front-end circuit shown in Figure 35. This preamble
detecting block assures that the RFID traffic profiling system can tolerate the noise and only rec-
ognize a valid preamble. A preamble is comprised of a fixed-length unit (delimiter) and three
non-fixed-length units: a Tari, an RTcal, and a TRcal, as shown in Figure 42 [23]. The specifi-
cation of the preamble data is defined in the EPC global Class-1 Gen-2 Standard [23]. The RTcal
sets the calibration of the transmission from an interrogator to an RFID tag. The TRcal sets the
calibration of the backscatter from a tag to an interrogator.
Figure 42: The preamble signal of EPC Global Gen-2 Standard.
The RTcal carries an important information for the RFID traffic profile system. A new value,
called a pivot, is defined as pivot = RTcal/2. The pivot is used for decoding the following RFID
command. After examining the length of each unit in the bit-stream preamble data, the preamble
detect block signals the state machine, computes the pivot, and passes this value and the encoded
RFID command to the command decoder.
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5.3.1.2 Command Decoder After receiving the pivot and the encoded RFID command, the
command decoder uses the pivot to examine the value of each bit symbol. The data encoding used
in this ECP standard is the Pulse-Interval Encoding (PIE), as shown in Figure 43. If the length of
a bit symbol is shorter than the length of the pivot, the bit symbol will be decoded as bit ’0’. On
the other hand, if the length of a bit symbol is longer than the length of the pivot, this bit symbol is
declared as bit ’1’.
Figure 43: The Pulse-Interval Encoding of EPC Global Gen-2 Standard.
In the EPC global standard, some commands are fixed-length, but some are variable. Each
varied-length command contains the Length data field in the command. Therefore, the command
decoder is not only designed for decoding every bit symbol, but also for recognizing the type of
the command and its length in real time.
5.3.1.3 Memory Bank Module The memory bank is a dual-port memory block. The state ma-
chine can write the entire command into the memory from port A. Meanwhile, the USB interface
controller is able to perform a burst read of the commands from port B of the memory bank.
When the command decoder finishes decoding a command, the entire RFID command will be
written into the memory bank. Since the data flash rate of the FPGA-related API to access the data
from the FPGA device is 25ms, it should be noted that the size of the memory bank module on the
FPGA chip needs to be sufficient to store the RFID packet information at least for 30ms period.
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Figure 44: The control flow diagram of the state machine.
The length of the Lock command is 60 bits. It is the longest fixed-length command. In order
to provide sufficient memory space for storing a 60-bit Lock command for a 30ms period, the
size of the memory bank should be more than 4800 bits. Therefore, the size of the memory bank
is 80X64.
5.3.1.4 State Machine Figure 44 shows the control flow of the state machine. It drops the
incoming packet, if the preamble detection block detects that the signal is invalid. For the decoding
process, it signals the command decoder to decode bit-by-bit. For decoding the variable-length
commands, it sets a length counter when it latches the length of the command. For decoding the
fixed-length commands, it decreases the length counter which has been set in the initial process.
Before the state machine writes the decoded command into the memory bank, it checks if any
access operation comes from the USB interface. If the memory has been accessed, it resets the
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memory address and writes the command into the memory. When the state machine processes an
entire command and writes it into the memory, the command counter is increased by one. This
counter tracks the number of commands which have been decoded and stored in the memory.
Figure 45: The VHDL components of the USB interface module.
5.3.1.5 USB Interface Module Figure 45 presents the VHDL components for the USB in-
terface module, including the Host Interface, WireIn, and WireOut modules. The Host Interface
module uses read/write, chip enable, IRQ, busy, data, and addr signals to communicate with the
FPGA-related API program on the software side. It uses clk, data, and control signals to access
data from the WireOut and WireIn modules. The WireOut and WireIn modules are I/O buffers.
The size of the WireOut module is 16-bit wide. Therefore, 64-bit output is split into 4 segments of
data into WireOut 0, 1, 2, and 3. The Host Interface sequentially updates (e.g. read or write) data
from the WireIn and WireOut modules.
5.3.2 Software Portion Design
The hardware portion of FPGA-based RFID traffic profiler design is responsible for capturing the
incoming commands, decoding them, and storing them into the memory banks. The software por-
tion design is responsible for reading the incoming commands from the memory, analyzing them,
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and generating the trace files for these commands. The software portion design is consisted of
FPGA-related API, Command Analysis Module, and Trace File Generator Module. Each compo-
nent of the software-portion of the design is enumerated as follows:
• FPGA-related API: communicating with the FPGA-based RFID-command detector.
• Command Analysis Module: analyzing each RFID command accessed from the FPGA de-
vice.
• Trace File Generator Module: generating the trace files.
5.3.2.1 FPGA-related API Module The FPGA-related API module is capable of exchanging
data with the FPGA device through the USB connection. Figure 46 shows the flow of building the
connection to the FPGA device. If the FPGA-related API module receives the correct information
such as dll date, dll time, and the PLL clock frequency, then the API module has established
the connection to the FPGA device. The command analysis module is then ready to access the
memory on the FPGA chip.
// Load FPGA library
okFrontPanelDLL_LoadLib(NULL);
//Test the connection
okFrontPanelDLL_GetVersion(dll_date, dll_time);
//Initialize the FPGA device
okCUsbFrontPanel *xem;
xem = initializeFPGA();
//Set the PLL file and achieve it from the FPGA device
xem->SetEepromPLL22150Configuration(pll_default);
xem->GetEepromPLL22150Configuration(pll);
Figure 46: Configuration of building the connection to the FPGA device.
5.3.2.2 Command Analysis Module Figure 47 shows the algorithm to read the commands
from the memory, analyze each of the commands, and output them into the trace file. First, while
any command exists in the memory bank, the command analysis module gets the command from
the memory bank on the FPGA device. The xem is declared as the object of the FPGA device. The
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GetWireOutValue, a member function of the xem, reads the data from the WireOut module,
returns the integer value of the data, and stores the integer value of the data in the variable, the
CMD value.
while (NO_of_CMD != 0)
{
int CMD_value = xem->GetWireOutValue;
char* CMD_str = Convert_int_to_ASCII(CMD_value);
Analyze(CMD_str)
{
Decode CMD_code;
Format CMD_str;
}
Output(Trace file);
}
Figure 47: Configuration of building the connection to the FPGA device.
The convert int to ASCII function convert the int value of the command into a com-
mand string, which is a character array of ASCII characters, ’1’ and ’0’. The CMD str is a
character string variable storing the returned character array from the convert int to ASCII
function.
The analyze function decodes the command string. Based on the different command codes,
the analyze function recognizes each command string and presents each of them in its particular
format. The example in Figure 40 shows multiple decoded commands organized in their particular
formats. For instance, the Query command is formatted as CMD code DR M TRext Sel
Session Target Q CRC5 and presented as 1000 0 00 0 00 00 0 0001 11001.
5.3.2.3 Trace File Generator Module The output function generates the trace file. It can
be used not only to print the decoded commands sequentially, but also to output groups of com-
mands into the trace file. For example, the user can specify that the output function groups the
commands by the command code or lists them by arriving time.
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5.4 CASE STUDY 1: Q VALUE VERSUS SLOT COUNTER
An RFID interrogator uses Query to initiate an inventory round. Figure 36 shows an inventory
round beginning with a Query command sent by an interrogator to a tag. A Query command
carries a Q-value within the command, which the reader can set. Upon receiving a Query, the
tag generates a random value in the range of (0, 2Q − 1), and loads this value into its slot counter.
If a tag loads the slot value with zero, it replies an RN16 number to an interrogator. (An RN16
number is a 16-bit random number.) Otherwise, the tag shall remain silent until its slot counter is
decremented to zero.
For example, if an interrogator sends Query with Q = 1, a tag is able to pick up the number
from the range of (0, 1). Thus, the slot counter is either 0 or 1. If Q = 3, the tag is able to pick up
the slot counter from the set of (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
The QueryRep command instructs tags to decrement their slot counters. If the slot counter
equals zero after decrementing, the tag backscatters an RN16 to the interrogator.
Figure 48 and Figure 49 present two segments of a trace file illustrating the initiation of two
different inventory rounds. An example in Figure 48, an RFID reader initiates an inventory round
beginning with the Query command with Q = 1. After sending a QueryRep command to decre-
ment the slot counter, the reader receives an RN16 and sends the Ack command carrying this
number back to the tag. Therefore, the slot counter in the tag is 1.
Select:1010 000 000 01 00000000 00000000 0 0101000001010001
Select:1010 000 000 01 00000000 00000000 0 0101000001010001
Query:1000 0 00 0 00 00 0 0001 11001
QueryRep:00 00
Ack:01 0000000001110010
Figure 48: A trace file including Query and QueryRep when Q = 1.
In Figure 49, an RFID reader initiates an inventory round beginning with the Query command
with Q = 3. After sending five QueryRep commands to decrement the slot counter, the reader
receives an RN16 and sends the Ack command with this number back to the tag. Therefore, the
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Select:1010 000 000 01 00000000 00000000 0 0101000001010001
Select:1010 000 000 01 00000000 00000000 0 0101000001010001
Query:1000 0 00 0 00 00 0 0011 01011
QueryRep:00 00
QueryRep:00 00
QueryRep:00 00
QueryRep:00 00
QueryRep:00 00
Ack:01 0110010001110010
Figure 49: A trace file including Query and QueryRep when Q = 3.
slot counter in the tag is five.
Through this case study, the RFID traffic profile system is capable of providing internal in-
formation for each RFID communication. Although this case study is targeting the passive RFID
system, the RFID traffic profile system can also be used in active RFID systems.
5.5 CASE STUDY 2: POWER ESTIMATION OF RFID COMMUNICATION
Many communication parameters such as the size of the command, the complexity of the commu-
nication, the number of retransmissions, etc, can have an impact on the power consumed in each
tag. The power consumption of a RFID tag can be effected significantly by the behavior of an
RFID reader with respect to the commands sent by the reader. The RFID traffic profile system can
be used to evaluate such power consumption.
In this case study, the FPGA-based traffic profiling system is used to monitor the RFID com-
munication transactions for a two-second period and outputs the transactions into a trace file. The
first row in Table 12 shows the number of commands found in the trace file.
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Table 12: Power consumption of RFID commands and energy estimation for RFID transactions.
RFID Commands Query QueryAdj QueryRep Nak Ack
# of CMDs 89 71 261 14 36
Traditional Method
Power (mW) 0.113 0.059 0.061 0.034 0.052
Length (µs) 275 112.5 50 100 225
Energy(nJ) 31.075 6.6375 3.05 3.4 11.7
Total Energy(µJ) 2.765 0.471 0.796 0.047 0.421
Table 12 also shows the power consumption of each command from the EPC Global Gen-2
standard. Upon the number of commands and the power consumption number, the energy estima-
tion for RFID communication transactions from the trace file can be calculated in the row of Total
Energy. Each of the RFID commands is synthesized by using Synopsys Design Compiler. The
power profile of each RFID command is generated by simulating each design in Mentor Graphics
ModelSim and estimating the power with Synopsys’ PrimePower.
From the EPC Global Gen-2 standard, the length of each command can be calculated and listed
in the fourth row in Table 12. The data for the entire RFID communication is captured within two
seconds by running the “auto read” command in the SAMSys Reader, as shown in Figure 35.
The number of each command sent by the reader can be calculated automatically by the C-based
Command-analysis program. Those numbers are listed in the # of CMDs row in Table 12.
For a two-second period, a tag needs to consume 2.765 µJ for processing Query, 0.471 µJ
for processing QueryAdj, 0.796 µJ for processing QueryRep, 0.047 µJ for processing Nak,
and 0.421 µJ for processing Ack.
5.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter describes an overview of the RFID traffic profile systems and presents the hardware-
software design approach to developing the system. In particular, for the RFID network analysts
or RFID researchers, this system provides insight to the communication transactions and outputs
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the trace file for captured communication transactions between a reader and tags. The hardware
components, such as Preamble Detector and Command Decoder, can not only be designed by
hand, but can also be implemented by the Physical Layer Design Automation tool, described in
Chapter 6.
Two case studies illustrate the usage of the trace file generated by the RFID traffic profile sys-
tem. Based on the trace files, a user is capable of understanding the details on the communication
transaction. For example, in order to study the collisions between tags, it is important to understand
the information of the slot counter from tags. Every tag has its own methodology to pick the slot
counter or to generate the slot counter based on the Q value. However, there is no way to obtain the
slot counter value by using a traditional network analyzer or spectrum analyzer. The RFID traffic
profile system provides an alternative approach to obtain this information for the users.
The second case illustrates the power estimation for the RFID communication by utilizing
the RFID traffic profile system. By sending “auto read” command from the SAMSys reader for
two seconds, a tag needs to consume 2.765 µJ for processing Query, 0.471 µJ for processing
QueryAdj, 0.796 µJ for processing QueryRep, 0.047 µJ for processing Nak, and 0.421 µJ
for processing Ack.
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6.0 RFID PHYSICAL LAYER DESIGN AUTOMATION (PLDA)
6.1 INTRODUCTION
RFID systems have become a ubiquitous technology with applications including logistics, supply
chain management, library item tracking, medical implants, road tolling, building access control,
aviation security, and homeland security. A wide range of extensions such as memory, sensors,
encryption, and access control can be added to RFID tags. The interrogators query the tags for
information stored on them, which can include items like identification numbers, user written data,
or sensory data.
Multiple RFID standards exist [22, 3, 4, 85, 92] for RFID hardware, software, and data man-
agement. Active battery powered tags and passive RF energy harvesting tags are operated with
frequencies ranging from 125 kHz to 2.4 GHz. However, most RFID systems are being deployed
for closed loop applications and use either proprietary protocols or non-intersecting standards with
non-reusable tags and readers. RFID specifications and standards are often vague enough to create
compliant tags that cannot inter operate among vendors. Thus, in many applications, RFID tag and
reader hardware and software must be specifically designed for each particular application. The
entire system must be physically modified or re-designed every time when the specification for the
current application is adjusted. In particular, as new applications are introduced, the standards are
modified, new standards are developed, and new compliance testing is introduced, RFID system
providers need to update or redesign tags or readers. This keeps the overall design time long and
the system costs high.
This chapter presents an RFID physical layer design automation system and power estima-
tion system that allows the design, optimization, and verification of new RFID specifications and
standards. This technique also allows the merging of two or more standards or specifications for
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interoperability among standards and backward compatibility. The resulting RFID device consists
of an automatically generated controller and physical layer hardware block that can interface with
existing RF circuitry and antennas.
RFID Tag
RFID Macros 
and Behavior
RFID Physical 
Layer Description
RFID Compiler
RFID Physical 
Layer Generator Interface
VHDL
VHDL
Backend 
CAD FPGA
COTS Air 
Interface
Figure 50: Overview of the RFID design automation flow.
The physical layer design automation tool also integrates with a design automation flow for the
transaction level of the RFID system [36, 37, 31, 86], and a commercial off the shelf air interface
to create a complete RFID system. An overview of the entire design automation flow is shown in
Figure 50 with the physical layer design flow highlighted.
Basic RFID systems, either readers or tags, contain three major components: an antenna/air
interface, a physical layer encoder and decoder, and a transaction layer controller. In this chapter
a design automation flow for the physical layer component of an RFID system is described. This
technique is called Physical Layer Design Automation. The overview design flow of Physical
Layer Design Automation is shown in Figure 51. It indicates several main components used in
the tool: the input textual file describing the physical layer waveform feature, the waveform
feature library which provides template VHDL components, and the synthesis process of parsing
the textual file and generating encoder/decoder VHDL code.
The design methodology allows the users to input the specification of waveform features of
encodings, which are captured in a textual format. These features specify characteristics of wave-
forms, such as bit period(s), bit accuracy, edge transitions, level detection, pulse width detection,
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etc. They are then used as inputs to parameterized hardware blocks and combined with automat-
ically generated customized hardware blocks. The result is automatically generated encoding and
decoding hardware blocks.
The main contributions of the physical layer design automation are to compile a variety of
encoding specifications and to generate corresponding encoder/decoder hardware blocks. Each
encoding scheme has its own waveform properties. Some of them require one transition in one
bit window, but some of them require multiple transitions. Some of them use a fixed bit-window
size, but some of them use a floating bit-window size. For some of the encodings, each bit has a
particular dependency with the previous bit. But some of them do not follow this rule. Thus, every
waveform-feature textual file provided by a user may contain a variety of waveform requirements.
RFID standard
Bit coding specification
Physical layer
waveform feature 
library
Synthesis
Physical layer
waveform 
features
Encoder
VHDL
Decoder
VHDL
Figure 51: The generation flow of the Physical Layer Design Automation system for an RFID
data encoder and decoder.
The entire design system was developed using the object-oriented programming language,
C++. Two main functions are used in the synthesis process: Parse and VHDL Generation. The
Parse procedure is a function used to parse the waveform features and to construct a group of fea-
ture objects. The VHDL Generation procedure explains how to generate encoder/decoder VHDL
code by using the group of feature objects and the template components in the waveform-feature
library.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 contains background ma-
terial on research and related work. The physical layer design automation flow is presented in
Section 6.3. The textual representation of the waveform is described in Section 6.3.1. The parsing
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procedure is presented in Section 6.3.2. A description of the interface with the waveform features
library and the VHDL generation procedure are described in Section 6.3.3. An explanation of the
final synthesis process is presented in Section 6.3.4. Results are presented in Section 6.4. Finally,
conclusions are included in Section 6.5.
6.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
There has been an explosion of interest in RFID in recent years. Some of the open issues in the
RFID domain are the existence of multiple standards, the use of high frequency (HF) or ultra high
frequency (UHF), the use of near field or far field powering and communication, the handling
of stored data and their formats, tag orientation, reader collision [96], range, cost, and security
concerns [97]. For active tags, maximizing battery life is an important concern. Recent research
has been focused on finding solutions for some of these issues.
Recent advancements in tag hardware contribute to improvements in range, power consump-
tion [31], tag antenna design [98, 99], packaging, and tag orientation. For performance charac-
terization of RFID systems under active interference, a test protocol is presented in [100] and
its effectiveness is verified. For RFID readers, a solution is developed for the problem of Tx/Rx
isolation at the physical layer [101].
Another issue is that proprietary hardware and software are used in specific application do-
mains. These devices must be physically modified or re-designed for adjustments in the specifi-
cation, the introduction of new applications, and/or modifications to relevant standards. A cus-
tomizable RFID tag can handle variations in standards and requirements as they are developed
with a significantly shorter time to market than current ad hoc techniques such as the prototyping
described in [88].
Figure 52 presents a comparison of different RFID tag design methodologies. The current state
of the art tag development shown in Figure 52(a) requires lengthy design, fabrication, and testing
cycles which can take months, with intellectual property (IP) reuse, to years if developing new
IP. A customizable RFID tag, as shown in Figure 52(b), can handle variations in standards and
requirements as they are developed with a significantly shorter time to market than current flows.
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The RFID compiler in the automated RFID tag design flow is capable of parsing the “Design RFID
Specification” into the C language and converting C to VHDL code.. Such a tag is mass produced
and tailored to a particular RFID use after fabrication. With the use of automation to program the
device, the design time can be reduced to hours or days.
(a) Current RFID tag design flow. All tag components integrated manually. Estimated time: months
or years.
Design RFID 
Specification RFID Compiler
Extensible 
RFID Tag
Air 
Interface
Library
Physical 
Layer 
Library
(b) Automated RFID tag design flow. Prepackaged extensible sili-
con device. Estimated time: hours or days.
Figure 52: Comparison of RFID tag design philosophies.
The overview architecture of an extensible RFID tag system is presented in Figure 53. The tag
can be easily customized to work with different existing or newly developed standards and even
concurrently with proprietary commands tailored to the desired application. The tag consists of au-
tomatically generated controller and physical layer hardware that works with existing air interface
blocks. To generate the controller and physical layer blocks, a design automation methodology has
been developed.
For the controller, the methodology allows the commands employed by the RFID system to
be specified using RFID macros, an assembly-like format. These RFID macros are processed
to generate a template file to specify the behavior for each primitive or macro. All behavior is
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Figure 53: Extensible RFID tag. Balloon objects are automatically generated with RFID Compiler.
specified using ANSI-C allowing the user to create arbitrarily complex behaviors. Finally, the
RFID compiler generates the final controller used for managing the tag. This technique allows the
seamless coexistence of several RFID standards such as the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) standard 256-2001 [4] and the International Standards Organization (ISO) standard 18000
Part 7 [3]. This technique is described in detail in Dontharaju’s dissertation [102].
For the physical layer, the methodology allows the specification of waveform features of the
encoding, which are specified in a textual format. The waveform feature is defined as a speci-
fication of waveforms including signal and timing information. These features are then used as
inputs to parameterized hardware blocks and combined with automatically generated customized
hardware blocks. The result is automatically generated encoding and decoding hardware blocks.
6.3 RFID PHYSICAL LAYER DESIGN AUTOMATION
One of the main components of an RFID system communication is the physical layer protocol em-
ployed to encode bits of information. The physical layer features for the bit encoding mechanism
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vary across various RFID standards. For example, the ISO 18000 Part 7 active tag standard spec-
ifies Manchester encoding [103] to transmit encoded data among RFID interrogators and tags [3],
while the ISO 18000 Part 6C standard defines different physical layer features of transactions
among readers and tags. Pulse-Interval Encoding (PIE) [22] is utilized to encode data transmit-
ted from readers to tags, and either FM0 [104] or Miller encoding [105] is utilized to encode the
backscattered data from tags back to readers [22]. Additionally, many other possible physical layer
encodings can be considered for RFID communications.
This section describes how the physical layer decoder and encoder blocks can be automati-
cally generated from a high-level specification of the protocol. This design flow is described in
Figure 51. For a physical layer specification, the user describes the waveform features of the en-
coding scheme such as edge transitions, level detection, pulse width detection, etc. The user can
then combine one or more wave features to represent bits or groups of bits. The physical layer
design automation tool, also called as the physical layer synthesis tool, then automatically gener-
ates hardware blocks for encoding and decoding the signal in VHDL. These VHDL descriptions
are created from the combination of predefined parameterized hardware libraries and automati-
cally generated hardware blocks used for detecting and generating the waveform features in the
encoding.
This dissertation presents the design flow for the physical layer from waveform features to
encoding and decoding hardware blocks. The algorithm, approaches, and techniques used in the
design flow are described in this dissertation. The main emphasis of this contribution is to shorten
the design time and to provide flexibility to the design flow as well. Thus, the Physical Layer
Design Automation (PLDA), not only generates encoding and decoding hardware blocks for dif-
ferent RFID standards, but also for general applications, as long as users provide the specification
of waveform features.
6.3.1 Specification of Waveform
The user describes the features of the encoding scheme using a textual representation. This repre-
sentation is created from a physical layer specification such as an RFID standard. It may include
edge transitions, level detection, pulse width detection, etc. After this file has been created, it be-
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comes the input to the physical layer synthesis tool shown in Figure 51. The textual file contains
three major segments: (1) declaration of the waveform to encode data values, (2) the declaration
of the preamble waveform, and (3) transmission characteristics for serial to parallel conversion.
Five encoding/decoding mechanisms collected from multiple RFID standards are enumerated as
following: (1) Manchester Encoding, (2) Differential Manchester Encoding, (3) Pulse-Interval
Encoding (PIE), (4) FM0, and (5) Modified Miller.
6.3.1.1 Manchester Encoding Manchester encoding [103] is a fixed-bit-window encoding
scheme specified in ISO 18000 Part 7 for transactions among active RFID readers and tags. The
waveforms of encoded bit ’0’ and bit ’1’ are illustrated in Figure 54(a). A Manchester encoding
signal encodes original data by XORing it with a clock signal. A transition (either a falling or a
rising edge) must occur in the middle of each bit window.
Bit 0
Bit 1
50%
50%
T = 36µs
50%
50%
T = 36µs
(a) Manchester encod-
ing.
Bit 0
50%
T = 36µs
50%
Bit 1
50%
T = 36µs
50%
or
or
(b) Differential Manchester encoding.
Figure 54: Continuous waveform for bits ’0’ and ’1’ of NRZ encodings.
The waveform feature of Manchester encoding for encoding a bit as either ’0’ or ’1’ is de-
scribed in Figure 55. Sig represents the non-return to zero (NRZ) value of the signal. The key-
word for describes the period of time for either logic level ’1’ or ’0’. For example, the statement,
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’1’ for 18 us, implies that the signal stays high for 18 µs. Transitions in the signal are repre-
sented by an & with a non-zero for parameter. Thus, the entire feature description,’0’: Sig
= ’1’ for 18 us & ’0’ for 18 us;, can be interpreted as the bit ’0’ is encoded as the
signal staying at a high level for 18 µs followed by a falling-edge transition and the signal staying
at a low level for 18 µs.
The length of the bit window is specified by a period T. Finally, A specifies how accurately each
measurement must be as a percentage of T. In the example from Figure 55, a ’0’ is represented
by a 50% duty cycle clock with a falling edge in the middle of the bit window. The edge must be
within 12.5% of the total period, which means 6.75% of the period before or after the expected
transition. In this case the transition occurs at 18 ± 2.43µs. A ’1’ is similar except with a rising
edge.
’0’: Sig = ’1’ for 18 us & ’0’ for 18 us;
’0’: T = 36 us; A = 12.5%;
’1’: Sig = ’0’ for 18 us & ’1’ for 18 us;
’1’: T = 36 us; A = 12.5%;
Figure 55: Textual description of Manchester Encoding
’0’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig = ’1’ for 18 us & ’0’ for 18 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig = ’0’ for 18 us & ’1’ for 18 us;
’0’: T = 36 us; A = 12.5%;
’1’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig = ’0’ for 18 us & ’1’ after 18 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig = ’1’ for 18 us & ’0’ after 18 us;
’1’: T = 36 us; A = 12.5%;
Figure 56: Textual description of Differential Manchester encoding.
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6.3.1.2 Differential Manchester Encoding Differential Manchester encoding, shown in Fig-
ure 54(b), is a modification of Manchester encoding used most prominently in token ring net-
works [106]. At first glance, Manchester and Differential Manchester encodings are indistinguish-
able as they both require a transition in the middle of a bit window for synchronization, and may
or may not have a transition at the edge of a window. However, Differential Manchester deter-
mines its value by examining the level between windows. As shown in Figure 54(b), if there is an
transition between windows this encodes a ’0’ and if there is no transition this encodes a ’1’.
To support this case, we add an Lprev condition to our waveform representation as shown
in Figure 56. Depending on the previous level, the user’s description describes a level change for
a ’0’ encoded bit and no level change for a ’1’ encoded bit. The if statement determines which
waveform to consider based on Lprev.
Pulse0
Pulse1
PW
PW
Bit ‘0’
Bit ‘1’
T0 
1.5 T0 < T1 < 2.0 T0
(a) Pulse-Interval encoding (PIE) encoding.
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(b) FM0 encoding.
Figure 57: Continuous waveform for bits ’0’ and ’1’ of PIE and FM0 encodings.
6.3.1.3 Pulse-Interval Encoding (PIE) Pulse-Interval Encoding (PIE) and FM0 encodings are
two different encodings used in the ISO 18000 Part 6C standard. These encodings are shown in
Figure 57. The waveform of PIE encoding is shown in Figure 57(a). This encoding is used for the
data transmission from an interrogator to RFID tags. The special characteristic of this encoding
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is that the bit window of either bit ’1’ or ’0’ is not fixed. The physical layer characteristics of
PIE are shown in Figure 57(a). Encodings for both ’1’ and ’0’ are based on an active high pulse
followed by a fixed width space called PW. The length of the pulse determines whether a ’1’ or ’0’
is encoded. Thus, the period T is different for each value. Unlike previous encodings, there is a
large amount of flexibility in the pulse lengths to make a valid PIE encoded value.
For PIE encoding, in the textual representation shown in Figure 58 the error keyword is
introduced, that allows a transition to take place within a range of times. For example, 7.5 us
error 1.6 us means that the transition could occur anywhere from 5.9 µs to 9.1 µs. This
is different from the A which corresponds to jitter associated with the RF transmission. For the
PIE encoding described in the ISO 18000 Part 6C standard, there are three possible periods for
encoding the values. Each is described in a separate statement in Figure 58. In some cases, the
period itself may fall within a range which is described by the error keyword.
[Tari = 6.25µs]
’0’: Sig = ’1’ for 3.125 us & ’0’ for 3.125 us error 0.64us ;
’0’: T = 6.25 us, A = 1%;
[Tari = 12.5µs]
’0’: Sig = ’1’ for 6.25 us & ’0’ for 6.25 us error 1.62us ;
’0’: T = 12.5 us, A = 1%;
[Tari = 25µs]
’0’: Sig = ’1’ for 12.5 us & ’0’ for 12.5 us error 3.25us ;
’0’: T = 25 us, A = 1%;
[Tari = 6.25µs]
’1’: Sig = ’1’ for 9.375 us & ’0’ for 3.125 us error 1.56us;
’1’: T = 12.5 us; A = 1%;
[Tari = 12.5µs]
’1’: Sig = ’1’ for 18.75 us & ’0’ for 6.25 us error 3.125us;
’1’: T = 25 us; A = 1%;
[Tari = 25µs]
’1’: Sig = ’1’ for 37.5 us & ’0’ for 12.5 us error 6.25us;
’1’: T = 50 us; A = 1%;
Figure 58: Textual description of Pulse-Interval Encoding (PIE).
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’0’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 3.1 us & ’0’ for 3.1 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 3.1 us & ’1’ for 3.1 us;
’0’: T = 6.2 us; A = 7%;
’0’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 2 us & ’0’ for 2 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 2 us & ’1’ for 2 us;
’0’: T = 3.9 us; A = 10%;
’0’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 1.5 ns & ’0’ for 1.5 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 1.5 ns & ’1’ for 1.5 us;
’0’: T = 3.1 us; A = 10%;
’0’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 0.7 ns & ’0’ for 0.7 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 0.7 ns & ’1’ for 0.7 us;
’0’: T = 1.5 us; A = 15%;
’1’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 6.2 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 6.2 us;
’1’: T = 6.2 us; A = 7%;
’1’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 3.9 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 3.9 us;
’1’: T = 3.9 us; A = 10%;
’1’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 3.1 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 3.1 us;
’1’: T = 3.1 us; A = 10%
’1’: if Lprev = ’0’ then Sig =’1’ for 1.5 us;
if Lprev = ’1’ then Sig =’0’ for 1.5 us;
’1’: T = 1.5 us; A = 15%;
Figure 59: Textual description of FM0 Encoding.
6.3.1.4 FM0 The FM0 encoding scheme is one of the encodings used in the ISO 18000 Part
6C. It is used for backscattering the passive tag response, through absorption or reflection of the
transmitted RF energy. The waveform of FM0 is shown in Figure 57(b). FM0 encoding determines
its value by examining the level in its bit window. As shown in Figure 57(b), unlike Differential
Manchester Encoding if an transition occurs in the middle of the bit window, this encodes a bit-
’0’. If there is no transition in the bit window, this encodes a bit-’1’. In addition, FM0 requires
121
inverting level at every symbol (e.g. bit window) boundary. Therefore, the starting level of each
bit encoding is based on the ending level of the previous bit. For example, “01” encoding can be
represented by either “high-low” followed by “high” or “low-high” followed by “low”.
The textual representation of FM0 is shown in Figure 59. The description of FM0 is similar
to that of Differential Manchester except that each bit value has four different representations
corresponding to each of the four data rates. Also the encoding for ’1’ is simpler, as it does not
have a transition within the bit window and as such has no & in the waveform description.
The physical layer encodings for FM0 are shown in Figure 57(b). Unlike PIE, FM0 is a fixed
period encoding. The data rate of FM0 can be one of several discrete values as specified by the ISO
18000 Part 6C standard. These values include 160, 256, 320, and 640 kbps. The corresponding bit
window periods are 6.2, 3.9, 3.1, and 1.5 µs with an error tolerance of 7%, 10%, 10%, and 15%,
respectively. To encode a ’0’, there must be a transition at the middle of a bit window. To encode
a ’1’ there is no transition within a bit window. However, between two adjacent bits there must be
a transition at the edge of the bit window.
6.3.1.5 ModifiedMiller Encoding Modified Miller encoding [107] is an encoding scheme that
is often employed in near field communication, or communication of 10 cm or less [108]. Modified
Miller encoding has a low pulse either at the beginning of the bit window to encode a ’0’, or delayed
by half a period to encode a ’1’. However, if a ’0’ is proceeded by a ’1’ the ’0’ is encoded with no
low pulse at all. This is shown in Figure 60.
T = 9.4µs
1bit 1/2bit 1/2bit 1/2bit 1/2bit 1bit
bit ‘0’ bit ‘1’ bit ‘1’ bit ‘0’ after bit ‘1’
4 µs 4 µs
Figure 60: Continuous waveform for bits ’0’ and ’1’ of Modified Miller encoding.
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To represent this in the waveform description text file, we introduce a new field, Vprev, which
corresponds to the previously encoded value. In the example from Figure 61, the modified Miller
encoding is shown for a period of 9.4 µs. To encode a ’0’ we either see a pulse at the beginning of
the window if the current bit was proceeded by a ’0’, or no pulse if it was proceeded by a ’1’. The
encoding for ’1’ does not specify a Vprev value.
’0’: if Vprev = ’0’ then Sig = ’0’ for 4 us & ’1’ for5. 4 us;
if Vprev = ’1’ then Sig = ’1’ for 9.4 us;
T = 9.4 us; A = 5%;
’1’: Sig = ’1’ for 4.7 us & ’0’ for 4 us & ’1’ for 0.7 us;
T = 9.4 us; A = 5%;
Figure 61: Textual description of Modified Miller Encoding.
The preamble in an RFID packet alerts the system that a transmission packet is beginning. It
typically includes a sequence of several pulses that are different from the encoded values in the
encoding. The preamble must be matched exactly before any data transmission can commence.
Figure 62 shows an example preamble using a textual preamble description starting with a 15 µs
pulse followed by 5 µs pulses separated by 10 µs. A typical preamble could continue for several
more pulses.
preamble: pre = ’1’ for 15 us & ’0’ for 15 us & ’1’ for 15 us
& ’0’ for 15 us & ’1’ for 15 us & ’0’ for 15 us....;
Figure 62: Preamble textual representation example.
RFID standards may also specify transmission protocols between readers and tags. Thus, cor-
responding transmission characteristics must be declared. For example, the transmission protocol
defined in ISO 18000 Part 7 specifies that an RFID reader transmits the least significant bit (LSb)
first within a byte, and sends the most significant byte (MSB) first within a packet. Each byte is
followed by a stop bit within a packet. The transmission order, MSB or LSB, determines the order
of receiving data, and sending a response.
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The textual description of each protocol ends with transmission characteristics. For example,
the characteristics for ISO 18000 Part 7 are shown in Figure 63. This declares that in a byte the
LSb is first, in a packet the MSB is first, each byte contains nine bits and one of these bits is a stop
bit. Thus, a complete physical layer description file contains a waveform description, preamble
description, and a transmission characteristics description.
transmission: bitOrder = least; byteOrder = most;
byteSize = 9; stopBits = 1;
Figure 63: Serial transmission characteristics
6.3.2 Parse Procedure of Waveform Features
Each encoding has its own waveform properties. Manchester encoding requires a transition in the
middle of each fixed-size bit window. Differential Manchester encoding determines the bit value
by examining the transistion at the boundary of each bit window. PIE encoding uses different
sized bit windows to determine the bit value. FM0 encoding requires a transition at the boundary
of each bit window. Modified Miller encoding contains multiple transitions within one bit window.
Table 13 lists a summary of waveform features for five encodings.
Table 13: The summary of waveform features for five encodings.
Number of Bit Window Dependency Bit Period Accuracy Error
Encodings Transitions Fixed Floating Level Value (µs) (%) (%)
M2 1 X U/D5 U/D U/D
DM3 1 X X U/D U/D U/D
PIE 1 X U/D U/D U/D
FM0 0/1 X X U/D U/D U/D
MM4 0/1/2 X X U/D U/D U/D
2M is the abbreviation of Manchester encoding.
3DM is the abbreviation of Differential Manchester encoding.
4MM is the abbreviation of Modified Miller encoding.
5U/D is the abbreviation of User Defined.
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The RFID System Class, declared as the top-level class, contains two private classes, Signal
Class and Preamble Class, as shown in Figure 64. The RFID System Class stores waveform fea-
tures captured by the parse function call, such as the “Number of Transitions”, “Bit Window”,
“Dependency”, “Bit Period”, “Accuracy”, and “Error” . The Signal Class records the signal en-
coding information and the Preamble Class records the preamle encoding information.
The Signal Class uses a List data structure to contain encoding information for each bit value.
As an example in Figure 64, the Signal Class contains Bit-’0’ and Bit-’1’ signal classes.
Each Bit-value Signal Class is composed of aList of type Signal Feature Class. The Signal Feature
Class is a parent class of Level-feature and Edge-feature classes.
Figure 65 indicates how to develop aList of type Signal Feature Class from a textual waveform
description. For instance, ’0’: Sig = ’1’ for 18 us & ’0’ for 18 us describes
the encoding scheme for bit-’0’ of Manchester encoding, as an example in Figure 65(a). This
waveform description is parsed into three signal features: level-high, edge-falling, and level-low
features. This feature list is developed for the Bit-’0’ Signal Class. The Bit-’1’ Signal Class is
constructed by using the same approach as shown in Figure 65(b). It is composed of three signal
features: level-low, edge-rising, and level-high features. Finally, the RFID System Class con-
tains detailed information on the encoding schemes which are utilized to generate encoder/decoder
VHDL code.
Each Signal Feature Class includes details on encoding information such as level value and
timing requirements. For example in Figure 65(a), Feature 1 contains the encoding information
such that Level(High) for 18µs with an accuracy of 12.5%. Feature 2 contains the encoding
information such as: the Edge(Falling) transition occurring at 18µs with an accuracy of 12.5%.
6.3.3 Waveform Feature Library and VHDL Generation
The physical layer waveform feature library in Figure 51 is a collection of basic hardware-based
components corresponding to various waveform features. For example, this set contains a hardware
based edge detector, a sampling counter, sampling registers, serial-to-parallel hardware blocks,
first-in-first-out (FIFO) blocks, and other basic blocks as predefined components in the library.
These components are programmable and designed to fit different user defined parameters specified
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Figure 64: Conceptual diagram of the PARSE procedure.
in the textual description from Section 6.3.1. A hardware-based edge detector for instance, can be
used for detecting only a raising edge, only a falling edge, or either edge. Similarly, a sampling
counter can vary based on sampling rates corresponding to the different data toggling rates and/or
different duty cycles of bit data in the description.
Waveform variables are parameters that are captured from the waveform description file. These
parameters are used to describe the physical layer characteristics of an encoding mechanism in
a way that the the synthesis process can understand. Thus, the synthesis process translates the
textual description into the parameters for the feature library and maps the parameters to the correct
hardware component.
A bit window period is a simple example of a waveform characteristic. A bit window can
contain a transition at a particular time during the period. Another characteristic is the direction of
this transition. From Figure 54(a), the Manchester encoding requires a 50% duty cycle waveform
with a period of 36 µs where the direction determines the value. A ’1’ has identical features to a
’0’ except that it is composed of a rising edge at the middle of a bit window as opposed to a falling
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(a) Bit ’0’ of Manchester encoding. (b) Bit ’1’ of Manchester encoding.
Figure 65: Developing a feature list of bit-’0’ signal class and bit-’1’ signal class.
edge. Because the waveform is a continuous wave, a transition may also occur at the edge of two
adjacent bits depending on the values of these windows.
The bit rate for a waveform with a period of 36 µs is 27.7 kbps. Because of the 50% duty cycle,
a transition occurs at the middle of a bit window and logic levels may change between bit windows.
Therefore, the data signal toggling rate is 55.4kbps. The sampling rate (fs) must be at least two
times faster than the toggling frequency (ft) of the target signal: fs = 2× ft. Since the data signal
toggling rate is 55.4kbps (ft) the minimum sampling rate is 110.8kbps, or four times oversampling.
However, the A parameter of the description tells us the typical fluctuation that might occur in the
signal, which was specified as 12.5%. Thus, a minimum of eight times oversampling should be
used for edge detection and synchronization.
An overview of the general waveform detection circuit is shown in Figure 66. This circuit
contains a preamble detection circuit, an edge detection circuit used for synchronization with the
incoming waveform, a timer circuit for signaling the controlling state machine to change states, a
sampling register file for converting levels and edges into decoded bit values, and a serial to par-
allel converter for building bytes from the incoming bits. The system clock speed is also variable
based on the required sampling by the circuit.
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Figure 66: General waveform detection circuit.
The data transmission begins after a valid preamble is detected by the start signal. The
edge detection circuit shown in Figure 67 is used to keep in synchronization with the incoming
waveform. For every system cycle in which the value changes, it signals the timer that an edge has
occurred.
The timer circuit shown in Figure 68 controls the sampling times used to check for level or
value changes in the incoming waveform. The timer circuit contains counters that count system
cycles until the next sampling window. Whenever the timer matches the time point, the system
samples the value of the decoded data for the further comparison. Thus, the hardware library
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XOR
Figure 67: Edge detection circuit.
contains parameters for the number of time points, n, to sample, the number of cycles to count
between each sample, N0, N1, ..., Nn−1,and the bit width of the counter which is log2 max(N).
Recall the example in Figure 65(a). Feature 1 contains the encoding information such as:
Level(High) for 18µs with an accuracy of 12.5%. In this example, four time points are needed:
(t1, t2) represents the period of level-high, and (t3, t4) represents the range of the accuracy. For
the edge transition example, Feature 2 in Figure 65(a) contains the encoding information such
as: Edge(Falling) transition occurring at 18µs with an accuracy of 12.5%. In this edge-feature
example, Feature 2 needs two time points: (t5, t6) represents the range of the falling transition.
The timer signals become inputs into an automatically generated finite state machine (FSM)
controller circuit. The FSM uses the timer signals and the sampling registers block to determine
the actual encoded values. The sampling registers circuit, shown in Figure 69, samples two data
values when signaled by the controller and reports back whether there has been a rising edge (’0’
followed by a ’1’), a falling edge (’1’ followed by a ’0’), or a constant level (’1’ or ’0’). Based
on these values, the controller traverses states to match one of the bit conditions specified in the
textual description. It can also base this on one or more previously seen values seen in the serial
stream with the previous value signal.
The controller uses the synchronization signal Edge out to tell the timer when to reset with
the Sync reset signal. For cases where the bit window is not fixed, a bit may be determined
before all timers have expired as with PIE encoded values of ’0.’ The controller can reset the timer
early in these cases to begin looking for the next bit.
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Figure 68: Timer circuit schematic.
Finally, once a bit is determined it is fed into the serial to parallel circuit. This circuit, shown
in Figure 70, has parameters such as the number of bits per byte and the direction of shifting. For
MSb first the circuit shifts bits into the register to the left and for LSb first the circuit shifts bits to
the right. When buffering the whole packet a similar shifting technique is used for most and least
significant bytes (MSB and LSB).
6.3.4 Synthesis Process and VHDL Generation
The synthesis process from the textual description is primarily based on discovering sampling
points based on the waveform properties. For example consider the modified Miller encoding
from Figure 60. The basic waveforms for ’0’ and ’1’ with an inverse pulse indicate sampling both
during the pulse and outside the pulse. The synthesis process first selects sampling points in the
center of a level region, thus at 2 µs and 6.7 µs for a ’0’ and at 2.7 µs, 6.7 µs, and 9.05 µs for
a ’1.’ First, the 9.05 µs is discarded, because the signal is high for all three descriptions. 6.7 µs
is retained directly, because it matches both the ’1’ and ’0’ directly. The 2 µs and 2.7 µs values
are determined to represent the same sampling window as they are within stable regions for both
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Figure 69: Sampling registers circuit schematic.
the ’1’ and ’0’ waveforms. As a result, a value within the range of 2 to 2.7 may be selected for a
sampling point.
The controller FSM is generated to detect different sequences of features for each encoded bit
in a manner similar as a numeric sequence detector. For example, if there is a rising edge between
the samples, it is a ’0,’ a falling edge indicates a ’1,’ and a constant level high is a ’0.’ Both versions
of ’0’ can be checked against the previous value.
For a PIE encoding (Figure 57(a)) there are three sampling points to consider. This is demon-
strated for the first description of each ’0’ and ’1’ from Figure 58. According to the description,
a falling edge occurs between 2.9 and 4.2 µs making this an “invalid detection region.” Thus for
a ’0’ the sampling points are 1.45 µs, and 5.225 µs. Because the period is not fixed for a ’1’ and
the “invalid detection region” and period completion time overlap, the system can move into active
sampling mode. Because a falling edge has not occurred by 4.2 µs, one must occur between 6.1
and 10.5 µs. A timer indicates when 6.1 µs have elapsed, then the FSM looks for an edge before
the timer indicates 10.5 µs. Finally, upon seeing a second edge, the FSM begins a new bit window.
The process for encoding these values appropriately is much simpler than the detection pro-
cess. The process requires a parallel to serial block complementary to the serial to parallel block.
Each bit waveform is generated with a very simple controller FSM that uses timers to traverse
states, with each state outputting one particular level. This is a fairly straightforward conversion
process from the textual representation.
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Figure 70: Serial-to-parallel circuit schematic.
VHDL code generation is the final phase of the synthesis flow. The structure of the block is
shown in Figure 66. Several of the included libraries are parameterized with VHDL generic
constructs for specified parameters including the timer and serial to parallel blocks. The FSM
controller is entirely generated by the synthesis engine using a generic for the number of timer
signals to include.
6.4 RESULTS
Hardware was generated for the five encodings; Manchester, differential Manchester, PIE, FM0,
and modified Miller. We implemented these hardware blocks on several different reprogrammable
targets we use for RFID prototyping including a Xilinx Spartan III 400 FPGA, an Actel Fusion
AFS90 flash-based FPGA, and a Xilinx Coolrunner II CPLD. The Spartan III was selected because
we have a credit card sized prototyping board with this device for demonstration. The Fusion was
selected because it is relatively low power and contains non-volatile programming bits and memory
for passive prototyping. The CPLD was selected because of its favorable power properties. We
also synthesized these designs into standard cell ASIC netlists for comparison.
Performance and area estimates were made using post synthesis, placed and routed netlist
simulations of the designs. Power estimation was completed using stimuli from the simulation
with vendor supplied tools. For the ASIC implementation area and performance estimates are
from Design Compiler. The cell library used for synthesizing the design is 0.16 µm technology.
Power estimates are from post synthesis simulation using Mentor Graphics Modelsim and analysis
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using Synopsys Primepower. Results for the physical layer synthesis flow are shown Table 14 with
manual results shown in parenthesis for comparison. Details on the encoders have been omitted
because their hardware is trivial compared to that of the decoders in each case. Based on our
studies, in terms of area and power consumption, the automatically generated designs are very
close to manually generated designs and in most cases are more efficient.
Table 14: Statistics of decoder blocks with the automatically generated value followed by manual
design value.
Man Diff Man PIE FM0 MM
Freq 1 MHz 1 MHz 10 MHz 4 MHz 10 MHz
Xilinx Spartan 3 XC3S400: area in cells, power in mW
Area 108 (108) 103 (98) 192 (216) 109 (113) 119 (105)
Power 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.31 (0.39) 0.10 (0.12) 0.25 (0.31)
Altera Fusion AFS90: area in cells, power in mW
Area 140 (153) 146 (206) 276 (306) 151 (159) 159 (142)
Power 0.10 (0.18) 0.11 (0.20) 1.25 (1.02) 0.40 (0.51) 1.06 (1.10)
Xilinx Coolrunner II 256: area in gates , power in mW
Area 314 (310) 329 (293) 625 (586) 335 (315) 372 (356)
Power 0.18 (0.18) 0.19 (0.18) 1.98 (2.13) 0.65 (0.62) 1.62 (1.53)
Oki 0.16µm cell-based ASIC: area in µm2, power in µW
Area 3585 (4128) 3998 (4323) 10713 (13414) 5134 (6058) 7299 (7218)
Power 0.61 (0.47) 0.63 (0.49) 4.31 (3.98) 1.74 (1.94) 3.71 (4.51)
The Manchester and Differential Manchester decoders have similar architectures. The size and
power consumption are very close. These decoders also require relatively low sampling rates of 1,
4, and 10 MHz. The modified Miller encoding requires a similar area to Manchester encoding but
requires considerably more power. This is due to the ten time higher sampling frequency. FM0 and
PIE encoding requires significantly higher area (2-3 times) more than the other encodings. Due
to the increased sampling rate and complexity, these encodings require significantly more power
consumption.
Based on our studies, in general, the automatically generated decoding designs require 20
%less in gate/cell than hand generated designs. However, simplified state machines (decoder con-
trol units) of the automatically generated decoding designs cause more energy consumption. Ac-
cording to our experimental results, the automatically generated decoding designs consume 7%
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more than normal hand generated designs. As a result, the FPGAs provide a 0.1 to 2mW level so-
lution, while the ASIC provides a 0.6 to 5µW level solution for decoders generated by our Physical
Layer Synthesis tool.
6.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter presents a physical layer design automation flow intended for RFID tags. The RFID
Physical Layer Generator automatically generates physical layer encoding and decoding blocks in
hardware through the description of waveform features of the encoding. We have implemented and
compared five different physical layer encodings, Manchester, differential Manchester, PIE, FM0,
and modified Miller encodings.
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7.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
7.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Active RFID technology has several challenges related to energy dissipation, inadequate security,
system verification capabilities, and design cost. They are enumerated as follows:
1. Unnecessary Power Dissipation: Power is dissipated in a traditional active RFID tag to many
factors such as an always-on active transmitter and tag controller. If the power dissipation
can be reduced, battery life of the tag can be extended or contain additional capabilities, such
as data encryption. It is important to develop a new technique to assist active RFID tags to
decrease power consumption.
2. The Need of Low-power Security Features: Traditional active RFID tags provide security
features by through their processor-based controller which increases the power consumption
overhead. This situation creates a security strength versus energy trade-off. However, RFID
systems require security features to be implemented using techniques that provide a high de-
gree of protection while not significantly increasing the complexity of the system as complexity
can increase power consumption and implementation cost. Thus, it is important to develop new
security techniques that take advantage of the fundamental properties of RFID communication
such as physical layer protocols, low-power communication extensions, sleep modes, physical
implementation variations, etc.
3. A Verification Platform for RFID Systems: RFID technology needs a verification technique
for the network traffic of RFID systems. A computer network debugging tool, tcpdump as an
example, allows the user to intercept TCP/IP packets and display them. Upon the collected
packet information, the user is capable of verifying and analyzing the network, monitoring the
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traffic, and even providing a protection to the network. However, there is no tool like tcpdump
in RFID systems, which provides detailed network traffic of RFID communications from the
system level perspective. It is essential to develop a new verification platform which provides
a system-level verification for RFID systems.
4. Increasing Design Cost and Time: RFID technology confronts the challenges of the increas-
ing cost for designing and implementing a variety of RFID systems. In order to meet the
requirements for different RFID circumstances and support extensive RFID applications, mul-
tiple standards exist. In most applications, RFID tag and reader hardware/software must be
specifically designed for each application. This keeps overall design time long and the system
cost high. It is essential to develop a design automation tool for reducing the design cost and
design time.
7.2 CONCLUSION
This dissertation provides a multi-domain solution to improve the power consumption and security,
while also reducing design time and verification time of RFID systems. In particular, I describe (1)
a smart buffering technique to allow a tag to remain in a standby mode until addressed, (2) a multi-
layer, low-power technique that transcends the passive-transaction, physical, and data layers to
provide secure transactions, (3) an FPGA-based traffic profiler system to generate traces of RFID
communications for both tag verification and power analysis without the need for actual hardware,
and (4) a design automation technique to create layer encoding and decoding blocks in hardware
suitable for RFID tags.
This dissertation presents four contributions for these four problems: (1) The Smart Buffer
technique is designed and developed to avoid the waste of the power dissipation. As a result,
based on a Markov Process energy model, the smart buffering technique is shown to reduce power
consumption by 82%, 88%, and 90% over a traditional active tag; (2) The multi-layer, low-power
security technique provides protection against malicious reader attacks to disable the tag, to steal
the information stored in or communicated to the device. It provides security features, such as
authentication and encryption mechanisms, without increasing the complexity of the tag system
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too much. The power consumption overhead for implementing these layers of security is increased
approximately 13% over the basic tag controller; (3) In addition, the FPGA-based traffic profiler
system has been developed and implemented as the new verification platform for RFID systems.
It is capable of generating traces for ISO 18000 part 6C (EPC Gen2) protocol. The trace files pro-
vide insight information of RFID communication transactions; and (4) The Physical Layer Design
Automation tool is developed and implemented to generate encoding/decoding hardware blocks
automatically. It is capable of reducing the design cost and time. This tool has been verified with
five data-encoding protocols used in or related to RFID systems. Consequently, any power con-
sumption of five designs is less than 5 µW. Furthermore, compared with five designs implemented
by hand, the difference of the power consumption between two of them is less than 7% at most.
7.2.1 Primary Contributions
Detailed conclusions of four contributions are enumerated as follows:
1. Smart Buffer Technique: This dissertation proposed the Smart Buffer technique, and its ar-
chitecture. The Smart Buffer allows a tag to remain in a sleep/standby mode until addressed.
This chapter also illustrates a RFID testing circumstance in a testing scenario and an associated
Markov Process model to analyze the efficiency of power saving.
Two observations are made that energy is wasted mainly when (1) irrelevant point-to-point
commands are sent to a group of tags, and when (2) the receiver of each tag always listens
to the incoming signals. Based on these observations, the Smart Buffer technique is proposed
to assist power saving for a passive active RFID tags (PARTs). The Smart Buffer is capable
of filtering irrelevant commands and remaining the microcontroller in sleep mode until it is
addressed. Three testing scenarios have been built for testing the power efficiency for a tag
with or without the Smart Buffer technique. In the scenario one, an interrogator only send
one point-to-point command to every tag. In the scenario two and three, an interrogator only
send 50 and 100 point-to-point commands to every tag. Our experiments show that the average
energy saved by adding the Smart Buffer is 82%, 88%, and 90% per tag where N = 100 for
scenarios one, two, and three, respectively.
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2. Multi-layer Low-power Security: The multi-layer, low-power security technique provides
advanced secure transactions on the passive-transaction, physical, and data layers. The exper-
imental results demonstrate the implementation of our encryption algorithm has resistance to
the side-channel attacks.
A secure transmission methodology for PART is presented where our primary concern is func-
tionality and power (battery lifetime). Our technique provides layers of security as multiple
levels of defense against attack. The passive activation layer is encoded to prevent a malicious
reader from continuously activating the tag to drain its battery or to attempt to issue malicious
commands. This layer of security provides an authentication mechanism for tag systems. The
physical layer is encrypted using a mixture of Manchester and Differential Manchester encod-
ing. Finally, the data itself is encrypted using the AES implemented to avoid the key from
being broken using DPA. These two layers of security provide the encryption mechanisms for
tag systems.
These security modifications are implemented with a minimal power overhead from the actual
RFID transaction power required. The burst switch detection circuit requires < 1µW when
operating at 100 kHz even for 32-bit values (.58µW). The modified Manchester, Differential
Manchester decoder requires approximately 1µW of additional power (1.11µW). Finally, the
AES operation requires a maximum of approximately 7µW at 10 kHz (7.031µW), which is
more than sufficient for the data transmission speed. Based on the active tag primitive logic
controller implemented in the same hardware, depending on the number of primitives included
(up to 40) the power consumed is 63-65 µW [86]. Thus, the overhead for the security is just
under 9µW (8.721 µW) which is 13.4% increase over the active tag logic alone.
3. FPGA-based Traffic Profiler: The FPGA-based traffic profiler system generates traces of
RFID communications for both tag verification and power analysis without the need of ac-
tual hardware. It demonstrates how to use the generated traffic trace file to profile the power
consumption of the communication.
Two case studies illustrate the usage of the trace file generated by the RFID traffic profile
system. Based on the trace files, a user is capable of understanding the details on the com-
munication transaction and verifying the RFID network traffic. The first case study illustrates
the method of analyzing the RFID network. For example, in order to study the collisions be-
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tween tags, it is important to understand the information of the slot counter from tags. Every
tag has its own methodology to pick the slot counter or to generate the slot counter based on
the Q value. However, there is no way to obtain the slot counter value by using a traditional
network analyzer or spectrum analyzer. The RFID traffic profile system provides an alternative
approach to obtain this information for the users.
The second case illustrates the power estimation for the RFID communication by utilizing the
RFID traffic profile system. By sending “auto read” command from the SAMSys reader for
two seconds, a tag needs to consume 2.765 µJ for processing Query, 0.471 µJ for processing
QueryAdj, 0.796 µJ for processing QueryRep, 0.047 µJ for processing Nak, and 0.421
µJ for processing Ack.
4. Physical Layer Design Automation Tool: The physical layer design automation tool is the
design automation technique to generate encoding and decoding hardware blocks automati-
cally for the physical layer data encodings. The main benefit of creating this tool is to shorten
the design time for a variety of RFID standards and applications.
This tool has been verified with five data-encoding protocols used in or related to RFID sys-
tems. They are the Manchester, the Differential Manchester, FM0, Pulse-Interval Encoding
(PIE), and Modified Miller encodings.
Based on our studies, in general, the automatically generated decoding designs require 20
%less in gate/cell than hand generated designs. However, simplified state machines (decoder
control units) of the automatically generated decoding designs cause more energy consump-
tion. According to our experimental results, the automatically generated decoding designs
consume 7% more than normal hand generated designs. As a result, the FPGAs provide a 0.1
to 2mW level solution, while the ASIC provides a 0.6 to 5µW level solution for decoders gener-
ated by our Physical Layer Synthesis tool. Due to the increased sampling rate and complexity,
these encodings require significantly more power consumption.
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7.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Future directions of the dissertation include security architecture for RFID systems, verification
platform of RFID systems, and integration with RFID compiler.
7.3.1 Security Architecture for RFID Systems
The multi-layer low-power security provides an advanced low-power security mechanism for RFID
systems. This technique is designed and developed from a hardware perspective. A complete
security architecture is needed for RFID systems to cover not only the hardware portion, but also
the software implementation. For example, a key distribution service is a good direction to be
concerned. Furthermore, adding security primitives to RFID basic primitives for RFID compiler
might be another research challenge. A future direction of extending the research of the multi-layer
low-power security will be a demonstratable prototype of security architecture for RFID systems.
7.3.2 Verification Platform of RFID Systems
The FPGA-based traffic profile system proposed in this dissertation is capable of verifying RFID
communication transactions. Since it is designed on an FPGA device, the hardware-portion design
can be reloaded based on the “System Under Verification”, which might be different RFID stan-
dard for different testing case. A verification platform for either a single RFID system or multiple
RFID systems is an interesting direction.
7.3.3 Integration with RFID Compiler
The physical layer design automation tool is capable of automatically generating physical encod-
ing/decoding block in hardware. The RFID compiler proposed in Dontharaju’s dissertation [102]
is capable of automatically generating a hardware-based RFID controller based on the user’s script
of RFID specification. It is an interesting research topic to develop a new RFID compiler integrat-
ing with the physical layer design automation tool. Such that the new RFID compiler is capable of
automatically generating the whole chip for an RFID tag when the users only provide the script of
RFID specifications and the description of waveform features.
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